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Second Amended Complaint. filed 1014107 ..................................................................................... 105 
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Date Code User Judge 
1211 312004 TRAN SHULTS Transcript Filed Joel E. Tingey 
111 012006 NCOT EDDY New Case Filed-All Other Richard T St. Clair 
SMIS EDDY Summons Issued Richard T St. Clair 
NOAP EDDY Plaintiff: American Pension Services, Inc. Notice Richard T St. Clair 
Of Appearance Daniel C. Green 
EDDY Filing: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No Richard T St. Clair 
Prior Appearance Paid by: Green, Daniel C. 
(attorney for American Pension Services, Inc.) 
Receipt number: 0001426 Dated: 1/10/2006 
Amount: $82.00 (Check) 
COMP EDDY Complaint Filed Richard T St. Clair 
EDDY Lis Pendens Richard T St. Clair 
APPL EDDY Application for Pre-Judgment Writ of Attachment Richard T St. Clair 
andlor Temporary Restraining Order and Request 
for Order to Show Cause Hearing 
AFFD EDDY Affidavit in Support of Application for Writ of Richard T St. Clair 
Attachment andlor Temporary Restraining Order 
EDDY Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Richard T St. Clair 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
American Pension Services, Inc. Receipt number: 
0001479 Dated: 1/10/2006 Amount: $1.00 
(Cash) 
EDDY Temporary Restraining Order Richard T St. Clair 
OSCl EDDY Order To Show Cause Issued Richard T St. Clair 
111 112006 BNDC DOOLITTL Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 1657 Dated Richard T St. Clair 
111 112006 for 5000.00) 
NOTC DOOLITTL Notice of Posting of Cash Bond Richard T St. Clair 
1/23/2006 DOOLllTL Filing: I IA  - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than Richard T St. Clair 
$1000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Holden 
Kidwell Receipt number: 0003054 Dated: 
1/23/2006 Amount: $52.00 (Check) 
NOAP DOOLITTL Defendant: Cornerstone Home Builders, LLc Richard T St. Clair 
Notice Of Appearance Karl R. Decker 
NOTC DOOLITTL Notice of Intention to Appear and Produce Richard T St. Clair 
Testimony and Evidence 
NOTC DOOLITTL Notice of Intention to Produce Testimony and Richard T St. Clair 
Evidence (fax) 
I12412006 HRHD SOUTHWIC Hearing Held Richard T St. Clair 
MJNE SOUTHWIC Minute Entry Richard T St. Clair 
STIP SOUTHWIC Stipulation to release lis pendens and vacate Richard T St. Clair 
temporary restraining order 
ORDR SOUTHWIC Order releasing lis pendens and vacating Richard T St. Clair 
temporary restrining order 
NOTC EDDY Notice of Intention to Produce Testimony and Richard T St. Clair 
Evidence I. 
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Cash Bond Exonerated (Amount 5,000.00) Richard T St. Clair 
Return Of Service 1-12-06 (Cornerstone Richard T St. Clair 
Home Builders, LLC by serving Wendy Nelson) 








Order releasing lis pendens Richard T St. Clair 
Order Setting Pretrial Conferenceltrial Richard T St. Clair 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/20/2007 10:OO Richard T St. Clair 
AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Richard T St. Clair 
03/07/2007 08:30 AM) 
HRSC SOUTHWIC 
Notice of Withdrawal (Karl Decker fldefendant) Richard T St. Clair 
(no order provided) 
Filing: I IA  - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than Richard T St. Clair 
$1000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Dunn & 
Clark Receipt number: 0026581 Dated: 
6/22/2006 Amount: $52.00 (Check) 
Defendant: Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC Richard T St. Clair 
Notice Of Appearance Penelope North Shaul 
Amended Complaint Filed Richard T St. Clair 
Notice Of Service (Plaintiffs 1st Discovery to Richard T St. Clair 
Defendant) 
Filing: I1 B - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than Richard T St. Clair 
$1000 With Prior Appearance Paid by: Shaul, 
Penelope North (attorney for Cornerstone Home 
Builders, LLC) Receipt number: 0044919 Dated: 
10/24/2006 Amount: $14.00 (Check) 
Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Richard T St. Clair 
Complaint 
Notice Of Service (Discovery) Richard T St. CIair 
Notice Of Service Plaintiffs Responses to Richard T St. Clair 
Defendant's 1st Discovery Requests 
Joint Motion to Continue Trial Richard T St. Clair 
RTS read motion to continue did NOT sign order Richard T St. Clair 
Notice Of Hearing 2/22/07 @ 9:00 a.m. Richard T St. Clair 
Notice of Taking Deposition 31517 @ 9:00 a.m. Richard T St. Clair 
Notice of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Cornerstone Richard T St. Clair 
Home Builders, LLC 
Hearing Held Richard T St. Clair 
Motion to continue JT GRANTED Richard T St. Clair 































SOUTHWIC Order Setting Pretrial Conferenceltrial - 
AMENDED 
Richard T St. Clair 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Richard T St. Clair 
03/07/2007 08:30 AM2 Continued 
CONT SOUTHWIC 
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Date Code User Judae 
CONT SOUTHWIC Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 03/20/2007 Richard T St. Clair 
10:OO AM: Continued 





SOUTHWIC Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Richard T St. Clair 
06/06/2007 08:30 AM) 
Notice Of Service (Plaintiffs Supplemental Richard T St. Clair 
Responses to Defendant's Discovery Requests) 
AMENDED Notice of Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Richard T St. Ciair 
American Pension Services, INc. 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum - Brad Richard T St. Clair 
Kendrick 






PHILLIPS Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Brad Richard T St. Ciair 
Kendrick 4/17/07 @ 9:00 a.m. 
NDDT PHILLIPS Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Martin Pool Richard T St. Clair 
4/17/07 @ 1:30 p.m. 
PHILLIPS 
WILLIAMS 
Consent to Waiver of Jury Trial 
Notice Of Service of Defendant's Second Set of 
lnterrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents 
Order 
Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs 2nd Discovery To 
Defendant 
Motion for Summary Judgment ***FAX*** 
Notice Of Hearing 5/22/07 @ 9:00 a.m. 
***FAX*** 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 5-22-07 @ 9:00 a.m. 
Richard T St. Clair 





Richard T St. Clair 





Richard T St. Clair 
Richard T St. Clair 









Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Richard T St. Clair 
Richard T St. Clair 
Richard T St. Clair 
Richard T St. Clair 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing 5-22-07 @ 9:00 a.m 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Martin Pool 
Affidavit of Brad Kendrick 
Affidavit of Stephen J. Muhonen 









Richard T St. Ciair 
Richard T St. Clair 
Richard T St. Clair 
Richard T St. Clair Notice Of Service (Plaintiffs Responses to 
Defnedant's 2nd Discovery to Defendant) 
Notice Of Service 5/3/07 (PI 2nd Suppl Resp 
to Def Discovery Requests) 
2nd Affidavit of Scott ~a l l&n  
NTOS PHILLIPS Richard T St. Clair 
Richard T St. Clair 
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51812007 AFFD PHILLIPS 2nd Affidavit of Penny North Shaul Richard T St. Ciair 
RESP PHILLIPS Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Memorandum Richard T St. Clair 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
AFFD PHILLIPS 2nd Affidavit of Stephen J. Muhonen ***FAX*** Richard T St. Ciair 
RESP PHILLIPS Piaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Richard T St. Ciair 
Summary Judgment ***FAXe** 
511 012007 RESP DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Richard T St. Clair 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD DOOLlTTL 2nd Affidavit of Stephen J. Muhonen Richard T St. Clair 
511 112007 NOTH DOOLITTL Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Richard T St. Ciair 
Compel Response to Discovery Requests 
MOTN DOOLITTL Motion to Compel Response to Defendant's 2nd Richard T St. Clair 
Set of Discovery to Plaintiff 
MEMO DOOLITTL Memorandum in Support of Motion to Copel Richard T St. Clair 
Responses to 2nd Set of Discovery to Plaintiff 
AFFD DOOLITTL Affidavit of Penny North Shaul in Support of Richard T St. Ciair 
Motion to Compel 
AFFD DOOLITTL Affidavit of Scott R. Tallman In Support of Motion Richard T St. Ciair 
to Compel 
511 512007 ST1 P DOOLITTL Stipulation to Shorten Time for Hearing on Richard T St. Ciair 
Defendant's Motion to Compel 
AFFD DOOLITTL 2nd Affidavit of Penny North Shaul in Support of Richard T St. Ciair 
Motion to Compel 
DOOLITTL Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Response to Richard T St. Clair 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
TAWlLLlAMS Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Richard T St. Ciair 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
AFFD TAWlLLlAMS Third Affidavit of Stephen J. Muhonen Richard T St. Ciair 
5/1612007 NTOS DOOLITTL Notice Of Service of Defendant's Answers to Richard T St. Ciair 
Plaintiffs 2nd Discovery to Defendant 
NDDT DOOLITTL Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Bonneviile Richard T St. Ciair 
Land &Titie Company 
511 712007 NOAP PHILLIPS Notice Of Appearance (W Beard as co-counsel Richard T St. Clair 
for def) 
ORDR SOUTHWIC Order Shortening Time For Hearing on Defs Richard T St. Clair 
Motion to compel 
5/21/2007 RESP DOOLITTL Response to Defendant's Motion to Compel Richard T St. Clair 
5/22/2007 HRHD SOUTHWIC Hearing Held Richard T St. Clair 
MINE SOUTHWIC Minute Entry Richard T St. Ciair 
5/29/2007 MOTN DOOLITTL Defendant's Motion to Continue Court Trial Richard T St. Clair 
MOTN DOOLITTL Defendant's Motion to Extend Discovery Deadline Richard T St. Ciair 
513012007 NTOS DOOLITTL Notice Of Service of Defendant's 2nd Richard T St. Clair 
Supplemental Answers to Plaintiffs <st Discovery 
to Defendant 4 
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Date Code User Judge 
5/30/2007 RESP DOOLITTL Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Richard T St. Clair 




DOOLITTL Response to Defendant's Motion to Continue 
Court Trial (fax) 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Continue 
Court Trial 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to 
Extend Discovery Deadline 
Plaintiffs Witness And Exhibit List (fax) 
Defendant's Witness and Exhibit List 
Richard T St. Clair 
DOOLITTL Richard T St. Clair 




Richard T St. Clair 
Richard T St. Ciair 
Richard T St. Ciair NTOS Notice Of Service 5/31/07 (PI Supplemental 
Responses to Defs 2nd Set of Discovery) 
ORDR SOUTHWIC Order granting defs motion to compel discovery 
response 
Richard T St. Clair 
Richard T St. Ciair HRHD SOUTHWIC Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 
06/06/2007 08:30 AM: Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Trial held on 06/19/2007 10:00 
AM: Continued Court trial 
Minute Entry 





Richard T St. Clair 
Order Setting Pretrial Conferenceltrial - 
AMENDED 









Hearing Scheduied (Trial 08/28/2007 10:OO AM) Richard T St. Ciair 
2nd Motion for Summary Judgment Richard T St. Clair 
Notice Of Hearing 7-31-07 @ 9:00 a.m. Richard T St. Ciair 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's 2nd Motion for Richard T St. Clair 







Defendant's 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment Richard T St. Ciair 
Motion for Leave to Amend Answer Richard T St. Ciair 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Richard T St. Clair 
Amend 


















Motion to Shorten Time Richard T St. Ciair 
Notice Of Hearing 7-12-07 @ 'l0:OO a.m. Richard T St. CIair 
Affidavit of Drew Downs 
Affidavit of Harry Segura 
Affidavit of Dean Deyoung 
Richard T St. Ciair 
Richard T St. Ciair 
Richard T St. Ciair 
Affidavit of Dale Henderson 
Affidavit of Curtis DeYoung 
Richard T St, Ciair 
Richard T St. Clair 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs 2nd Motion Richard T St. Clair 
for Summary Judgment 
AMENDED Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Richard T St. Clair 
American Pension Serv ic3 lnc. 7/13/07 @ 
9:00 a.m. 
NDDT PHILLIPS 
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Brief Filed in Support of Defendant's 2nd Motion Richard T St. Clair 
for Summary Judgment (2) 
Hearing Held Richard T St. Clair 
Minute Entry Richard T St. Clair 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 8-3-07 @ 9:00 Richard T St. Clair 
a.m. 
2nd Affidavit of Harry Segura Richard T St. Clair 
2nd Affidavit of Dean DeYoungaffd Richard T St. Clair 
2nd Affidavit of Dale Henderson Richard T St. Clair 
2nd Affidavit of Curtis DeYoung Richard T St. Clair 
2nd Affidavit of Drew Downs Richard T St. Clair 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's 2nd Motion for Richard T St. Clair 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Michael D. Gaffney Richard T St. Clair 
Defendant's Brief Filed Supplementing Its 2nd Richard T St. Clair 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs 2nd Motion for Summary Judgment 
Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Richard T St. Clair 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Appearance Richard T St. Clair 
Jeffery Mandell - Co-Counsel for Plaintiff 
Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum In Support of Richard T St. Clair 
Plaintiffs Second Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
Stipulated Amended Notice of Hearing 8-3-07 Richard T St. Clair 
@ 9:00 a.m. (fax) 
Defendant's Bried Supplementaing Its Second Richard T St. Clair 
Motion For Summary Judgment and In Opposition 
to Plaintiffs Second Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
Hearing Held Richard T St. Clair 
Minute Entry Richard T St. Clair 
Order regarding motions for summary judgment Richard T St. Clair 
Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Richard T St. Clair 
Conclusins of Law 
Amended Defendant's Witness and Exhibit List Richard T St. Clair 
Notice of Offer of Judgment Richard T St. Clair 
Notice Of Service Defendant's Third Richard T St. Clair 
Supplemental Answers to Plaintiffs First 
Discovery Requests 
Plaintiffs Amended Witness and Exhibit List Richard T St. Clair 
Notice Of Service (Plaintiffs 2nd Supplemental Richard T St. Clair 
Responses to Defendant's Discovery Requests) 
bi 
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MEMO DOOLITTL Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Richard T St. Clair 
Dismiss 






Amended Defendant's Witness and Exhibit List Richard T St. Clair 
Plaintiff: Downs, Drew Notice Of Appearance Richard T St. Ciair 
Stephen J. Muhonen 
Plaintiff: Deyoung, Curtis L Notice Of Appearance Richard T St. Clair 
Stephen J. Muhonen 
Plaintiff: Seguara, Harry Notice Of Appearance Richard T St. Clair 
Stephen J. Muhonen 
Plaintiff: Deyoung, Dean G Notice Of Appearance Richard T St. Clair 
Stephen J. Muhonen 
Plaintiff: Henderson, E Dale Notice Of Richard T St. Clair 
Appearance Stephen J. Muhonen 
Defendant's 2nd Amended Exhibit List Richard T St. Clair 








Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Richard T St. Clair 
Strike Notices of Appearance 
MEMO DOOLiTTL 







Defendant's Motion to Shorten Time Richard T St. Clair 
Defendant's Supplemental Exhibit List Richard T St. Ciair 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Exhibit Lit Richard T St. Clair 
8/28/2007 TLST SOUTHWIC Hearing result for Trial held on 08/28/2007 10:OO Richard T St. Clair 











Plaintiffs' Second Supplemental Exhibit List 
Order Shortening Time 
Richard T St. Clair 
Richard T St. Ciair 
Richard T St. Clair Minute Entry 
Judge Change (batch process) 
Defendant's Memorandum RE: Oral Motion to 
AMEND Pursuant to Rule 15(b) *"*FAX*** 
Plaintiffs Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Rule 
15(b) Motion 
Plaintiffs Proprosed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 
Defendant's Post Trial Brief 
Joel E. Tingey 
911 312007 RESP PHILLIPS Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey PHILLIPS 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
TAWILLIAMS 
TAWILLIAMS Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact And 





Order (granting Pl's motion to amend) Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
7 
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OBJECTION to Proposed Judgment ***FAX*** Joel E. Tingey 
Memorandum of Fees and Costs Joel E. Tingey 
Affidavit of Stephen J. Muhonen In Support of Joel E. Tingey 
memorandum of Fees and Costs 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendants OBJECTION Joel E. Tingey 
to Proposed Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Objection to Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs' Proposed Judgment (fax) 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's OBJECTION to Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs Proposed Judgment 10123107 @ 
9:00 a.m. 
Judgment ($105,750.00 for sale of 141 lots) Joel E. Tingey 
Civil Disposition entered for: Cornerstone Home Joel E. Tingey 
Builders, LLC, Defendant; American Pension 
Services, Inc., Plaintiff; Deyoung, Curtis L, 
Plaintiff; Deyoung, Dean G, Plaintiff; Downs, 
Drew, Plaintiff; Henderson, E Dale, Plaintiff; 
Seguara, Harry, Plaintiff. 
order date: 1011 212007 
Case Status Changed: Closed Joel E. Tingey 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Joel E. Tingey 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
American Pension Services, Inc. Receipt number: 
0044407 Dated: 1011512007 Amount: $1.00 
(Cash) 
Defendant's Answer to Second Amended Joel E. Tingey 
Complaint 
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court Joel E. Tingey 
($86.00 Directly to Supreme Court Plus this 
amount to the District Court) Paid by: Shaul, 
Penelope North (attorney for Cornerstone Home 
Builders, LLC) Receipt number: 0044815 Dated: 
1011712007 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: 
Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC (defendant) 
Notice of Appeal Joel E. Tingey 
Appeal Filed in District Court Joel E. Tingey 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Joel E. Tingey 
Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees I Objection to Joel E. Tingey 
Memorandum of Fees and Costs (fax) 
Motion to Disallow Costs and Fees 1 Objection to Joel E. Tingey 
Memoramdum of Fees and Costs (fax) 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal Joel E. Tingey 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 45197 Dated Joel E. Tingey 
I011912007 for 100.00) - Deposit for prepartion of 
Clerk's record on appeal to the supreme court. 
STATUS HAGERTY Case Status Changed: sed pending clerk Joel E. Tingey 
action 74' 
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Motion for Stay of Exeuction of Judgment Joel E. Tingey 
Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Joel E. Tingey 
Against Plaintiff American Pension Services, Inc. 
Amended Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Joel E. Tingey 
Post-Trial Motions/Objection 
NOTH WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS MEMO Defendant's Memorandum of costs and Fees and Joel E. Tingey 
Affidavit of Counsel 
Motion to Shorten Time Joel E. Tingey 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Joel E. Tingey 





Plaintiffs' Respons/Objection to Defendants' Joel E. Tingey 
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for Joel E. Tingey 
Stay of Execution 









Minute Entry Joel E. Tingey 
Memorandum Decision and ORDER on Costs Joel E. Tingey 
and Attorney Fees 
Judgment of Costs and Attorney Fees 
$190,251.74 
Joel E. Tingey JDMT SOUTHWIC 
WILLIAMS Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And Joel E. Tingey 
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid 
by: Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey Receipt 
number: 0047266 Dated: 11/2/2007 Amount: 
$1 .OO (Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Joel E. Tingey 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey Receipt 
number: 0047266 Dated: 11/2/2007 Amount: 
$1 .OO (Check) 
Motion for Order for Writ of Execution and Joel E. Tingey 
Garnishment 
Writ Issued $190,251.74 Bonneville Joel E. Tingey 
Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid Joel E. Tingey 
by: Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey Receipt 


















Order for writ of execution and garnishment Joel E. Tingey 
Motion for Additional Record Joel E. Tingey 
Notice Of Service 12/18/07 @ 9:00 a.m. Joel E. Tingey 
Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 257000.00 ) Joel E. Tingey 
Order Granting Motion to Stay Execution of Joel E. 1-ingey 
Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Joel E. Tingey 
Additional Record 
****FAX*** 
12/18/g @ 9:00 a.m. 
NOTH PHILLIPS 
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1211 812007 ORDR 












Motion for Additional Record ***FAX*** Joel E. Tingey 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And Joel E. Tingey 
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid 
by: Dunn Law Offices Receipt number: 0053602 
Dated: 12/14/2007 Amount: $1.50 (Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Joel E. Tingey 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Dunn Law Offices Receipt number: 0053602 
Dated: 12/14/2007 Amount: $1.00 (Check) 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Joel E. Tingey 
Additonal Record 
Motion for Additional Record Joel E. Tingey 
Stipulation for Additional Record Joel E. Tingey 
Order for Additional Record Joel E. Tingey 
Writ returned, Unsatisfied Joel E. Tingey 
Order for Additional Record (nunc pro tunc to Joel E. Tingey 
12/18/07 document signed and lost) 
Amended Order Granting motion to Stay Joel E. Tingey 
Execution of Judgment and Release of Judgment 
Liens Pursuant to IAR 13(B)(15) 
DANIEL C. GREEN (ISB No. 3213) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208)232-6101 
Fax: (208)232-6109 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 











COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff, AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC., and 
for its cause of action against the above-named Defendant, CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, 
LLC, states and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff, AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC. ("Plaintiff') is a Corporation, 
incorporated by the laws of the State of Utah. Plaintiff has its place of business at 11027 S. State 
Street, Sandy, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant, CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC., (hereafter "Defendant") 
is a Utah Limited Liability Company and is now and at all times relevant hereto has conducted 
COMPLAINT 
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business in the State of Idaho. Defendant's Idaho address is 1675 N. Stevens, Idaho Falls, 
Bonneville County, Idaho. 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
3. On or about January 22,2004, P&B Enterprises, Inc., a Utah Corporation, and S.R. 
Tallman Construction, Inc., aUtah Corporation, as grantors, executed a Corporation Warranty Deed 
transferring certain real property locatedin Bonneville County, Idaho to Defendant. The Corporation 
Warranty Deed was recorded on March 7, 2004 as Bonneville County Recorders Instrume~~t No. 
114631 1. A true and correct copy of the Corporation Warranty Deed and description of the real 
property described therein is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference 
as if set forth fully. 
4. The Plaintiff is informed and believes and therefore alleges that the property was 
acquired by the Defendant for the purpose of subdividing and constructing homes thereon for resale. 
The project was to be completed in five phases. 
5. In order to proceed with the project, Defendant sought investors to inject capital into 
the project. In return, Defendant agreed to provide the investors with a Promissory Note, Deed of 
Trust and Repayment Schedule. 
6. On several prior occasions, Plaintiff had loaned funds to Defendant and each time 
received a Promissory Note and Deed of Trust as agreed. 
7. In reliance upon Defendant's representations and based upon the prior course of 
dealing between the parties, on September 30, 2003, Plaintiff wired to Defendant the sum of 
$226,218.70. A true and correct copy of the wire transfer instructions is attached hereto aExhibit 
"B" and incorporated herein by reference as if set forth fully. 
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8. As a result of interest accrual and other charges, there is currently due and owing to 
Plaintiff the sum of $260,000.00. Despite repeated demands, and contrary to the parties agreement, 
Defendant has failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to provide Plaintiff with a 
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust evidencing the loan and detailing the terms of repayment as 
represented and agreed to by Defendant. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
[Breach of Contract] 
9. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-8 above, and incorporates 
the same herein by reference as if set forth fully. 
10. In exchange for Plaintiffs investment and payment of the sum of $226,218.70, 
Defendant promised to provide to Plaintiff a Promissory Note containing the terms of repayment 
together with a Deed of Trust to secure said Promissory Note. Defendant's failure to provide said 
Proinissory Note and Deed of Trust as described above constitutes a breach of said agreement. 
11. As a result of said breach, Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount which is 
currently unknown and which is to be proven at the time of trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
[Fraud] 
12. Plaintiffrealleges the allegatioils in Paragraphs 1-1 1 above and incorporates the same 
herein by reference as if set forth fully. 
13. Defendant's representations to Plaintiff as described above constituted a 
representation of material fact that Defendant knew was false at the time it was made. 
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14. Defendant intended that Plaintiff would act upon the representation and loan funds 
to Defendant in the contemplated manner. 
15. Plaintiff did not know the representation was false and that Defendant did not intend 
to provide a Promissory Note and Deed of Trust. Plaintiff had a right to rely on, and did rely on, the 
truth of Defendant's representations. 
16. As result of Plaintiffs reliance on Defendant's representations, Plaintiffhas suffered 
consequential and approximate damages in an amount to be proven at the time of trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
[Specific Performance] 
17. Plaintiffrealleges the allegations in Paragraphs 1-16 above and incorporates the same 
herein by reference as if set forth fully. 
18. The real property associated with the representations and agreements made by 
Defendant to Plaintiff, as specifically identified in the Corporation Warranty Deed attached hereto 
as Exhibit "A", is unique and created the motivation and intent of the Plaintiff to pay to Defendant 
the sum of $226,218.70, Plaintiff thereby being entitled to obtain, and Defendant being obligated to 
provide to Plaintiff a proper and valid security interest in the real property by way of a Promissory 
Note and Deed of Trust. 
19. Plaintiff paid these sums to Defendant in anticipation of receiving the agreed upon 
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust for the above-described real property as was the common 
practice of the parties based upon their previous course of dealing. However, Defendant failed to 
provide the Prolnissory Note and Deed of Trust to Plaintiff. 
20. Under the facts and circumstances of this transaction and the course of dealing 
between the patties Plaintiffs payment to Defendant of the sum of $226,218.70 constitutes part 
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performance in satisfaction of the Statute of Frauds with regard to contracts involving the real 
property at issue, and Defendant's failure and refusal to provide to Plaintiff the agreed upon 
Promissory Note and Deed ofTrust constitutes abreachof theunderstanding and agreementbetween 
the parties. 
21. Due to the unique nature of the real property involved in this transaction Plaintiff is 
unable to obtain orreceive an adequate remedy at law and therefore seeks and is entitled under Idaho 
law to receive the remedy of specific performance requiring Defendant to provide to Plaintiff the 
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust as contemplated and agreed upon by the parties. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
[Unjust Enrichment/Rescission] 
22. Plaintiffrealleges the allegations in Paragraphs 1-21 above and incorporates the same 
herein by reference as if set forth fully. 
23. In the alternative to the remedy of specific performance, or in the event the Court 
determines that Plaintiff is unable to obtain relief by way of specific performance Plaintiff is entitled 
to the remedy of rescission. 
24. Plaintiff paid to Defendant the sum of $226,218.70 in anticipation of receiving in 
exchange a Promissory Note and Deed of Trust securing the sums paid through the real property 
described herein. 
25. Defendant has failed and refused and continues to fail and to refuse to provide to 
Plaintiff the promised Promissory Note and Deed of Trust. 
26. Additionally, Defendant has retained Plaintiffs monies and has failed and refused and 
continues to fail and to refuse to refund to Plaintiff the monies paid. As a result of interest accrual 
and other charges, there is currently due and owing to Plaintiff tile sum of $260,000.00. 
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27. Plaintiff is entitled to the complete and full refimd of all monies paid to Defendant 
with interest as set forth herein by reason ofDefendant's breach of theunderstanding and agreement 
between the parties. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
[Request for Attorney's Fees] 
17. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-16 above, and 
incorporates the same herein by reference as if set forth fully. 
18. It has beell necessary for Plaintiff to employ counsel to represent it in this action and 
has obligated itself to pay reasonable fees for such services. Pursuant to Idaho Code $ 12- 
120(3)Defendant is obligated for payment of attorney's fees, Title Search costs, and all expenses 
incurred by Plaintiff to prosecute this action. 
SMALL LAWSUIT RESOLUTION ACT DECLARATION 
Pursuant to IRCP 85(b) and Idaho Code 4 7-1501 et seq., Plaintiffs' claims, excluding 
costs and attorneys fees, exceed the $25,000.00 statutory limitation of the Small Lawsuit 
Resolution Act. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment and Decree of this Court as follows: 
A. That the Court find that a contract existed between the parties with regard to the 
payment and real property described herein and that the Defendant has breached this contract; 
B. That Defendant be immediately required to provide to Plaintiff a Proinissory Note 
in the sum of $226,218.70 together with interest thereon at a rate established by the Court 
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together with a Deed of Trust securing the Promissory Note with the real property described 
herein; 
C. That in the alternative, the Defendant be immediately required to repay andior 
refbnd to Plaintiff the entire sun1 of $226,218.70 with interest at the statutory established rate; 
D. That Plaintiff recover from Defendant all of its attorney fees associated with this 
action; 
E. That Plaintiff recover from Defendant all of its costs and expenses associated with 
this action; and 
F. For all other relief that the Court deems just and proper utider these premises. 
DATED this 3 day of ~ d 2 0 0 5 .  
RACDJE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
DANIEL c .GREEN ' /  
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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KEY BANK QF IDAHO 
1625 NORTHGATE W E  
1 D r n  FALLS; mAR0 83401. 
ACCOUNR BONNEVALLF, LAND & TITLE CO. 
497 WORTH CAPITAL AVENUE, SUYTE 100 
lDGa0 BALLS, IDAHO 83402 
ACCOUNT NO.: 151100262-6 
' I  
L," ~ O ~ ~ O N  NEEDIED.. OUR F&E { C Q m r c r )  NUMBER Anlorn 
NAME OF BORROWER 
Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
iooo Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.0. BOX 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone 208-523-0620 
Facsimile 208-523-9518 
Penelope North-Shaul, ISB #I4993 
Dunn & Clark, P.A. 
P.0. BOX 277 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 
Telephone: 208-745-9202 
Fatximilie: 208-745-8160 
Attorneys for Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




NOTICE OF INTENTION TO APPEAR AND 
PRODUCE TESTIMONY AND J%VIDENCE 
(1.R.Civ.P. 6(c)(4)) 
Fee Category: 1.i.a 
Fee: $52.00 
COMES NOW defendant Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC (hereafter 
"Cornerstone" or defendant) through Karl R. Decker, Attorney at Law, of Holden, 
Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and Penelope North-Shaul, Attorney at Law, of Dunn 
& Clark, P.A., pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 6(c)(4) and notifies the court 
and opposing counsel that Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC elects to appear and 
produce testimony and evidence at the hearing scheduled for 1o:oo a.m. on January 24, 
Notice of Intention to Appear and Produce Testimony and Evidence 
(1.R.Civ.P. 6(c)(4)) 
Page - 1 
F A X  No, 208745816p 
DATED this day of Januaiy, 2006. 
Aolden, Kidwell, Hahn 81 Crapo, P.L.LC. 
Karl R Decker 
DATED this 2 5 'Gay of January, 2006. 
Dunn &Clark, P.A. 
I hereby certify tha.t I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my 
office in Ida110 Fans, Idaho, and that on the day of January, 2006, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first 
class mail, with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered as 
definedby Rule 5(b), 1.RC.P. 
Persons Served: Method of Service: 
Daniel C. Green [ I  Mail [ 1 Band [xl Fax 
Stephen J. Muhonen 
Racine Olsen Nye Budge 8r Bailer Chartered 
PO BOX 1391 
201 East Center 
P O C ~ ~ ~ O ,  ID 83204-1391 
Fax No. 232-7352 
Karl R. Decker 
Notice of Inte11tion to Appear aud Produce Testimony and Evidence 
(LR.Civ.P. 6(~)(4)) 
2r.j 
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DATED this 23  day of January, 2006. 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
ikLL--e. r5-k 
Karl R. Decker 
DATED this day of January, 2006. 
Dunn &Clark, P.A 
Penelope North-Shaul 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my 
office in Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the ;L'5 day of January, 2006, I sewed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first 
class mail, with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered as 
defined by Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P. 
Persons Served: Method of Service: 
Daniel C. Green [ ] Mail [ ] Hand [x] Pax 
Stephen J. Muhonen 
Racine Olsen Nye Budge & Bailer Chartered 
PO BOX 1391 
201 East Center 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
Fax No. 232-7352 
Karl R. Decker 
Notice of Intention to Appear and Produce Testimony and Evidence 
(1.R.Civ.P. 6(c)(4)) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
. STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




vs . ) Case No. CV-06-140 
) 




On the 24th day of January, 2006, application for temporary 
restraining order came before the Honorable Richard T. St. Clair, 
District Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mrs. Marlene Southwick, Deputy Court Clerk, was present. 
Ms@ 
ny North Shaul appeared on behalf 
Mr. Stephen Muhonen appeared on behalf of the 
Counsel waived reporting by court reporter. Hearing was 
digitally recorded. 
The parties advised the Court that a resolution has been 
reached in this case. 
Mr. Muhonen orally placed the resolution on the record. Mr. 
Decker stipulated to release the lis pendens, release the 
$5,000.00 cash bond back to the P;Spintiff, and vacate the TRO. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I h e r e b y  c e r t i f y  t h a t  on t h e  o f  J a n u a r y ,  2005, i 
c a u s e d  a  t r u e  and  c o r r e c t  copy o f  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  document t o  
be  d e l i v e r e d  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  
RONALD LONGMORE 
Penny Nor th  Shaul 
PO Box 277 
Rigby, I D  83442 
K a r l  R .  Decker 
PO Box 50130 
Idaho  F a l l s .  I D  83405 
S tephen  J. Mahonen 
PO Box 1391 
P o c a t e l l o .  I D  83204-1391 
DUNN & CLARK, P.A. 
Robin Dunil, Esq., ISB #2903 
Stephen J. Clark, Esq., ISB #2961 
Penny North Shauf, Esq., ISB #4993 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 ( f )  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN  AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, ) 






) NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, ) 
LLC, 1 Fee Categoty: I.G(a) 
1 Filing Fee: $47.00 
Defendant. ) 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF, and its attorney, Stephen J. Muhonen, Esq. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that PENNY NORTH SHAUL, Attorney at Law, 
with residence at 240 So. 5t"W., P.O. Box 277, Rigby, Idaho 83442, hereby enters an 
appearance as attorney of record for defendant, CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, 
LLC, and the Clerk of this Court is hereby requested to make such entries as may be 
required to record such appearance, and tale notice that such attorney demands that all 
papers, and notices be served on her at his above address. 
/!*aY of June, 2006. DATED this -
Penny ~ o r t G h a u 1 ,  Esq. 
DUNN & CLARK 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t11e &day of June, 2006, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by: 
- Hand Delivery 
X Postage-prepaid mail 
- Facsimile Transmission 
Stephen J. Muhonen, Esq. 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
NOTlCE OF APPEARANCE -- 
DANIEL C. GREEN (ISB No. 3213) 
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN (ISB No. 6689) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208)232-6101 
Fax: (208)232-6109 
Attorneys for Plaintiff American Pension Services, Inc 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




VS. ) AMENDED COMPLAINT 




COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff, AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC., and 
for its amended cause of action against the above-named Defendant, CORNERSTONE HOME 
BUILDERS, LLC, states and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff, AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC. ("Plaintiff') is a Corporation, 
incorporated by the laws of the State of Utah and authorized to conduct business in the state of 
Idaho. Plaintiff has its place of business at 11027 S. State Street, Sandy, County of Salt Lake, state 
of Utah. 
2. Defendant, CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC., (hereafter "Cornerstone") 
was at all times relevant hereto a Utah limited liability company, conducting business in the state of 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
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Idaho. Based upon information and belief, since the initial filing of this action, Cornerstone has 
become an Idaho limited liability company with its current mailing address at 3270 E. 17Ih Street, 
Suite 299 Amnon, Bonneville County, Idaho. 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
3. On September 29,2003, Old West Annuity &Life Insurance Company, as Grantor, 
executed a Corporation Warranty Deed transferring certain real property located in Bonneville 
County, Idaho to P&B Enterprises, Inc., a Utah Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "P & B )  and 
S.R. Tallman Construction, Inc. a Utah corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Tallman") as 
Grantees. The Corporation Warranty Deed was recorded on September 30, 2003 as Bonneville 
County Recorder's hstruinent No. 1 130070. A true and correct copy of said deed is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference as if set forth l l l y  herein. 
4. On or about January22,2004 P&B andTallman, as Grantors, executed a Corporation 
WarrantyDeed transferring certain real property located in BonnevilleCounty, Idaho to Cornerstone, 
as Grantee. The Corporation Warranty Deed was recorded on March 19,2004 as Bonneville County 
Recorders Instrument No. 114631 1. A true and correct copy of said deed is attached hereto as 
Exhibit B and incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein. 
5. The Plaintiff, due to his knowledge, experience and relationships with individuals in 
the finance industry as well as the former owner of the property described above, was instruinental 
in setting up the foregoing purchase by cornerstone. 
6 .  Prior to Cornerstone's acquisition of the above described real property, Plaintiff had 
built four homes on the property and had a contract with Leon Harward, the former owner of the 
subdivision. Mr. Harward's subdivision project went into foreclosure. 
7. When the project went into foreclosure, Plaintiff, utilizing his experience, contacts 
and knowledge in the finance industry, arranged a meeting with the project lender, Met Life of 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
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Spokane Washington, himself and Conlerstone to detennine what could be done to save the 
subdivision project. 
8. Due to this meeting facilitated by Plaintiff, MetLife and Cornerstone were able to 
work out an arrangement where Cornerstone would and did purchase the subdivision property. 
9. The Plaintiff is infonned and believes and therefore alleges that the property was 
acquired by Cornerstone for the purpose of subdividing and constructing hoines thereon for resale. 
The project was to be completed in five phases. 
10. In order to proceed with the project, Cornerstone sought investors to inject capital into 
the project. In return, cornerstone agreed to provide the investors with a promissory note, deed of 
trust and a repayment schedule. 
11. h1 reliance upon Cornerstone's representations and based upon the prior course of 
dealing between the parties or individuals affiliated thereto, beginning in September, 2003 Plaintiff 
began wiring to Cornerstone and/or its manager(s) and/or member(s) or individual(s) affiliated 
thereto, capital to be utilized on the development of the land as described above and in the 
aforementioned Warranty Deeds. 
12. Following the initial wire transfer to Cornerstone and/or its manager(s) and/or 
~nember(s) or individual(s) affiliated thereto, Plaintiff continued to provide capital to Cornerstone 
through February 2004, with such capital to be utilized on the development of the land as described 
above and in the aforementioned Warranty Deeds. 
13. Prior to Plaintiffs agreement with Cornerstone and/or its manager(s) and/or 
member(s) or individual(s) affiliated thereto, to provide the foregoing stream of financing for the 
above mentioned construction and subdivision project, Cornerstone and Plaintiff verbally agreed to 
certain repayment terms, including, but not limited to, an interest rate of ten percent (10%) per 
annun on the monies lent, a promissory note and deed of trust on the land in the constructiol~ and 
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subdivision project, as well as an agreement between Cornerstone and Plaintiff that Plaintiff was to 
receive $750.00 per lot sold in the project. 
14, This oral financing agreement nmade by Cornerstone with Plaintiff was based upon 
the parties prior course of dealings as well as in consideratioil to Plaintiff for his experience and 
knowledge and contacts in the finance industry, all of which ultimately led to Cornerstone's 
introduction and purchase of the subdivision property. 
15. Since lending the above mentioned suins of money to Cornerstone, Plaintiff has not 
been provided a promissory note and deed of trust on the land pursuant to the agreement between 
the parties. 
16. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not received the $750.00 per lot sold or to be sold by 
Cornerstone in the construction and subdivision project. 
17. Following the filing of the original Complaiilt in this matter, the parties have 
negotiated resolution of the underlying principal and interest debt owed by Cornerstone on the sums 
lent by Plaintiff, for which Plaintiff has been paid in full. 
18. Despite repeated demands and contrary to the parties agreement, Cornerstone has 
failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to provide Plaintiff with a promissory note and 
deed of trust evidencing the loan and detailing the terms of repayment as represented and agreed to 
by Cornerstone and Plaintiff. 
19. Despite repeated demands and contrary to the parties agreement, Cornerstone has 
failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to pay Plaintiff $750.00 per lot for each lot sold 
or to be sold in the construction and subdivision project owned by Cornerstone and funded by or 
funded in part by Plaintiff. 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
[Breach of Express Contract] 
20. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-19 above, and 
incorporates the same herein by reference as if set forth hlly, 
21. In exchange for Plaintiffs investment and payment of capital into the construction 
and subdivision project owned by Cornerstone, as well as Plaintiffs knowledge, experience and 
contacts in the finance industry which ultimately led to Cornerstone's introduction to and purchase 
of the subdivision property, Cornerstone promised to provide to Plaintiff a promissory note 
containing the terms of repayment, including but not limited to an interest rate often percent (1 0%) 
and payment of $750.00 for each lot sold or to be sold by Cornerstone, together with a deed of trust 
to secure said prolnissory note. 
22. Basedupon information and belief, Cornerstone has sold lots within the construction 
and subdivision project owned by Cornerstone but has failed to pay Plaintiff $750.00 for each lot 
sold. 
23. cornerstone has also failed to provide Plaintiff with apromissory note and a deed of 
trust. 
24. Cornerstone's failure to provide said promissory note and deed of trust as described 
ahove and Cornerstone's failure to pay Plaintiff $750.00 per lot sold, constitutes a breach of said 
agreement. 
25. As a result of said breach, Plaintiff bas been damaged in the alnount which is 
currently unknown and which is to be proven at the time of trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
[Breach of Implied In Fact Contract] 
26. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-25 above, and 
incorporates the same herein by reference as if set forth fully. 
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27. An implied in fact contract exists between the parties because the conduct of the 
parties shows the intent to make a contract. 
28. The circumstances imply or demonstrate a request by Cornerstone for Plaintiff to 
provide certain funds to it for construction andlor subdivision development purposes. 
29. The circumstances imply a promise by Cornerstone to compensate Plaintiff for its 
efforts in setting up the purchase of the subdivision project and providing the financing, which was 
to be secured by a promissory note and deed of trust. 
30. Plaintiff provided the money as requested. 
3 1. Cornerstone's failure to pay to or provide Plaintiff with a promissory note and deed 
of trust under the tenns and conditions as outlined above constitutes a breach of their implied in fact 
contract. 
32. As a result of said breach, Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount which is 
currently unknown and which is to be proven at the time of trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
[Fraud] 
33. Plaintiffrealleges theallegations in Paragraphs 1- 32 aboveand incorporates thesame 
herein by reference as if set forth fully. 
34. Cornerstone's representations to Plaintiff as described above constituted a 
representation of material fact that Cornerstone knew was false at the time it was made. 
35. Cornerstone intended that Plaintiffwould act upon the representation and loan funds 
to Cornerstone in the contemplated manner. 
36. Plaintiff did not know the representation was false and that Cornerstolledidnot intend 
to provide a promissory note and deed of trust, nor did Cornerstone intend on paying Plaintiff the 
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$750.00 per lot. PlaintifThad aright to rely on and did rely on the truth of Cornerstone'srepresentations. 
37. Plaintiff provided hundreds of thousands of dollars to Cornerstone based upon 
Cornerstone's representations, however, Cornerstone has failed to and continues to refuse to provide 
Plaintiff with a promissory note and deed of trust as well as $750.00 for each lot sold in the 
subdivision. 
38. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a fax dated memoranduln dated April 7,2005 from 
Cornerstone to Plaintiff. This memorandum memorializes that the above described agreement 
between Plaintiff and cornerstone did in fact exist, including the promiseby Cornerstone to Plaintiff 
to provide Plaintiff a promissory note and deed of trust as well as "an equity participation of either 
$550 or $725 per home to APS." 
39. Based upon Cornerstone's failure and continued refusal to provide Plaintiff with a 
promissory note and deed of trust and refusal to pay Plaintiff $750.00 per lot sold, Cornerstone's 
representations to Plaintiff were false representations that induced Plaintiff to enter into the 
agreement. 
40. Due to Cornerstone's fraudulent misrepresentations, Plaintiff has suffered 
consequential and approximate damages in an amount to be proven at the time of trial. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
[Unjust Enrichment] 
41. Plaintiffrealleges the allegations in Paragraphs 1-40 above and incorporates the same 
herein by reference as if set forth fully. 
42. Plaintiff, utilizing his experience, knowledge and contacts in the finance industry, 
introduced Cornerstone to the underlying construction and subdivision project, as well as provided 
capital to Cornerstone. In exchange, Plaintiff anticipated receiving a prolnissory note and deed of 
trust securing the sums lent through the real property described herein, with such repayment terms 
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to include, but not limited to, the repayment of the sums lent, including interest and $750.00 per lot 
as outlined above. 
43. Cornerstone has failed and refused and continues to fail and to refuse to provide to 
Plaintiff the promised promissory note and deed of trust. 
44. Additionally, Cornerstone has retained Plaintiffs monies and has failed and refused 
and continues to fail and to refuse to pay to Plaintiff the $750.00 per lot sold. 
45. Plaintiff is entitled to the value of the benefit bestowed upon Cornerstone as a result 
of Plaintiffs loan. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
[Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing] 
46. Plaintiffrealleges the allegations in Paragraphs 1-45 above and incorporates the same 
herein by reference as if set forth fully. 
47. There is implied in the contract between the parties a covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing on the part of Cornerstone to pay Plaintiff and provide Plaintiff with a promissory note and 
deed of trust in accordance with the agreement reached between the parties so that Plaintiff may 
obtain all benefits available to it under the contract. 
48. Through the actions alleged above, Cornerstone has materially breached the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. 
49. As a result of said breach, Plaintiff has been damaged in the amount which is 
currently unknown and which is to be proven at the time of trial. 
ATTORNEY S' FEES 
It has been necessary for Plaintiff to employ counsel to represent it in this action and has 
obligated itself to pay reasonable fees for such services. Pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-lZO(3) 
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Cornerstone is obligated for payment of attorney's fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff to prosecute 
this action. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for Judgment and Decree of this Court as follows: 
A. That the Court find that a valid contract existed between the parties with regard to the 
payment and real property described herein and that Cornerstone has breached this contract; 
B. That Cornerstone should be immediately required to provide to Plaintiff apromissoly 
note, together with a deed of trust securing the promissory note with the real property described 
above; 
C. That Cornerstonebe immediately required to pay to Plaintiff $750.00 per lot sold and 
to be sold by Cornerstone in the development describe above; 
D. Alternatively, Cornerstone be ordered to pay to Plaintiff the value of the benefit 
bestowed upon Cornerstone resulting from the loan from Plaintiff; 
E. That Plaintiff recover from Cornerstone all of its attorney fees associated with this 
action; 
F. That Plaintiff recover from Cornerstone all of its costs and expenses associated with 
this action; and 
G. For all other relief that the Court deems just and proper under these pren~ises. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
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DATED this d d a y  of October, 7006. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
BY 
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Page 10 
Oct 04 2006 12:31PM fir -ican Pension Services 801- '12712 - P -  3 
,---J- 
OGT-02-2006 NON 02:22 PN RACIWE LlrW OFFICE FAX NO. 208 23'2 6109 P, 12 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
county of- 
I, CurtisDoYoung,Pfesident of AmericanPensicos Sewiccs, bc., beingfirstdulyswornupon 
oath, depose and state that 1 have rcDd the foregoing document, and basal on my information und 
belief so acknowledge and agree voluntarily thst the foregoing docuiner~t i s  m e  and correct. 
DATED hiis & day of October, 2006. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this _ff day of  Oc(oba; 2006. 
(S 
My Commission Expires: l . / 3 d / q  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _LC1 day of ~c tober ,  2006, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Karl R. Decker [ 1 U. S. Mail 
HOLDEN KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO Postage Prepaid 
P.O. Box 50130 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 vernight Mail 
- 523-9518 
Peilelope North-Shaul 
DUNN & CLARK 
P. 0 .  Box 277 
Rigby, Idalio 83442 
[ ] U. S. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ f lacs imile  - 745-81 60 
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN 
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DUNN & CLARK, P.A. 
R o b i  D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
Stephen J. Clark, Esq., ISB # 2961 
Penny North Shaul, Esq., ISB # 4993 
P.O. Box 277 
240 South 5* West 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 ( f )  
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 





) DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO 
1 PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED 
) COMPLAINT 
) 
CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, ) 
LLC., ) Fee Category: I.1.b 
) Fee: $14.00 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and through its undersigned attorney of record, 
and answeis that Amended Complaint as foLtows: 
I 
The Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Amended Complaint on file 
herein unless specifically admitted hereafter. 
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I1 
The Defendant answers each and every paragraph of the Amended Complaint herein 
according to the numerical paragraph markings of the plaintiff as follows: 
1. This Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to answer in an informed fashion 





6. This Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to answer in an informed fashion 
and therefore denies. 
7. Deny. 
8. Defendant admits that the subdivision property was purchased and 
subsequently, said property was transferred to cornerstone Home Builders, LLC. 
Defendant denies the balance of Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. 
9. Defendant purchased the subdivision for constructing homes upon it. Defendant 
denies the balance of Paragraph 9. 
10. Defendant did seek investors. Defendant denies the balance of Paragraph 10. 
11. Defendant admits Plaintiff began winiog funds to Defendant in September, 2003. 
Defendant denies the balance of Paragraph 11. 
12. Defendant admits that Plaintiff wired funds to Defendant through Febmary, 2004. 
Defendant denies the balance of Paragraph 12. 
U. Defendant admits that a verbal agreement was entered into by Plaintiff and 
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Defendant regarding certain repayment terms for funds loaned by Plaintiff to 
Defendant, which was limited to an interest rate of ten (10) percent, pet annum, 
on monies lent. Defendant admits there was a sepatate verbal agreement that 
Defendant would pay Plaintiff $750.00 pet closing of final sale, per lot, contingent 
on Plaintiff providingfull funding of the consauction project at the subdivision. 
Defendant denies the balance of Paragraph W. 
14. Deny. 
15. Deny. Any monies lent by Plaintiff to Defendant have been fully repaid with 
interest accrued at the rate agreed upon. 
16. Deny. No such sums are due and owing to Plaintiff. 
17. Defendant always acknowledged that sums were due for monies lent by Plaintiff 
to Defendant, and did, in fact, pay such sums once Plaintiff cooperated with 
Defendant to determine the hxed sum due and owing. Therefore, Defendant 
denies Paragraph 17 as alleged by Plaintiff. 
18. Deny. Plaintiffwas provided with several drafts of promissory notes and/or 
deeds of aust, up until the underlying principal and interest owed by Defendant 
to Plaintiff was paid in full. 
19. Defendant admits it has refused to pay Plaintiff $750.00 per lot for each lot sold or 
to be sold in the construction and subdivision project, because no such sums are 
due and owing to Plaintiff. Defendant denies the balance of Paragraph 19. 
20. Defendant realleges its answers to Paragraphs 1 through 19 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint. 
21. Defendant admits it agreed to enter into a promissory note which contained a 
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provision for assessment of interest in the amount of ten (10) percent per annum 
on funds loaned to Defendant by Plaintiff. Defendant admits there was a 
separate verbal agreement for payment to Plaintiff $750.00 per lot for each lot sold 
or to be sold in the construction and subdivision project, contingent upon Plaintiff 
providing full funding through the completion of the construction/development 
project at the subdivision. Plaintiff failed to provide full funding on the project. 
Defendant denies the balance Paragraph 21. 
22. Defendant has sold lots in its subdivision. Defendant denies the balance of 
Paragraph 22. 
23. Deny. Defendant sent several drafts of promissory notes and/or deeds of trust to 












33. Defendant realleges its answers to Paragraphs 1 through 32 of Plaintiffs 






37. Defendant admits Plaintiff provided funding to Defendant through February, 
2004. Defendant has paid Plaintiff in full for the principal and interest accrued 
upon funding provided by Plaintiff to Defendant, and therefore, the need for a 
promissory note and deed of trust is moot. Defendant denies the balance of 
Paragraph 37. 
38. Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to verify the authorship of Plaintiffs 
Exbibit C to his Amended Complaint. Therefore, Defendant must deny 
Paragraph 38 as aUeged in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
39. Deny. 
40. Deny. 




44. Defendant denies it has retained Plaintiff's "monies". Plaintiff has been paid in 
full for the principal and interest owed by Defendant to Plaintiff. Defendant 
denies the balance of Paragraph 44. 
45. Deny. 
46. Defendant realleges its answers to Paragraphs 1 through 45 of Plaintiffs 






111. ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Defendant denies that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho 
Code Sl2-UO(3). Conversely, Defendant is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 
Idaho Code SU-120. 
IV. FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 
pursuant to IRCP l2@)(6). 
V. SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Amended Complaint is barred by the Statute of Frauds, in that this transaction 
involves real estate, and such transaction was never reduced to wiiting. 
VI. THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Amended Complaint is barred because the underlying principal and interest 
have been fully paid and satisfied by Defendant. 
VII. FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Amended Complaint is barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. Any 
debt owed to Plaintiff by Defendant has been paid in full. 
VIII. FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Amended Complaint is barred because Defendant detrimentally relied upon 
Plaintiffs assertion that he would not fund the subdivision project, thereby breaching 
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any verbal agreement that may have existed between the parties hereto. 
IX. SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Amended Complaint is barred because Plaintiff failed to provide funding for the 
entire subdivision project, thereby failing to confer a benefit on Defendant. 
X. SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Amended Complaint herein is inconsistent in its claims, in that Plaintiff has 
alleged breach of contract, which confers a legal remedy, and also alleged unjust 
enrichment, which is equitable in nature. Plaintiff cannot proceed under both 
theories of recovery. 
XI. EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendant reserves the right to allege additional defenses and/or counterclaims after 
completion of discovery. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendant herein requests attorney fees, to be awarded in a reasonable amount, 
along with reasonable costs associated with litigation pursuant to statute, rule and case law 
consistent in the State of Idaho. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for relief as follows: 
1. The Complaint on file herein be dismissed with prejudice; 
2. For reasonable attorneys fees as are just; 
3. For related costs associated with litigation; and, 
4. For aU further just relief. 
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DATED this & day of Octobet, 2006. 
DUNN & CLARK, P . k  
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the &@ of October, 2006, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by: 




Penny ~ o d h a u l ,  Esq. 
Stephen J. Muhonen, Esq. 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
DW & CLARK 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC., ) 
) 
Plaintiff (s) , ) 
) MINUTE ENTRY 
vs . i 
) CASE NO. CV-06-140 
CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant (s) . ) 
\ 
On the 22nd day of February, 2007, a status conference and 
motion to continue jury trial came before the Honorable Richard 
T. St. Clair, District Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, 
Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
Mr. Stephen Muhonen appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
Ms. Penny North Shaul appeared on behalf of the Defendant. 
Ms. Shaul advised the Court that the parties have made a 
joint motion to continue jury trial. Mr. Muhonen presented a 
statement in support of the motion to continue. 
The parties have conducted a mediation; no settlement was 
reached. 
The Court granted the motion for continuance and reset the 
matter for jury trial on June 19, 2007 at 10:00 a.m. Pretrial 
Conference was rescheduled for June 6, 2007 at 8:30 a.m. 
Discovery deadline is May 31, 2007. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the &<day of February, 2007, that 
I mailed or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document to the following: 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Daniel C. Green 
Stephen J. Muhonen 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
Penny North Shaul 
PO Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
Karl R. Decker 
PO Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
?TI< !I~!,,,.~; 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRiIQ&!Qp8 TBES ! i.,t - .-. .;, 









Based upon the Collsent to Waiver of Jury Trial and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the jury trial previously 
scheduled in this matter for 10:OO a.m. on June 19,2007, is hereby set as a court trial. The remaining 
terms and conditions of this Court's Order dated February 22,2007 shall remain as ordered except 
for those matters the jury trial, which is now ordered as WAIVED. 
of April, 2007. 
/' Seventh District Judge 
ORDER - Page 1 
--" -.,l- ---.m' 
L)\ APR - 9 2007 
I i. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the &iy o f ~ p r i l ,  2007, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing docunent to the following person(s) as follows: 
Penelope North-Shaul [ 4 U. S. Mail 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC Postage Prepaid 
P. 0. Box 277 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 [ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile - 745-8160 
Stephen J. Muhonen 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE [ U. S. Mail 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED Postage Prepaid 
P.O. 1391 [ ] HandDelivery 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204 [ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile - 232-6109 
vr~l n, /". - " 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
ORDER - Page 2 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 pM 4: 5'4 
Penny North Shaul, Esq., ISB # 4993 lafi? fi%? \ 8 
David L. Brown, Esq., ISB #7430 ; . ! 1 ii \'$ ! 
: , . ' ; ; ; > d  i ~ i G t 4  
P.O. Box 277 ... i - . ~ , t i ~ y  
.. ! <  : ,I, / , > 477 Pleasant Country Lane . , . , ,  s I. i:, 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (Q 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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1 DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS. 1 
) 





COMES NOW Defendant, CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC., by 
and rhtough its attorney of record, Penny North Shaul, Esq., and hereby moves this 
Court for its Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summaey Judgment on 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. This motion is brought putsuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil ~rocedutk 56(c), based upon the record on file, and depositions and affidavits to 
be lodged d t h  the Court with Defendant's Memorandum in Suppott of Motion for 
Summary Judgment; and wherein there are no genuine issues of material fact as to 
all Counts contained in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, as set forth more fuYT in 
DEPENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Oral 
argument is requested. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this @day of April, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / day of April, 2007, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by: 
- HandDelivery 
Postage-prepaid mail 
- Facsimile Transmission 
Penny North$$aul, Esq. i 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Stephen J. Muhonen, Esq. 
RACINE, OLSEN, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
DEPENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Daniel C. Green (ISB No. 3213) 
Stephen J. Mul~oneit (ISB NO. 6689) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208)232-6101 
Fax: (208)232-6109 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICLAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




VS. ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
1 JUDGMENT 




COMES NOW, Plaintiff AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC. ("Plaintiff'), by and 
through its counsel of record and for a cause of action against the Defendant CORNERSTONE 
HOME BUILDERS, LLC. ("Defendant"), and respectfully inoves this Court, pursuant to Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure 56, for the elltry of Suininary Judgxnent in favor of Plaintiff on the groullds 
and for the reason that there are no genuine issues of nlaterial fact and that Plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law 
This motion is made and based upon the tnemoranduin in support of the sane, the Affidavit 
of Counsel and the Affidavits of Brad Kendrick and Martin Pool, which will he filed in accordance 
with Rule 56, together with the Court files and records. 
MOTION FORSURIMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1 56- 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED this d day of April, 2007. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY. CHARTERED 
By: 
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Daniel C. Green (ISB No. 3213) 
Stephen J. Muhotlen (ISB No. 6689) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CI-IARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1 391 
Telephone: (208)232-6101 
Fax: (208)232-6109 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC. ) Case No. CV-06-140 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
vs . 1 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 




COMES NOW Plaintiff, AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC., A Utah co~poration 
(hereafter "APS"), that is authorized to do and is doing business in the State of Idaho by and through 
its attorneys of record, and hereby submits this Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
APS seeks an eiltiy of Judginent in its favor awarding the relief prayed for in its Amended 
Complaint, which is verified, and filed with this Cou~t  on October 5,2006, against the Defendant 
CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC., an Idaho Limited Liability Corporation 
(hereaftef'Comerstoi~e"), for the unpaid balance in the suiil of $750.00 per lot within the developed 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1 
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subdivision identified and described in Plaintiffs Anlended Coinplaint and all accrued interest on 
said surns together with its reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The followi~~g facts are material, undisputed and supported by the file, APS's Amended 
Complaint, suppo~tirrg Affidavits and other pleadings, and entitle APS to Judg~neilt against 
Cornerstone as a matter of law. 
1. APS is a Utah corporation in business as a contract administrator for third party 
retirement plans. (Dep. of Curtis DeYoung at 7, lines 2-7.) In 2001, APS, through its President, 
Curtis DeYoung, approached P&B Entepises IIIC. and infor~~led its CEO, Martin Pool of a real 
property development project located in Idaho that APS was involved in. Mr. DeYoung and 
inquired as to whether or not P&B would be interested in being involved in the project. P&B looked 
into the project and tuined down the offer at that time. (Dep. of Cultis DeYoung at 5, line 8 and 
gene~ally at pp. 23-26; Pool Aff. 1 6.) ~ a t e r ,  in 2003, APS, once again through Mr. DeYoung, 
approached P&B and inforrned it that APS was involved in the Idaho project previously discussed. 
Mr. DeYoung advised that the Idaho project developer was trying to get out and that the project was 
going into foreclosure. Mr. DeYoung inquired whether P&B would be interested in picking up the 
project if APS provided funding the downpayneilt to facilitate the purchase of the real property that 
was in foreclosure. (Dep. of Cultis DeYoung at 27, lines 4-17, 29, line 17; Pool Aff 1 8.) 
2. P&B agreed to look into the project and Brad Icendrick, the Chief Operatiolls Officer 
of P&B was assigned to investigate the matter due to his previous experience with real prope~ty 
development. (Pool Aff.1 8; Icendrick Aff. 17.) The prospective development project was ill or near 
Idaho Falls, Idaho. MI.. Pool and Mr. Kendtick thought Scott Tallrua~~ might be a good fit to assist 
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with the project since Mr. 'Tallman was a hotne builder, had built Mr. Pool's llonle and was from the 
Idaho Falls area. Id. 
3. Sllortly thereafter, Mr. Talhnan came to the P&B office in Utah and it was agreed 
upon by Mr. Kendrick, Mr. Pool, Mr. Tallnla~l and Jonathan Reyes, another individual involved with 
P&B, that they would fonn a new business entity and attempt to purchase the Idaho project. (Pool 
Aff.7 9; Kendrick Aff. 7 8; Dep. of Scott Tallinan at 3 1-34,59, line 15-25.) Mr. Kendrick, Mr. Pool, 
Mr. Tallman and Jonathan Reyes all agreed that APS, through Curtis DeYoung, would be the source 
of funding of the down papilent to facilitate the purchase of the Idaho real property developn~ent 
project. (Pool A f t 7  9; Kendrick Aff. T/ 8.) 
4. The business entity formed by Mr. Kendrick, Mr. Pool, Mr. Tallnlan and Jonathan 
Reyes was called Co~llerstone IHornebuilders, LLC. Mr. Kendnck was designated to be the Member- 
Manager. (Pool Aff.7 10; Kendrick Aff. 7 9; Dep. of Scott Tallman at 13, lines 3-20.) A tlue and 
correct'copy of the Ai-ticles of Organization for Cornerstone Homebuilders, LLC, which were filed 
in the state of Utah in October 2003 are attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Brad Kendiick. 
5. Though not yet fo~malized, Cornerstone agreed to enter into the project with APS. 
Thereafter, APS, by and through Mr. DeYoung, and Cornerstone, through its members Mr. Tallman 
and Mr. Kendrick, flew to Spokane, Washington to meet with Metropolitan Mortgage & Securities 
Co., Inc., and Old West Annuity & Life Insurance Company, t l~e  lenders involved in the Idaho 
development project, with the purpose of attempting to finalize the purchase of the Idaho real 
property. (Pool Aff.111; Kendrick Aff. 7 11; Dep. of Scott Tallman at 56-57,68, lines 19-25.) 
6 .  In Spokane, cornerstone was able to reacli an agreement on the purchase of the Idaho 
real property development project with Metropolitan Mortgage & Securities Co., Jm., and Old West 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 3 
56 - 8 
Alllluity & Life Insurance Cornpany for the purchase price of approximately1 . I inillion dollass. The 
title of the real property was to be put and was put into both P&B's name and Scott Tallman's 
business name, S.R. Tallman Construction, Inc., due to Cornerstone not yet being formalized. 
(Pool Aff.7 12; Kendrick Aff. 7 12.) In January, 2004 title to the Idaho real property was put into 
Co~~~e~-s tone 's  name. (Pool Af t7  13; Kendrick Aff. 7 13; Am. Compl. Ex. B.) 
7. Noile of the inetnbers of Cornerstone knew of the Idaho developnlent project until 
APS brought it to their attention. (Pool Aff.7 14; ICendrick Aff. 7 14; Dep. of Scott Tallnia~~ at 57, 
lines 12-14.) During Cornerstone's preliminary calculations, they projected to I-ealize a profit in the 
Idaho development project in an amount over two(2) niillion dollars. (Pool Aff.7 15; Kendrick Aff. 
1/ 15; Dep. of Scott Tailrnan at 55, lines 19-25.) Due to APS bringing the project to Cornerstone's 
attention, the funding agreement that was entered into, orally, between Cornerstone and APS for the 
Idaho real property develop~nent project was as follows: APS would provide the down payment of 
approximately twenty percent (20%), which would be repaid at 10% interest. 111 addition, APS 
~would receive $750.00 per lot sold in the developrnel~t project. Fu~thei~nore, APS was to have the 
option of being able to Iend on the individual homes to be built in the developme~lt project. The 
lending of money fi-on1 APS to Cornerstone was to be secured by APS through a Promissory Note 
and Deed of Trust issued by cornerstone. (Pool Aff.1/16; ICendrick Aff. 5/ 16; See geizeralZy Dep. 
of Curtis DeYoung at 99, lines 6-20.) 
8. During much of the analyzing, calculating and negotiations of the purchase of the 
Idaho development property, Brad ICendrick was with Scott Tallman. Attached as Exhibit C to the 
Affidavit of Brad ICendrick is a true and correct copy of notes he was working on with Mr. Tallman. 
In the upper night hand comer of the docurnent is a note that reads "$750.00 Curtis." That note was 
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written by Mr. Tallman. The purpose oftlie note was to nlemorialize Cornerstone's $750.00 per lot 
obligation to APS for lending the 20 % down payment as Colilerstolle was attempting to determine 
profitability, retail, etc. of the lots in the developll~ent project. (Kendrick Aff. 7 17; Dep. of Scott 
Tallinan at 96, lines 12-25, 97, lines 1-4.) 
9. While the parties were in Spokane, Washington, negotiati~lg the purchase of the 
subject property, there was a break where Mr. DeYoung, Mr. Taliman and Mr. Icendrick were 
discussing life in general whicb eventually led into a discussion about retirement accounts. At the 
end of the conversation Mr. DeYoung mentioned he wanted his $750.00 equity position to be in 
writing. Mr. ICend~ick was intrigued by the conversation and took notes, nlenlorializing the topic 
of discussion and Mr. DeYoung's request. (Kendrick Aff. 'j 18.) 
10. When the agree~nent between Colllerstolle and the lenders out of Spokane was 
finalized for the purchase of the Idaho property, on Septesnber 30, 2003, APS perfo~lned its 
obligation and provided the ag-eedupon 20% down paynlent, in the suin of$226,218.70, which was 
used to purchase the property. APS was not provided a Promissory Note or Deed of Trust at this 
time. (Pool Aff.7 18; Kendrick Aff. 7 19; Seegenerally Dep. of Scott Tallsnan at 122, lines 15-25, 
123, lines 1-2.) 
11. On or about Novenlber 5,2003, APS loaned Conlerstone an additional $49,476.30 
for development of the Idaho project. APS was not provided a Promissory Note or Deed of Trust 
at this time. (Kendrick Aff. 7 20; Dep. of Scott Tallinan at 123, lines 7-24.) 
12. On or about December 5,2003, APS loaned Comerstoneanadditional $36,406.91 for 
developmeilt of the Idaho project. APS was not provided a Protnissoly Note or Deed of Trust at this 
time. (Kendrick Aff. 7 21; Dep. of Scott Tallrnan at 124, lines 3-1 1 .) 
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13. On or about January 13,2004, APS Ioaued Cornerstone an additional $78,280.28 for 
development of the Idaho project. APS was not provided a Pro~nissoiy Note or Deed of Trust at this 
time. (lcendtick Aff. f/ 22; Dep. of Scott Tallman at 125, li~les 1-1 4.) 
14. On or about February 26, 2004, APS loailed Cornerstone a11 additional $97,569.33 
for development of the ldaho project. APS was not provided a Promissory Note or Deed of Trust 
at this time. (ICendrick Aff. 7 23.) 
15. The conlbined amount of inoney lent by APS to Cornerstone, tlirough February2004 
was in the approximate sum of $487,951.52, plus interest. (Kendrick Aff 7 24.) 
16. The reason APS was not provided a Promissory Note and Deed of Trust rdecting 
the agreement between the parties was because at the time of the initial purchase of the real property, 
Cornerstolle had yet to be formalized. Once Coi~lerstone was fonualized, the inembers of 
cornerstone just didn't get around to followiilg through with their end of the bargain and providing 
APS the docuvne~lts as previously agreed. (Pool Aff. 7.20; Kendrick Aff 7 25.) 
17. Mr. DeYoung contacted me~nbers of Cornersto~le several times after APS's initial 
loan and continued tl~ereafter after the subseque~lt loans to cornerstone, inquiring as to the status of 
the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust. (Pool Aff. 7 21; Icendrick Aff. 7 26; Dep. of Curtis 
DeYoung at 49, lines 15-25,) 
18. In March 2004, APS refused to lend any additional funds to Cornerstone as a result 
of having lent approximately one-halfmillio~l dollars to Co~~lerstone and having 110 security in place 
for said funds. (Pool Aff. 22; Kendrick Aff 7 27; Dep, of Cultis DeYoung at 45, lines 18-23.) 
When APS stopped lending lnolley to Coi~lerstone Mr. Talllnan told Brad Ke~ldiick that 
Cornerstone would not bepaying APS tbe$750.00 per lot because, from his perspective, the $750.00 
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per lot was only to be provided upon complete hndillg of the elltire development project by APS. 
(Kendrick Aff. 1 28; See generally Am. Answer 1 13 .) This co~ltingency expressed by Mr. tall ma^ 
at this time was never part of the agreement between APS and Cor~lerstone. (Pool Aff. 1 17; 
Kendrick Aff. 7 28; Dep. of Curtis DeYoung at 59, lirles 22-25, GO, lilies 1-5.) 
19. In March 2004, Martin Pool and Jo~lathan Reyes disassociated themselves fiom 
Cornerstone. At that time only Brad Kendrick and Scott Tallma~l remained as illembers of 
Cornerstone. (Pool Aff. 7 23; Kendrick Aff. 7 29; Dep. of Scott Talhnan at 132, lines 8-9.) 
20. Ln June, 2004,on behalf ofCornerstone, Mr. ICe~~drick sent aProll1issoly Note to APS 
for $250,000.00, interest free, signed byhinlselfand Mr. Tallman, for APS's review. This is the first 
Note Coinerstoile sent to APS and it was never recorded. (Kend~ick Aff. 130,  Ex. E; Dep. of Scott 
Tallman at 130.) Followillg APS's receipt of this Note, Mr. DeYoung infonned Mr. Kendrick this 
Note was in enor and was not acceptable as it did not reflect the agree~nent between APS and 
Comerstone. (~(endllck Aff. 7 3 3 ;  Dep. of Curtis DeYoung at 56, lines 1 1-21 .) 
21. In September 2005, Mr. Icendrick, on behalf of Co~llerstone, sent APS atlother 
Promissory Note and a Deed of Trust which reflected an unpaid principal a~nount of $150,000.00 
at 10% interest. These documents werenever recorded. (Kendrick Aff. '// 32, Ex. F; Dep. of Scott 
Tallman at 1261ines 14-24.) Following APS's receipt ofthis Note and Deed of T~ust,  Mr. DeYoung 
info~med Mr. Kendrick this Note was also in error and was not acceptable as well as it did not reflect 
the agree~nent between APS and Counerstone. (Kendrick Aff. 7 33.) 
22. Co~llmellcillg in April 2004, Comerstonebegailpayi~lg backlnonies to APS, however, 
due to various internal problems, APS and Cornerstone could not agree upon an arnount that was due 
and owing to APS for the plincipal amount plus interest. (Icendrick Aff. 7 34.) 111 April 2005 Mr. 
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Kend~ick wrote a Financial Recollciliatioll to APS. This docuirrent itemized monies lent by APS to 
Colnerstone and amounts paid back. Additionally, the Reconciliation also addressed the principal 
and interest balai~ce then believed to be due and owing, as well as the existence of the per lot 
agreement. Specifically, Mr. Kendriclc wrote, 
Regarding the equity interest in tile project to APS - 1 have searched my notes, and 
literally evexy file I have, but have found nothing. However, I specifically recall that 
we all discussed and agreed to an equity participation of either $550 or $725 per 
home to APS. I ain therefore proposing a payment of $625 per holl~e which would 
equate to $175,000 to you as an equity paiticipanl on the Single Faillily Homes and 
roughly $20,000 011 the Multi-Family Units, for a total oE$195,000. However, the 
last thing I want to do is short change you. Therefore if you remember the number 
to be different. then let me know. 
(Kendrick Aff. .'// 35, Ex. G.) 
23. In theReconciliation document Mr. Kendrick wroteC'$550 or$725 per home to APS" 
because he was trying to negotiate between APS and Mr. Tallman since Mr. Tallman refused to pay 
what was owed to APS. (Icendrick Aff. fi 37.) Both Mr. Icendrick and Mr. tall in at^ knew all along 
that $750.00 was the agreed upon per lot alnount. (Kendrick Aff. fi 16; Dell. ofScott Talll~lan at 117, 
line 18-25,118, lines 17-20.) APS agreed to compromise the per lot amount to $650.00 per lot, but 
Cornerstone was to pay APS the a~llounts due within three weeks of the agreement. Mr. Kend~ick 
inelno~ialized this $650.00 agreement in a Cornerstone meeting agenda identified as Exhibit I in Mr. 
ICetldrick's affidavit. Mr. Tallman still refused to pay this obligation to APS and Cornerstone never 
did pay it. (Keildrick Aff. 7 39, Ex. I.) 
24. In March 2005 Mr. ICendrick had prepared another agenda for a Cornerstone business 
meeting. Paragraph 5 of the agenda starts with "Curtis." "Curtis" is the first 11ai11e ofMr. DeYoung 
fio~n APS. This agenda ine~norializes Cornerstone's obligation to APS regarding the per lot profit 
which remained due and owing, in addition to the outstanding principal and interest. Specifically, 
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regarding Curtis (APS), paragraph (c.) reads, "We committed to him. [sic] i. What ifwe didn't take 
his money, we would still have to honor our con~~nitrnent - he is the reason we have this great 
opportunity." (Kendrick Aff. 7 38, Ex. 
25. Attached to Mr. Kendrick's affidavit as Exhibit J is a copy of the constructioll costs 
break down for lot #29 in the Co~~lerstone project. This docun~errt was given to Mr. Ketldlick by Mr. 
Talllllan on March 9, 2004 or sometime thereafter. Item number 1600, too, menlorializes the 
$750.00 equity payment that was agseed upon with APS and Comerstone. (ICendrick Aff. 7 40.) 
26. In Janua~y 2006 Cornerstone was sued by APS for the outstanding principal and 
interest. Once Cornerstone resolved this poltion of the obligation with APS, the parties agreed on 
the record that the $750.00 per lot was still in issue. (See generally Compl.; (Icendrick Aff. 7 41.) 
27. In April 2006 Mr. Icendrick disassociated hiinself from Cornerstone. (ICe~~drick Aff. 
7 43.) Cornerstone remains as an entity with Mr. TaIlrnan's constructioll company, S.R. Tallman 
Constsuction being the owner and Mr. Tallnlan is the Managing Me~nher. (Dep. of Scott Tallman 
at 10, lines 20-25, 1 1, line 1 .) Mr. Talhnan agreed that as part of the disassociation regarding Mr. 
Kendrick, Cornerstone is responsible for this litigation by their separation agreenle11t. (Dep. of Scott 
Tallinan at 30, lines 1-5.) 
28. Since the parties resolved the underlying principal and interest issues, Plaintiff 
amended its Complaint, focusing on recovery of the $750.00 per lot issue, seeking recoveiy of 
$750.00 per lot already sold as well as $750.00 per lot to be sold and a Pvornissory Note and Deed 
of T~ust o secure such future payments. (See generally Ain. Compl.) 
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34. Prior to Cornerstone's purchase of the real property in issue, APS owned four (4) of 
the lots and three (3) lots were owned by someone else. (Dep. of Curtis DeYoung at1 I, lines 4-10; 
Dep. of Scott Talhnan at 79, 80, lines 20-22.) There were 25 additional lots existing prior to 
development, below Green Willow Lane. (Dep. of Scott Tallmail at 81, lines 13-22.) After the 
development started, Coi~lerstone bought additional pieces ofreal property appurtenant to the project 
in issue. This property is on both sides of Eve Drive and Portal Stone Drive consisting of 35 lots. 
APS is not seeking a $750.00 per lot recovery on these lots. (Dep. of Curtis DeYoung at 64, lines 
18-25.) Calculating the above described number of lots, 248 lots remain which were developed or 
are to be developed and sold as a result of APS providing the down payment to begin the underlying 
propelty development project. (Aff. of Stephen J. Muhonen 7 4.) Approximately 150 lots have 
already been sold. (Dep. of Scott Tallmall at 146, Iine 23.) 
35. Damages sought by APS regarding the per lot issue are calculated as follows: 248 
lots multiplied by $750.00 equals $1 86,000.00. 
36. During the negotiations and purchase of the real property, Conle~-stone also obtained 
aright of first refusal on a comvnercial piece ofreal property that was appurtenant to the real property 
being purchased. This right of first refusal on the comn~ercial piece of property arose from the 
purchase of the underlying property from Old Standard and Metropolitan for which APS provided 
the down payment for. (Dep. of Scott Talli~lan at 78,lines 22-25.) This property has been purchased 
by Cornerstone and currently has not been subdivided or developed. (Dep. of Scott Talhnan at 176, 
line 24, 177, lines 1-5.) 
37. Cornerstone now estimates to realize a profit of over 3 milIion dollars in the 
~uxderlyingpropeity development project. (Dep. of Scott Tallmal at 174, lines 23-25,175 lines 1-6.) 
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ISSUE 
The undisputed facts and exhibits that are supported by the Affidavits filed herewith and 
which are described inore fully above raise the following issue: 
1. Did the contract between the parties require APS to provide full financing of the 
entire underlying property developinent project in order to receive $750.00 per lot? 
ARGUMENT 
1. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGR'IENT. 
The applicable standard in Idaho supports the Court's awarding summaiy judgment in favor 
of APS. Sunlmaryjudgnent is proper in Idaho when "the pleadings, depositions, adn~issions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, sllow that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
themoving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Once the lnovingpa~ty 
establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to make a 
showing of the existence of a genuine issue of lnaterial fact on the ele~nents challenged by the 
lnovingparty. Tholnsonv. Idaho Ins. Aaencv. Inc., 126 Idaho 527,530-31,887P.2d 2034,1037-38 
(1994). 
It is also well settled in Idaho that in order to create a genuine issue of material fact, the party 
opposing the motion must present mol-e than just a conclusory assertion that an issue of lnaterial fact 
exists. Cod~lan, 987 P.2d at 3 12-13, Van Velson Coro. v. Westwood Mall Assoc., 126 Idaho 401, 
406, 884 P.2d 414, 419, (1994). "Rather, the [opposing party] must respond to the sullllnary 
judginent motion with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." C o d l m ,  987 
P.2d at 312-13; Tuttle v. SudenlgaIndus., Inc., 125 Idaho 145,150,868 P.2d 473,478 (1994). The 
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opposing party, may not rest upon the illere allegations or denials stated in its pleadings, but its 
response must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure 56(e); Anderson v. Citvof Pocatello, 112 Ida110 176,731 P.2d 171 (1987). In other 
words, illere allegations or claims and/or a scintilla of evidence will not suffice to create a genuine 
issue of fact. Eliowlos, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984 (Ct.App. 1992); Evans v. Twin Falls 
C&&J, 118 Idaho 210,796 P.2d 87 (1990). 
A complete failure of proof concentillg an essential elellletlt of the non-moving party's case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Badell v.Beeks, 1 15 Idaho 101,765 P.2d 126 (1 998) 
(citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322, 106 S.Ct. 2548,2552 (1986)). In such a situation, the 
ntoving party is entitled to a judgn~ent as a matter of law because the non-moving party has failed 
to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which that party bears 
the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Coghlan, 987 P.2d at 312-13. This rule 
facilitates the dismissal of factually unsupported claims prior to tl-ial and leads to the economy of 
judicial resources. Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771, 828 P.2d 334 (Ct.App. 1992). 
The facts of the present case cannot be disputed. APS, tlxougl~ its prior iltvolvement in the 
Idaho construction development project, approached P&B and presented the possibility to P&B of 
becoming involved in the project with APS. (Dep. of Curtis DeYoung at 27, lines 4-17,29, line 17; 
Pool Aff. 71 8.) Martin Pool, P&B's CEO then approached Jollathal~ Reyes, Brad Kendrick and Scott 
Talllnan regarding the project. These four individuals agreed to fonn the entity Cornerstone Home 
Builders LLC and to become involved in the developmet~lt project with APS. (Pool Aff.7 9; 
Kendrick Aff. 7 8; Dep. of Scott Tallman at 31-34, 59, line 15-25.) The ageetlieut between the 
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illdividuals conlprising both entities is undisputed except by Mr. Tallinan, the only individual 
presently affiliated with cornerstone. 
Cornerstone agreed that since APS brought the development project to Comerstone's 
attention, APS would be the money source to provide the initial down payment funds of 20% at 10% 
interest, so as to allow Cornerstone to purchase the real property. APS would also have the option 
of lending on the collstruction of the individual homes in the develop~nent should it so choose. 
Finally, it was agreed that APS would receive from Comerstone $750.00 per lot sold in the 
developmeilt project. The foregoing was to be secured by a Promissory Note and Deed of Trust 
provided by Cornerstone to APS. (Pool Aff.7 16; ICendrick Aff. 16; See generally Dep. of Curtis 
DeYoung at 99, lines 6-20.) 
APS provided the down payrnent as was obligated. (Pool Aff.7 18; Kendrick Aff. 7 19; See 
generally Dep. of Scott Tallman at 122, lines 15-25, 123, lines 1-2.) Cornerstone did not provide 
APS a correct Promissory Note and Deed of Trust and in fact, did not even provide APS a proposed 
draft of said security documents until approxiinately eight months after the original sums were lent. 
(Kendrick Aff. 30; Dep. of Scott Tallman at 130.) Furthermore, eve11 though approximately 150 
lots have been developed and sold in the development project, APS has yet to be paid the $750.00 
per lot as promised. (Dep. of Scott Tallman at 146, line 23; See generally Answer 1 13.) Mr. 
Tallinai~, the only reillaining individual affiliated with Cornerstone, who leanled of the agreement 
second hand through Mr. Pool, rehses to allow Cornerstone to pay APS as obligated. (Dep. of Scott 
Tallman at 10, lines 20-25, 1 I ,  line I ;  Dep. of Tallman at 56, lines 9-2 l ;  (Kendrick Aff. 7 28: See 
geizerally Answer 7 13.) Mr. Tallman's position is that the $750.00 agreement did exist, but 
payment of said sruns was contil~gent upon APS providing full huding of the entire development 
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project. (Kendrick Aft  '1/ 28; See genera& Answer ij 13.) Mr. Pool, the source of h4r. Tallinan's 
"understanding" of the agree~nent has directly refuted Mr. Talltnan's position, i.e. a contingeilcy 
never existed. Mr. Kendrick, the Meinber Manager of Comerstone, too, has stated that the $750.00 
was never contingent upon APS providing full financing. (Pool Aff. '1/ 17; Keildrick Aff. 7 28; Dep. 
ofCustis DeYoung at 59, lines 22-25,60, lines 1-5.) 
In his deposition testimony, Mr. Tallman admits he has no evidence of any kind to support 
his contingency position, other than his own self setviilg position, which has been directly refuted. 
(Bep. of Scott Tallmiul at 119, lines 14-25, 120, lines 1-15.) By failing to produce such evidence, 
Cornerstone has completely failed to prove an essential ele~nei~t  of its case. As a result, this Cour-t 
should grant APS' motion for surninaiy judgment for either $186,000.00 or $750 per lot sold and 
to be sold, plus $750.00 per lot should the commercial piece be subdivided, together with attonley 
fees and costs. 
11. STANDARD WHEN COURT IS THE TRIER OF FACT. 
With the Court acling as the trier of fact the Court is able to inake all inferences and 
deteilninations at suinmary judgment that are ilecessary to dispose of this case ill its entirety. When 
at1 action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court becomes and acts as the ttier of 
fact. Shawver v. Hucklebein Estates. LLC, 140 Idaho 354,360-61, 93 P.3d 685, 691-92 (2004). 
It is well established that "[aJs the trier of fact, the district court is free to assive at themost probable 
inferences based upon the evidence before it and grant suizunary judgnei~t, despite the possibility 
of conflicting inferences." Brown v. Perltins, 129 Idaho 189, 191,923 P.2d 434,436 (1 996). If any 
coilflict between iilferences exists, as the trier of fact, the trial court is responsible for resolving the 
possible coilflict between the iilferences. Brown, 129 Idaho at 191-92,923 P.2d at 436-37. The test 
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for reviewing the inferences drawn by the trial court is whether the record reasonably supports the 
inferences made by the trial court. Shawver, 140 Idaho at 361,93 P.3d at 692. 
By Cornerstone's own adtnissions through Mr. Tallmai~, Cornerstone has no evidence 
whatsoever to support its position that payment to APS of $750.00 per lot was subject to APS 
providing full financing ofthe developrneilt project. (Dep. of Scott Tallinail at 11 9, lines 14-25,120, 
lines 1-1 5.) The undisputed facts support that no such contillgency ever existed. This Court is free 
to enter its order awarding surnlnary judgneilt in hvor of APS. 
111. SATISFACTION OF TI-IE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
In its Answer, Comwstone pled the affirmative defense of the Statute of Frauds stating, 
"[Tlbis trailsaction involves real estate, and such trallsaction was never reduced to writing." (Answer 
qp.) The Statute of Frauds is not applicable in the present case, but even if it were, the writings that 
exist fully satisfy all Statue of Frauds requireinet~ts. Idaho's Statute of Frauds is codified as Idaho 
Code (I.C.) 5 9-501 et. seq. Pursuant to the Statute of Frauds certain agreements must be in writing 
to be enforceable. These coiltracts include any tr.nnsfer of real property. &, I.C. § 9-503 
(eniphasis added). 
A writing satisfies the Statute of Frauds requirement concernillg a transfer in real property 
when an instrument in writing exists that is subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
sun-endering or declarillg the same, or by his lawful agent thereto. a, I.C. § 9-503. Where there 
is no intended transfer of the real property the statute of ftauds does not apply. Additionally, where 
a transfer of real property is intended by the parties to occur but no writing exists, the doctrine of 
paitial performance relieves the requirement of a writing. Thorn Surings Ra~cl i  v. Smith, 137 Idaho 
480, 484, 50 P.3d 975,979 (2002). 
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The statute of frauds does not bar the recovery sought by APS for two reasons. First, the 
transaction in this case is siinply contractual in nature. Under the tenns of the contract between APS 
and Coinerstor~e, APS is entitled to receive the sum of $750.00 per lot once the lot is sold. This is 
pui-ely contractual in nature. The parties never intended to transfer any property in a way that would 
bring the statute of frauds into play as to the paynent of the $750.00 per lot agreeinent. 
Cornerstoile's atteinpts to convi~lce the Court that the statute of frauds is applicable by bringing ill 
the issues and factts related to APS' seeking promisso~y notes and deeds of trust to secure these 
promissory notes. It is true that APS sought and contir~ues to seek the pro~nissoly notes and deeds 
of trust. However, these facts only pertain to securing re-payme~~t for the underlying loans and the 
paynlent of$750.00 per lot sold. The loans have now all been co~npromised and settled between 
APS and the Defendant. The only issue that remains is whether Cornerstone is bound and obligated 
to pay to APS the suin of $750.00 per lot sold or to be sold and to secure said paynent by a 
Proinissory Note and Deed of Trust. Nothing concen~ing this aspect of the agreelnent co~~cerns the 
transfer of real propel-ty at the time the transaction is entered into. 
The second reason the statute of frauds does not bar the recovery sought by APS is because 
the written agreements that do exist do fully satisfy all statute of frauds require~nn~ts. The 
undisputable evidence is that Cornerstone executed various memorandums, notes and agendas 
evidencing the $750 per lot agreement, including a ine~norand~un agreement that ackilowiedges that 
APS will receive aper lot payment. The meinorandun1 explains in detail how many homes and twin 
hoines were then contemplated. The parties are identified by the ageelllent. The only t e ~ m  not 
specified in the agreement was the actual amount APS would receive per lot. (& Kendrick Aff. 
135, Ex. G.) Cornerstone in its pleadings has admitted that the amount to be paid to APS is the sum 
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of $750 per lot. (Answer 7 13.) Additionally, the undisputed evidence itself specifically identifies 
that APS would receive $750 per lot. 
The statute of frauds is simply not applicable in this case, despite the clailns made by 
Cornerstone. For these reasons, APS is entitled to suinrnaryjudgrnent against Cornerstone as to the 
issue of the statute of frauds. The next issues to be addressed is the breach of the contract by 
Cornerstone. 
IV. CORNERSTONE BREACHED THE CONTRACT. 
By failing to pay the alnou~lts agreed for each lot in the subdivision, Cornerstone breached 
its contract with APS. A contract is "a PI-omise or a set of proinises for the breach of which the law 
gives a remedy, or the performance ofwhich the law recognizes a duty." Atwood v. Western Const., 
h, 129 Idaho 234, 238, 923 P.2d 479, 483, (Ct.App. 1996). A pro~nise is "a manifestation of 
intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in 
understanding that a commitment has been made." Atwood, 129 Idaho at 238, 923 P.2d at 483. 
Whether a promise amounts to a contract is a factual issue and is ordinarily to be detetlnined by a 
jury. "However, if the evidence relating to the alleged promise is not conflicting and admits of but 
one inference, the court may decide the issue as a matter of law." Atwood, 129 Idaho at 238, 923 
P.2d at 483, w, Watson v. Idaho Falls Co~lsolidated hospitals. Inc., 11 1 Idaho 44, 47, 720 P.2d 
632,635 (1986), and Johnson v. Allied Stores Cop., 106 Idaho 363,368,679 P.2d 640,645 (1984). 
The cove~lant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract. &e, Luzar v. 
Western Surety, 107 Idaho 693,696,692 P.2d 337,340 (1984). A violation of the covenant occurs 
when "either party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract." Sorensen 
v. Collun Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 669, 799 P.2d 70,75 (1990). 
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Generally, Idaho courts will not permit aparty to avoid its contractual obligations. Srriith v. 
Idaho State University Federal Credit Urlion, 114 Idaho 680,284, 760 P.2d 19,23, (1988). Idaho 
Courts have long held that "an agree~nent voluntaiily made between comnpetent persons is not lightly 
to be set aside . . . because it has tu111ed out unfortunately for one party." Stearns v. Williams, 72 
Idaho 276, 283, 240 P.2d 833, 837 (1952). Additionally, a contract should be constlued nlost 
strongly against the party that prepared or wroteit. J-I, 2006 Ida. Lexis 
In the present case the evidence illustrates the existelice of the contract and the breach by 
Cornerstone. The parties' contract is evidenced by the notes, agendas and the April 2005 
me~nurandum, all of which were written and/or signed by Cornerstone. (Icendrick Aff. 77 17, Ex. 
C,  18, Ex. D, 35, Ex. G, 38, Ex. H, 39, Ex. I, 40, Ex. J.) The April 2005 memorandurn is pa~ticularly 
insighthi since it was drafted by Cornerstone's Member Manager and reads in part, as follows. 
Regarding the equity interest in theproject to APS - I  have searched my notes, 
and literally evely file I have, but have found nothing. However, I specifically recall 
that we all discussed and agreed to an equity participation of either $550 or $725 per 
home to APS. I am therefore proposing a payment of $625 per home which would 
equate to $175,000 to you as an equity participant on the Single Family Homes and 
roughly $20,000 on the Multi-Family Vl~its, for a total of $195,000. However, the 
last thing I want to do is short change you. Therefore if you relnelnber the number 
to be different, then let me know. 
(Kendnck Aff. '/j 35, Ex. G.) 
The contract is furtller evidenced by Cornerstone's own admissions. In Cornerstone's Answer to 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, Cornerstone adinits there was an agreement to pay APS $750.00 
per- lot, but alleges such obligatioll was contingent upon APS providing full financing for the entire 
development project. (Answer 1 13.) 
Cornerstone's contingency ai-gument is flawed and without merit. First, Mr. Tallman, is the 
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only member of Cornerstone to allege a contingency existed that required APS to provide complete 
funding in order to receive $750 per lot. Mr. Tallman bases his contingency argument on his 
"understanding" of the agreement, that he learned, second hand, from Mr. Pool, not APS. (Dep. of 
Tallman at 56, lines 9-21, 94, lilies 22-24, 91,linel7.) Fu~theitnore, Mr. Pool, the source of Mr. 
Tallmaui's "understanding" and Mr. Kendlick, the Member Manager of Cornet-stone, both state that 
there never existed any sort of contingency that required APS to provide full funding of the 
developinent project in order for APS to receive $750 per lot. (Pool Aft  77 10, 17; Kend~ick Aff. 
77 1,28; Dep. of Scott Tallman at 13, lines 3-20 (admitting Mr. Kend~ick was the Member Manager 
of Cornerstone) .) The second reason Mr. Tallman's contingency argument is flawed is because Mr. 
Tallman's position is an internal issue of Cornerstone that he must resolve that has no bearing on the 
agree~nent between APS and Cornerstone. Mr. Tallinan is not a pasty in this action. Cornerstone 
is the Defendant and it is Cornerstone that entered into the agrreernent with APS. 
The evidenceunequivocally establishes that the agreement of$750 per lot was made between 
APS and Cornerstone. None of the ~nen~bers of Comerstone knew of the Idaho development project 
until APS brought it to their attention, hence the $750 payment per lot. (Pool Aff.7 14; Kendnck 
Aff. 7 14; Dep. ofScott Tallinan at 57, lines 12-14,) Dui-ing Con~erstone'spreli~ninary calculations, 
they projected to realize aprofit in the Idaho development project in an amount over two(2) million 
dollars. (Pool Aff7 15; Kendrick Aff. 7 15; Dep. of Scott Tallman at 55, lines 19-25.) That profit 
estiinatio~lirealization is now over tlu-ee (3) inillion dollars. (Dep. of Scott Tallman at 174, lines 23- 
25, 175 lines 1-6.) 
Due to APS bsinging the project to Cornerstone's attention, the funding agreeinent that was 
entered into, orally, between Cornerstone and APS for the Idaho real property development project 
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was as follows: APS would provide the down payment of approxinlately twenty percent (20%), 
which would be repaid at 10% interest. In addition, APS would receive $750.00 per lot sold in the 
developinent project. Furthennore, APS was to have the option of being able to lend on the 
illdividual homes to be built in the development project. The lending of money from APS to 
Coinerstone was to be secured by APS through a Prolnissory Note and Deed of Trust issued by 
Cornel-stone. (Pool Aff.7 16; Kendrick Aff. 7 16; See generally Dep. of Curtis DeYoung at 99, lines 
6-20.) 
In compliance with the agreement, on September 30,2003, APS perfoimed its obligation and 
provided the agreed upon 20% down payment, in the sum of $226,218.70, which was used to 
purclxase the property. APS was not provided a Pron~issory Note or Deed ofTiust at this time. (Pool 
Aff.7 18; Icendrick Aff. 7 19; See generally Dep. of Scott Tall~nan at 122, lines 15-25, 123, lines 1- 
2.) After providing the down payment as required, APS exercised its option to lend fui-ther monies 
on the project and did so by lending a combined total of $487,951.52 through February 2004. 
(Kendrick Aff. 7 24.) In March 2004, after more than five lnonths of not receiving a Prolnissory 
Note and Deed of Trust securing the allnost a half of a million dollars lent by APS' to Cornerstone, 
APS refused to lend kither funds to Cornerstone. (Pool Aff. 7 22; Kendrick Aff. 7 27; Dep. of 
Curtis DeYoung at 45, lines 18-23.) 
It was not until June, 2004, eight inonths after the original funds were lent, that Col-nerstone 
finally got around to attejnpting to provide APS with a Prornissoiy Note, which, by the way was 
inaccurate, as was each proposed draft submitted thereafter. (Kendrick Aff. 71 30, 33.); Dep. of 
Scott Tallinan at 130.) 
Cornerstone's only defense to the existence of the contract and it's breach of the contract is 
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its u~lsupported claim that the payment of $750 per lot was contingent on APS' jxoviding finalzcing 
for the entire project. However, there is no external evidence that supports Cornerstone's claim. 
There is nothing in writing that supports Cornerstone's defense. Additionally, thel-e is no testilnony 
from ally other source that supports Cor~~erstone's defense. All Cornerstone can offer is it's own 
bald assertion that a contingency existed. Col~lerstone has admitted that it has no evidence, 
whatsoever in this wl~ole world that will support its continge~~cy position. (Dep. of Scott Tallman 
at 119, lines 14-25, 120, lines 1-15.) 
The Court is acting as the trial of fact in this case. All the evidence that will be presented to 
the Court at trial concerning the $750 per lot issue is on tile record before the Court in these 
summaiyjudgxnent proceedings. Because of this the Courtis entitled and required"to arrive at the 
most probable inferences based upon the evidence before it and grant su~n~nafy judgment, despite 
the possibility of conflicting inferet~ces." APS requests that the Court view the evidence on the 
record and that the Court grant sunnnary judgment to APS finding that Cornerstone owes to APS 
the sum of $750 per lot as was agreed upon between the parties. 
V .  THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES DO NOT BAR RECOVERY BY APS. 
Cornerstone raises several affirnlative defenses in its Answer to Plaintiffs Amended 
Colnplaint in a11 effort to bar recovery by APS. However, none of the affirmative defenses raised 
by Cornerstone are in fact applicable to this case. These affirmative defenses include: (a) I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) (see First Affinnative Defense); (b) Statute of Frauds (see Second Affinnative Defense); 
(c) Accord and Satisfaction (see Third and Fourth Affirmative Defenses); (d) Detrilnental Reliance 
(see Fifth Affirmative Defense); (e) Failure to Confer a Benefit (see Sixth Affrrniative Defense); and 
(.f) Inconsistent or alternative causes of action plead in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (see Seventh 
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Affisinative Defense). 
A. Defense oT I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
The first affirmative defense raised by Cornerstone, which is I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), is improperly 
plead and cannot act as a bar to recovery by APS. The prior version of I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) allowed a 
party to plead in its answer to a colnplaint that the conlplaining pasty had failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. However I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) was an~ended on July 1,2004. I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) now reads as follows: "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, 
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive 
pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses shall be made by motion: . . 
, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be gsanted . . . " See, I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) (italics 
added). Coulerstone failed to raised its I.R.C.P. 12@)(6) claim in a proper motion before it filed its 
answer to APS' coinplaint. For this reason, Cornerstone has failed to properly plead its I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) claiin and has therefore waived this defense. Because this defense has been waived it 
cannot prevent APS froin obtaining sulninaty judgment as requested. 
B. Defense of Statute of Frauds. 
The affirmative defense raised by Cornerstone under Statute ofFrauds, in that this transaction 
i~lvolves real estate and wasn't reduced to writing cannot bar recovery by APS. This affirmative 
defense is set forth Inore .frilly in section 111. Satisfaction of Statute of Frauds, above. 
C. Defense of Accord and Satisfaction Does Not Apply. 
Cornerstone's afftnnative defense of accord and satisfaction is not applicable and does not 
bar recovery by APS. The elements of an accord and satisfaction are: (I) a bona fide dispute as to 
the arnount owed; (2) that the debtor tendered an atnount to the creditor with the intent that such 
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paymei~t would be in total satisfiction of the debt owed to tlae creditor; and (3) that the creditor 
agreed to acceptpayment iiz full satisfaction of the debt, or that both the debtor and the creditor 
understood that the acceptance of the check was in full paytnent of all sulus owed by the debtor. 
Beard v. George, 135 Ida110 685,689 23 P.3d 147,151 (2001) (italics added). Additionally, because 
accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense, the burden is upon the Cot~lerstolle to prove all the 
elements of ail accord and satisfaction. &, Id. citing, Clay v. Rossi, 62 Idaho 140, 108 P.2d 506 
(1940). 
In the present case, APS initially sought recovery for the underlyiilg amounts that were 
loaned by APS to Cornerstone. In the course of this litigation APS and the Cotnerstones have settled 
the payment of the ur~derlying amounts which were l o a ~ ~ e d  by APS to the Cornerstoile. The only 
issue that remains to be decided in this litigation is whether Cornerstone is also obligated to pay to 
APS the sum of $750 per lot. 
Nothing in the setile~nent between APS and the Cornerstone of the ui~derlyiilg loan claims 
acted as an accord and satisfaction of the $750 per lot a~llounts that yet reinail1 due and owing by 
Cornerstone to APS. Furthennore, the settienlent of theunderlyingpri~~cipal nd interest dispute was 
placed on the record before this Court on January 24, 2006. During that proceeding, it was 
specifically put on the record, with Mr. Icendrick and Mr. Tallmarl present and representing 
Comerstone, that the $750 per lot reinairled in issue and was not yet resolved. (ICendrick Aff. 1 4 1  .) 
Because the burden is on cornerstone to prove all the elements of accord and satisfaction, 
Comerstone cannot defeat summary judgment with nothing illore than a bald assertion. The 
evidence outlined above and on the Couit record evidences that the accord and satisfaction cannot 
be met. For this reason, in addition to those areas listed above, APS is also entitled to summary 
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judgnieiit on the issue of accord and satisfaction. 
D. Defense of Detrimental Reliance. 
As with all previous discussed affiniiative defenses, Cornerstone's affii~ilative defense of 
detrimental reliance cannot bar recovery by APS. The elements required to sustain a defense of 
equitable estoppel are: ( I )  a false representation or concealinent of a inaterial fact be made; (2) that 
the party asse~ting estoppel did not know ox could not discover the truth; (3) that the false 
representation or concealment be made wit11 intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the 
misrepresentation resulted in detrimental reliaiice on the part of the party asserting estoppel. 
Sclioonover v. Bonner County, 113 Idaho 916,919,750 P.2d 95.98 (1988). 
As outlined in the facts, there is no evidence whatsoever that APS made a false representation 
or concealed a material fact from Cornerstone. Co~~ierstone knew what the deal was from day olle 
of the agreement as outlined by the affidavits and depositions described above. Mr. Tallman's false 
understanding of the agreement is an issue between himself and the other Cornerstone members, but 
has iiothing to do with the fact that the agreement is what it is and was openly made between the 
parties. If Mr. Tallnian needed to discover the "truth" of the agreement or representations, he needed 
to look no further than to the other individuals ill Cornerstone, whom he leaned about the agreement 
frotn. Co~nerstoiie cannot establish that it relied upon, to its detriment, any false representations 
nlade by APS. Furthennore, it is difficult to understand the detriineiital aspect of this affirmative 
defense made by Cornerstone when Cornerstone is realizing a millioii dollars more in  profit than it 
originally expected. 
The burden is on Cornersto~le to prove all the elements of detrimental reliance or equitable 
estoppel. Cornerstone cannot defeat suintnary judgrnent with nothing more than a bald assertion. 
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The evidence outlined above and on the Court record evidences that there was an open, iu~own and 
agreed upon agreement between APS and Cornerstone, Cornerstone cannot satisfy eve11 one element 
of equitable estoppel. For this reason, in addition to those areas listed above, APS is also entitled 
to suininary judgment on the issue of detrin~ental reliance. 
E. Defense of Failure to Confer a Benefit. 
Furtheirnore Coilterstone's affinnative defense that APS failed lo confer a benefit is not 
supported by the record and cannot bar recovery by APS. This section is incorporaked into section 
IV. Breach of Contract set forth more fully above. Simply put, APS brought Colnerstone a project 
that Colilerstone is realizing a benefit of more than three (3) ~nil l iol~ dollars. 
F. Defense of Pleading in the Alternative. 
APS's Amended Complaint, which states alternative causes of action, does not bar recovely 
by APS. J.R.C.P. 8(e)(2) states in pertinent part: 
A party may set forth two or more stateinerlts of a claim or defense alten~atively or 
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When 
two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made 
independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the 
insufficiency of one or Inore ofthe alternative statements. A party may also state as 
inany separate clailns or defenses as the party has regardless of consistency and 
whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. 
See, I.R.C.P. 8(e)(2). -
In Cornerstone's Seve11t11 Affirn~ative Defense, it alleges that APS cannot proceed under the 
theories of breach of contract and unjust etuicl~ment. T h e  foregoing rule explicitly allows APS to 
proceed under said alter~lative theories. Nonetheless, APS does hereby waive and withdraws its 
unjust enrichment claim as plead in its Ainended Complaiirt. 
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VI. DAMAGES 
APS is entitled to sumnlary judgment on the damages it has suffered due to the Defendant's 
breach of the contract. 
Where two parties have made a contract which one of thein has broken, the darnages 
which the other pal-ty ought to receive ill respect of such breach of contract should 
be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i. e., 
according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such 
as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the collteinplation of both parties, at 
the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. 
Traylor v. Henkels & McCov. Inc., 99 Idaho 560, 561-62, 585 P.2d 970,971-72 (1978) 
In the present case there are 248 lots for which APS is entitled to be paid $750 for each lot, 
for a total of $1 86,000.00. (Aff. of Stephen J. Muhonen 74.) Conlerstoile admits that a right of first 
refusal existed on a commercial piece of real property located appurtena~lt to the underlying 
development project. This right of first refusal relative to the cotninercial piece of property aros:: 
directly from the purchase of the development real property for which APS provided the down 
payment f ~ ~ n d s .  (Dep. of Scott Tall~nan at 78,lines 22-25.) Cornerstone has admitted it exercised 
its right of first refusal and purchased the conl~nercial piece of property, bringing it within the 
developinent project. (Dep. of Scott Tallinall at 176, line 24, 177, lines 1-5.) 
The agreementbetween APS and Cornerstone conteinplated illat Cornerstone would pay APS 
$750 for each lot developed within the development project. For these reasons, in addition to those 
areas listed above, APS is also entitled to summary judgment awarding APS either $186,000.00, or 
$750 per lot sold and to be sold, plus $750 per lot on the coinmercial piece should it be subdivided. 
VII. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
In addition to receiving a lnoney judgment against Cotnerstone andlor a decree ordering 
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Co~nerstone to provide APS with a Promissory Note and Deed of Trust securing payment on the lots 
to be sold within the development project, APS should also be awarded its attorney fees and costs 
in this case. Idaho Code 5 12-120(3) specifically gives the Coult the authority to award APS its 
attorney fees and costs. Specifically S 12-120(3) states: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instiument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, 
wares, merchandise, or services and in any cornrnercial transaction unless otherwise 
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to 
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. The term "comnlercial 
transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except transactions for personal or 
household purposes. The tenn "party" is defined to mean any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
Idaho Code S 12-120(3) 
The monies loaned to Conlerstone pursuant to the agreenlent between the parties specifically 
qualify as a cornrnercial transaction as defined by the Idaho Code. Because this litigation is 
concerning a commercial transaction, APS should be awarded its reasonable attorney fees and costs 
as a lnatter of law and the Court should grant sun~nary judgment in favor of APS for these sums. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, APS is entitled to judgment requiring Cornerstone to pay Plaintiff 
$1 86,000.00 or $750.00 per lot sold and to be sold in the develop~nent project, plus $750 per lot on 
the co~nlnercial piece d r e a l  property if and when it is subdivided. 
DATED this B - d a y  of April, 2007. 
RACTNE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
By: ,d,df/Jy. 
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN 
Attoiney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the say of April. 2007,1 served a true and correct copy 
of the above and fox-egoing docunlent to the followitlg person(s) as follows: 
/' 
Penelope North-Shaul 1 U. S. Mail 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 'Postage Prepaid 
P. 0. Box 277 [ ] Hand Deliveiy 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 [ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile - 745-8160 
k ] ' % n a i l  
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COMES NOW Defendant, CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC., by 
and rbrough its attorney of record, Penny North Shaul, Esq., and hereby submits the 
following Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. FACTS 
Scott Tallman (hereinafter "Tallman") is the owner and sole shareholder 
of S.R. Tallman Construction, Inc., which originally operated in Ogdetn, Utah. 
Afiiddvit of Scott Tallman. In 2003, S.R. Tallman Consauction, Inc. was the 
general contractor on a few houses in Utah for an entity called P& B Enterprises, 
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Inc. (hereinafter c'P&B"), of which Martin Pool (hereinafter "Pool") was the sole 
shareholder. Afidavit of Scott Tallmun; Deposition of Martin Pool Transcript, p. 
12, in. 12-15. Through Martin Pool, Tallman met Brad Rendtick (hereinafter 
'LKendrick"), and Jonathan Reyes (hereinafter "Reyes"). Affridavit of Scott 
Tallman. Prior to Tallman becoming involved with Pool, P&B had borrowed 
funding &om Plaintiff, through Curtis DeYoung (hereinafter "DeYouug"). 
Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, p 112, in. 1-4; Deposition ofMartin Pool, p. 19, in. 
13- p. 21, in. 15. DeYoung is the sole shareholder and president of Plaintiff, 
American Pension Services, Inc. Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, p. 5 ,  in. 6-18. 
In the fall of 2003, as Tallman was leaving P&BYs office one day, DeYoung 
was coming in, and Pool said "this is the guy we have been tallcing abouf' to 
DeYoung. Deposition ofMartin Pool, p. 31, La. 10- p. 32, in. 14. DeYoung said 
he knew of an Idaho property for sale, and had someone Tallman needed to talk 
to. Afidavit of Scott Tallman. Within an horn or two, a representative from Old 
West Annuity and Life Insurance (hereinafter L'Old West") called Tallman. 
AFpiavit of Scott Tallman. Old West Annuity and Life owned a large parcel of 
real property located in Ammon, Idaho, known as Cornerstone Community 
Subdivision (hereinafter '<the Subdivision"). Affridavit of Scott Tallman. 
Within a few days, Tallman had arranged for DeYoung, Kendrick, and 
himself to fly to Spokane, Washington, to meet with a representative from Old 
West Annuity and Life Insurance. AfJ3davit of Scott Tallman; Deposition of 
Brad Kendrick, p. 71, in. 10- p. 72, in. 1. Tallman and Kendrick, as two of the fow: 
intended members of Defendant, which had not yet been legally formed, 
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negotiated a purchase and sale agreement between P&B Enterprises, Inc. and 
S.R. Tallman Construction, Inc., as purchasers, and Old West, as seller, for the 
Subdivision, in the approximate amount of one million two hundred thousand 
dollars, ($1,200,000.00). Affidavit of Scott Tallman. Del'oung agreed to ptovide 
financing, through his company, the named Plaintiff in this action, for the 
purchase of the property, and subsequent development/consttuction within the 
subdivision. Afidavit of Scott Tallman; Deposition of Martin Pool, p. 42, in. 9- 
20. Wbile still in Spokane, Washingron, Tallman specifically asked DeYoung if 
he was onboard to provide financing for the down payment, infrastructute 
imptovements, and consauction loans on the residential construction intended 
for the Subdivision. Afidavit of Scott Tallman. DeYoung indicated to Tallman 
he agreed to urovide all such funding for the completion of the Subdivision. 
Afidavit of Scott Tallman. 
After the meeting, DeYoung, Kendrick and Tallman had a discussion 
wherein DeYoung wanted additional compensation, termed by Plaintiff as an 
"equity position" to be paid upon closing of sale of each residence constructed 
and sold within the subdivision, contiwent uuon Plaintiff providing full funding 
of the development and construction within the Subdivision. Affidavit of Scott 
Tallman. Plaintiff provided the down payment necessary to secure purchase of 
the property, in the amount of approximately $240,000.00. Deposition ojBrad 
Kendrick, p. 86, in. 4-8. The Subdivision was purchased in September, 2003. 
Affidavit of Scott Tallman. The balance of the purchase price of the Subdivision, 
owed to Old West Annuity and Life Insurance, in excess of $1,000,000.00, was 
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paid for directly by Defendant from its own fimds, without any subsidy from 
Plaintiff. Affidavit of Scott Tallman. 
Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC was formed in the State of Utah on 
October 24,2003. Afidanrit of Scott Tallman. Its original members were 
Pool, Reyes, Kendrick and Tallman. Deposition of Brad Kendrick, p. 88, in. 
18-21. On January 22,2004, P&B and S.R. Tallman Construction, Inc., 
executed a Corporation Warranty Deed transferting the Subdivision to 
Defendant. Afidavit of Scott Tallman. 
While these legal maneuverings were occurring, Tallman was in the 
process of constructing residences in the Subdivision. Afidavit of Scott 
Tallman. Pursuant to the original agreement, Plaintiff provided funding to 
begin tbis construction. Affidavit of Scott Tallman; Deposition of Curtis 
DeYoung, p. 108, in. 14-17. In February, 2004, only partial construction of no 
more than ten (10) homes within the Subdivision had occurred with the amount 
of funds provided by Plaintiff. Afidanrit of Scott Tallman. 
At the end of Februaty, or first part of March, 2004, DeYoung called 
Tallman and indicated he was out of money and therefore was bowing out of the 
project. He wished Tallman luck, and said he was sorry he was unable to provide 
any further funding. Affidavit of Scott Tallman; Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, 
p. 48, in. 10-16. At the point DeYoung indicated Plaintiff was no longer able to 
participate and uphold its obligations, only ten (10) residences were under 
construction, and were less than half finished. Affidavit of Scott Tallman. 
Tallman was forced to obtain alternate financlag, which he did, through his 
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contact, Howard Kent. Kent began providing financing to Defendant in March, 
2004. Afidavit of Scott Tallman. On March 23,2004, Pool and Reyes 
withdrew as members, leaving Defendant and Kendrick as members.' 
Affidavit of Scott Tallman. 
From the beginning of its relationship with Plaintiff, continuing through 
August, 2005, Defendant sent several drafts of promissory notes and deeds of 
trust to Plaintiff for approval, memorializing the principal and interest owed by 
Defendant to Plaintiff. Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, p. 51, in. 19-24; Deposition 
of Brad Kendrick, p. 96, in. 21-24. However, Plaintiff never approved any of the 
proposed promissory notes and/or deeds of trust. Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, 
p. 101, in. 15 - p. 103, in. 19. Notwithstanding, all loaned money, plus interest, has 
been re-paid to Plaintiff. Afidavit of Scott Tallman. No outstanding loan 
balance remains outstanding, as explained hereafter. 
In addition to attempting to finalize a Deed of Trust and Note, Defendant 
made several lump sum payments on the principal and interest owed to Plaintiff 
during the relevant time set forth above. Afidavit of Scott Tallman; Deposition of 
Curtis DeYoung, p. 108, in. 17-20. In addition, Defendant attempted to obtain the 
payoff amount several times from DeYoung. Deposition of Brad Kendrick, p. lZ0, in. 
1 In June, 2006, Kendrick was removed as a member of the LLC 
pursuant to an agreement between Kendrick, Defendant and Scott Tallman. 
Scott Tallman is now the sole member of Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC. 
The original Utah LLC still exists, hut a new Idaho LLC has been formed, as 
of July 6,2006. All assets of the LLC are in Idaho, the subject real property is 
in Idaho. The real property still owned by Cornerstone Home Builders, 
LLC has been transferred from the Utah LLC to the Idaho LLC. 
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14 - p. 121, in. 14. In September, 2005, in response to Defendant's last proposed 
promissory note and deed of trust, DeYoung stated to Mary TeNgaio of AmeriTitle 
in Idaho Falls, Idaho, that Plaintiff would not loan Defendant any more money. 
Afjidavit of Mary TeNgaio. Thereafter, Defendant again made repeated attempts to 
ascertain the amount of principal and interest owed to Plaintiff, unfd such time as 
Plaintiff instituted this action, and filed a lis pendens on Defendant's real property, 
on January 10,2006. A m a v i t  of Scott Tallman. 
Defendant, at the time the lis pendens was filed by Plaintiff, was comprised of 
only two members: Tallman and Rendrick Afidavit of Scott Tallman. Neither 
Tallman nor Kendtick denied that there was money owed to Plaintiff for monies 
loaned. Afidavit of Scott Tallman. Defendant had made severat lump sum 
payments to Plaintiff to repay the original advance for purchase of the subdivision, as 
well as to repay the sums advanced by Plaintiff for beginning construction on 
approximately ten (10) homes within the subdivision. Afidavit of Scott Tallman. 
However, Plaintiff did not have a payoff amount for Defendant, despite repeated 
requests for such to Plaintiff, for several months. Afzdavit of Scott Tallman. 
Plaintiff claimed $226,218.00, plus interest, for a total of $260,000.00, in its 
original complaint. After careful review of all documents at its disposal, Defendant 
was able to ascertain the payoff amount, including interest accrued, to be $187,591.35. 
Afidavit of Scott Tallman. This amount was wired to Plaintiff, by Defendant, on 
January 24,2006. Afidavit of Scott Tallman. 
Upon payment of this sum, Plaintiff agreed to release its' lis pendens against 
Defendant's Subdivision. Defendant incurred approximately $40,000.00 in additional 
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interest accrued as a result of Plaintiffs refusal to give a payoff amount. Afidavit of 
Scott Tallman. Thus, the underlying ptincipal and interest owed by Defendant to 
Plaintiff has been satisfied in full. Afidavit of Scott Tallman The issue which 
remains for determination by the Court in this matter, per Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint, is whether Defendant owes Plaintiff $750.00, per closing, on all 
residential consauction within the Subdivision. The amount in dispute in this 
matter is roughly $186,000.00 (186,000 -+ 750.00 = 248 homes). Defendant does not 
concede that there are any sums due, much less based upon 248 lots. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
This Cowt is required to review a motion for summary judgment by applying 
the following standard: 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, 
affidavits, and discovery documents on file with the 
cot$ read in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. The burden of proving the absence of material 
facts is upon the moving party. The adverse party, 
however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits 
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
aial." In other words, the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a 
showing sufticient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party's case on which that party 
will bear the burden of proof at trial. 
Baxter v. Craney, I35 Idaho 166,170,16 P.3d 263,266 (2000) (citations omitted). The 
Court should "liberally construe the record in favor of the party opposing the motion 
for summary judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported 
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by the record in favor of that party. Walker v. Hollinger, W2 Idaho 172,175,968 
P.2d 661,664 (1998). Notwithstanding, the following also applies to the case herein: 
W h e n  a motion for summary judgment which has been 
properly supported with evidence indicating the absence 
of material factual issues, the burden shifts to the non- 
moving party to make a showing of the existence of a 
genuine material fact which would preclude summary 
judgment. This standard of review is not affected by the 
fact that both parties have filed motions for summary 
judgment. Rather, each motion must be separately 
considered on its own merits, with the coutt drawing all 
reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is 
under consideration. 
Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A., v. Woods, W5 Idaho 485,488-489 
20 P.3d 21,24-25 (2001). In the instant case, both Plaintiff and Defendant have filed 
Motions for Summary Judgment. 
B. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief mav be manted. 
In Paragraph IV, First Affumative Defense, of its Answer to Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, pursuant to IRCP 12@)(6). 
In instant case, Plaintiff wired funds on September 30,2003, to AmeriTide 
(formerly known as BonneviUe Land & Title) in Idaho Falls, Idaho, intended for use 
as a down-payment in the real estate transaction which subsequentfy resulted in 
purchase of the Subdivision by P&B and S.R. Tallman Construction. This same real 
property was transferred into Defendant's name, once said entity was legally formed. 
Plaintiffwired approximately $49,000.00 in sevetal smaller wires, also for 
Defendant's use in the development of the Subdivision. Over the course of 
approximately two (2) years, Defendant wired several payments to Plaintiff to pay off 
the funds loaned. Each of these wire transfers were sent, by instruction of Plaintiff, 
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to the following: Ametican Pension Services, Inc., Master Trust Account No. 
11014222. Payments were sent by Defendant to said Master Trust Account on August 
2,2004; January 21,2005; March 16,2005; April 1,2005; April 20,2005; May 6,2005; 
and December 14,2005. Afidavit of Scott Tallman. 
According to Plaintiffs deposition testimony, it is a third party administrator 
for pension plans. Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, p. 7, in. 2-17. All funds paid by 
Defendant were sent to a master trust account managed by Plaintiff. Afidavit of 
Scott Tallman. It  appears that Plaintiff was not actually lending the funds out, but 
administering such loans for pension plan or IRA participants who lodged their 
funds with Plaintiff. Plaintiff admitted at deposition that it forwards funds from 
pension funds without first obtaining security documents. Deposition of Curtis 
DeYoung, p. 112, in. 17-23. Any payments owed under an enforceable contract would 
be owed to the actual participants in such pension plans or IRAs, and not the 
Plaintiff herein. (Defendant does not herein concede that there is an enforceable 
contract, however.) Thus, Plaintiff is not entitled to the payments it now claims, and 
therefore, it has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and its 
Amended Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety. Plaintiff is entitled to nothing 
and has no standing in the instant case. 
C. The Idaho Statute of Frauds renders any oral contract entered into in 
this case unenforceable. 
In Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, it alleges breach of express contract (First 
Cause of Action), and breach of implied contract (Second Cause of Action). 
However, as discussed more m y  below, Plaintiff cannot maintain either its First 
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Cause of Action or Second Cause of Action, by application of the Idaho Statute of 
Frauds to the facts of this litigation. 
1. Idaho Code $9-505(4) prevents enforcement of any oral acreement in 
this case. 
Idaho Code s9-505(4) sets forth, in relevant part, the following rule: 
Certain agreements to be in writing.-In the following 
cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some 
note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and 
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. 
Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be 
received without the writing or secondary evidence of its 
contents: 
. . . 
4. An agreement ... for the sale, of real property, or of an 
interest therein, and such agreement, if made by an 
agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, 
unless the authority of the agent be in writing, 
subscribed by the party sought to be charged. 
Idaho Code 99-505(4). 
In the instant case, Plaintiff claims entitlement to payment from Defendant, 
in the amount of $750.00, per closing, on resider~tial ots located within the 
subdivision. Plaiatiff characterizes its claim as an "equity position" or "equity 
participation" in the Subdivision. Plaintiff alleged repeatedly during its deposition 
that it was entitled to a Deed of Trust and Promissory Note from Defendant, 
evidencing the alleged debt of $750.00, per closing, on residential construction within 
the Subdivision. Clearly, it is claiming an interest in the Subdivision. However, 
Plaintiff acknowledges there is no written document which memorializes any such 
agreement. Thus, the Statute of Frauds renders any such agreement for an "equity 
position" or other interest in the Subdivision unenforceable, and Defendant is 
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entitled to summary judgment as matter of law. 
2. Idaho Code c9-505(5) orevents enforcement of anv oral ameement in 
this case. 
Idaho Code s9-505(5) sets forth, in relevant part, the following nile: 
Certain agreements to be in writing.-In the following 
cases the agreement is invalid, d e s s  the same or some 
note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and 
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. 
Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be 
received without the writing or secondary evidence of its 
contents: 
~ ~ ~ 
5. A promise or commitment to lend money or to grant 
or extend credit in an original principal amount of 
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) or more, made by a 
person or entity engaged in the business of lending 
money or extending credit. 
The basis of this litigation arises from Plaintiffs promise or commitment ro 
lend two hundred forty thousand dollars ($240,000.00) for initial down payment on 
the purchase of the Subdivision, as well as all such additional funding as needed by 
Defendant to complete the residential construction within the Subdivision. 
Construction costs to date within the Subdivision, all of which have been iinanced, 
including the down payment and initial construction loans from Plaintiff, have 
exceeded twenty million dollars. These sums clearly exceed the fifty thousand dollar 
($50,000) requuement contained in I.C. 9-505(5), as set forth above. 
Plaintiff described its business as third party administrator of pension funds, 
but it also admitted that it engaged in providing numerous loans to third parties, 
5G4 
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conaected with its same business. Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, p. 112, in. 1-23. 
Plaintiff indicated it had loaned approximately $5,000,000 to P&B before it ever 
began its relationship with Defendant. Ibid. Plaintiff described its practice to loan 
funds and subsequently obtain security documents on such transactions. Ibid. 
Plaintiff loaned approximately $400,000 to Defendant through Febmaly 2004. In 
addition, all fuads loaned to Defendant were repaid through transactions directed to 
Plaintiffs Master Trust Account. Afidazlit of Scott Tallman. Thus, Plaintiff is an 
entity engaged in the business of lending or extending credit. Even if this Court 
accepts that Plaintiffs version of the oral agreement is correct, it still must determine 
that such oral agreement, for an amount in excess of $50,000, and involving an entity 
engaged in the business of lending or extending credit, is invalid because it so 
obviously violates the Statute of Frauds. Lettunich v. KeyBank National Association, 
141 Idaho 362,367,109 P.3d 1104,1109 G005). Therefore, Defendant is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
3. Partial ~erformance of any such oral contract does not preclude 
a~~l ica t ion  f the Statute of Frauds to the facts this case. 
Defendant anticipates that Plaintiff will argue that partial performance by the 
parties will preclude application of the Statute of Frauds (I.C. $9-505(4) and (5)) to 
the facts of this case, thereby rendering any oral agreement between the parties 
hereto enforceable by this Court. As support for this contention, Plaintiff wiU in all 
likelihood argue that it loaned $240,000 as a down payment on the purchase of the 
Subdivision, and that constitutes its entire obligation to Defendant, thereby 
indicating pan performance of the contract. However, the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated: 56- 45 
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Under Idaho law, part performance per se does not 
remove a contract from the operation of the statute of 
frauds. Rather '[tlhe doctrine of part performance is 
best understood as a specific form of the more general 
principle of equitable  stopp pel."' To be spec&alIy 
enforced by operation of the doctrine of part 
an oral agreement "must be complete, 
dehnite and certain in all its material terms, or contain 
provisions which are capable in themselves of being 
reduced to certainty." 
Lettunich v. KeyBank National Association, 141 Idaho 362,367,109 P.3d 1104,1109 
(2005), citations omitted. 
The crux of this case rests upon, the disputed terms of an oral agreement. 
Plaintiff maintains its only responsibility to Defendant under the terms of the oral 
agreement was that it lend $240,000 as a down payment on the purchase of the 
subdivision, to be repaid at ten percent interest (10%). In tetum, it claims it is 
entitled to not only fd repayment of monies loaned, plus interest, but also 
approximately $186,000 in additional compensation ($750.00 per closing on 
residential lots in the Subdivision, on approximately 248 lots) as an "equity 
participation" or "equity position" in the Subdivision. Defendant, as noted above, 
believes the terms of the agreement were substantially different. 
In Lettunich, the coutt determined that notwithstanding an inference that 
Lettunich had partialiy performed, there was "no evidence in the record of a 
complete and enforceable agreement." Lettunich v. KeyBank National Association, 
141 Idaho at 367,109 P.3d at 1109. The coutt looked at the following factors in 
reaching its decision: 
For example, there is no indication of the amount of the 
loan, the interest tate, the disbursement schedule, the 
terms of the repayment, the security for the loan, or the 
parties' rights after default. While none of these terms 
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individually may be determinative, the lack of all of 
them in this case makes the oral agreement to lend 
money vague, incomplete and unenforceable. 
Consequently, the doctrine of patt performance does not 
apply to this case. 
a i d .  In the instant case, the same factors are completely absent in regards to any 
oral agreement reached by Plaintiff and Defendant. 
The parties hereto are in complete disagreement as to the amount of funds 
Plaintiff was obligated to provide to Defendant. Plaintiff claims it was only obligated 
to provide one specific amount ($240,000); Defendant believes it was entitled to full 
funding of the Subdivision project by Plaintiff. There is no evidence of any agreed- 
upon disbursement schedule. There is no evidence regarding terms of repayment- 
there is no agreement regarding m i h u m  payments, repayment schedules, or even 
the mahuity date of any such repayment agreement. In fact, at deposition, DeYoung 
asserted that the principal and intetest were to be repaid within twelve (32) months 
from the date said funds were advanced, but none of the proposed Deeds of Trust or 
Promissory Notes contained such language. Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, p. 108, 
In. 9-16. Of the proposed Deeds of Trust and Promissoiy Notes submitted to 
Plaintiff for approval, not one contains a provision that the maturity date of the Note 
was within twelve (32) months from the date funds were advanced, or from the date 
of the Note itself. Afidavit of Scott Tallman. Nor did Plaintiff ever send any written 
objections regarding the proposed matutity date(s) of proposed Notes. Afidavit of 
Scott Tallman. 
Furthermore, in its Response to Request for Admission No. 2, Plaintiff 
admitted it exhausted its funds to be loaned at ten percent (10%) intetest, and then 
offered funds to Defendant at twelve petcent (32%) interest. This arguably provides 
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support that no definite agreement existed between the parties such that this Court 
could find part performance of an oral couttact with specific, definite and complete 
terms. No evidence exists as to any defined right of either party after default, as 
well. 
Of more import, however, is the fact that there is no definite agreement as to 
the form of security required in this agreement. Plaintiff claims it was entitled to 
$750.00, per closing, on lots in the Subdivision secured by a Deed of Trust and 
Promissory Note. At deposition, Plaintiff claimed it did not accept proposed Deeds 
of Trust and Promissory Notes from Defendant, for a variety of reasons: there was 
no interest provided for; there was no provision of payment of the $750.00 per 
closing; the date of disbursement was incorrect; and the Deed of Trust was correct, 
but the Note did not contain the $750.00 per closing. At deposition, Kendrick 
indicated there was no reason to include the $750.00 per closing in a proposed Deed 
of Trust. Deposition of Brad Kendrick, p. 111, in. 14 - p. 112, in. 23. Yet, a 
promissory note without the security of the correct amount, lodged in a deed of trust, 
is at best an unsecured promise of future payment. It appears even Kendrick and 
DeYoung do not agree on what obligations were truly owed by Defendant to Plaintiff 
in this regard. Therefore, there is no definite agreement, with specific terms, which 
this Court could find from the facts of the case. It is clear that the parties did not 
even have a specific agreement as to whether the $750.00 per closing on residential 
construction was to be secured by interest in the property, or was simpfy an 
unsecured obligation. Again, the facts indicate the orat agreement lacked such 
crucial terms that it became vague and incomplete in its terns, and therefore, is 
unenforceable. Therefore, the ~efeud&t is entitled to summary judgment herein. 
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4. Idaho Code s9-508 renders any oral ameement between the uarties 
hetto unenforceable. 
Idaho Code §9-508 states the foUowing: 
Real estate commission contracts to be in writing.-No 
contract for the payment of any sum of money or thing 
of value, as and for a commission or reward for the 
finding or procuring by one person of a purchaser of real 
estate of another shall be valid unless the same shall be 
in writing, signed by the owner of such real estate, or his 
legal, appointed and duly qualified representative. 
In the instant case, PIaintiff claims that it is entitled to a fee of $750.00, per 
closing, on residential construction within the subdivision, because it brought the 
o p p o d t y  to purchase the subdivision to the attention of Defendant. It claims that 
it brought the purchaser (Defendant) to the sellers (Old West), and facilitated the 
sale of the Subdivision to Defendant. Kendrick indicated that the "equity position" 
was derived fcom providing this information to Defendant. Kendrick states as 
follows: 
A. ... He would lend-he--APS would lend the monies 
needed for the down payment on the project. 
And he said-I can't give you a verbatim, but I 
remember again us talldrtg about, wow, that's very 
generous. 
And be said, "Guys, I don't want to be-I don't want 
to be in your project as a partner in it." He said, "I 
just want a small equity piece in the project." 
And that's when we first talked about $750 a lot for 
him bringing the deal to us. 
Deposition ofBrad Kendrick, p. 82, in. 6-16. 
When asked what an <'equity position" or "stakeY'meant, Kendrick responded 
as follows: 
Q. What does that term mean to you? 
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estate deals, development deals, there's typically an 
equity participant, somebody that bring the project 
or makes the project happen, that they get an equity 
piece of the project for bringing the project. 
Sometimes that's all they do, no more, no less. 
I've gotten hundceds of thousands of dollars as an 
equity participant. I didn't put one dime in the 
project, but I brought the project and- 
Q. So an equity position is a payoff for bringing a real 
estate deal, a realty- 
A. That's one definition. I mean, multiple definitions. 
But yes, absolutely. 
Q. In this context, Mr. Rendtick, what did it mean? 
A. In this context, it meant Curtis was going to have 
APS lend 200 some odd thousand dollars in addition 
to other costs to get us started. And for that, he 
wanted a $750 per lot equity position for bringing the 
project. End of story. 
Deposition of Brad Kendrick, p. 83, in. 2-24. 
Essentially, Plaintiff is claiming a "reward" from Defendant for notifying 
Pool, Tallman, Kendtick and Reyes, who subsequently formed the members of 
Defendant in late 2003, that the Subdivision was available for purchase. Plaintiff had 
no ownership interest in the Subdivision as it was owned by Old West. Plaintiff did 
not become a member of Defendant's legal entity. Thus, Plaintiff is really claiming a 
finder's fee, or commission for bringing the purchaser and seller of real estate 
together. Such transaction requires a written agreement, which does not exist in this 
case, to be enforceable. Hence, Plaintiffs claim is unenforceable. Therefore, 
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
D. Defendant has not been unjustly enriched. 
In Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, Foutth Cause of Action, PlaiitSf alleges 
that Defendant was unjustly enriched as follows: Plaintiff introduced Defendant to 
the Subdivision project and provided capital to Defendant, expecting in return a 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 17 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
promissory note and deed of trust seckng  the funds loaned, and said funds were to 
be repaid with interest, and a further payment of $750.00 per lot; Defendant has failed 
and refused to provide a promissory note and deed of trust, and has retained 
Plaintiffs funds, as well as refused to pay the $750.00 per lot. 
In order to sustain an allegation of unjust enrichment, Plaintiff must prove the 
following elements: "(1) a benefit is conferred upon defendant by plaintiff, (2) 
appreciation by the defendant of the benefit, and (3) acceptance of the benefit under 
circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit 
without payment of the value thereof." BHA Investments, Inc. v. State of Idaho, 
Alcohol Beverage Control Board, l38 Idaho 348,355,63 P.3d 474,481 (2003). The 
Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the measure of 
recovery under a contract implied in law. A contract 
implied in law, or quasi-contract, '5s not a contract at 
all, but an obligation imposed by law for the plupose of 
bringing about justice and equity without reference to 
the intent of the agreement of the parties, and some 
cases, in spite of an agreement between the 
parties". . . .Recovery under unjust enrichment theory.. .is 
limited to the amount by which the defendant was 
unjustly enriched. 
Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827,834,103 P.3d 440,447 (2004). 
Finally the following rule applies to a claim based upon unjust enrichment: 
Generally, a party cannot recover under the equitable 
theory of unjust enrichment where t h e ~ e  is an 
enforceable express contract covering the same subject 
matter. However, 
[tlhe existence of an express agreement does not in 
and of itself signify that an action for unjust 
enrichment cannot be brought. Rather, orrly when the 
express agreement is found to be enforceable is a court 
precluded from applying the equitable doctrine of 
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unjust enrichment in contravention of the express 
contract. 
Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012,1017,829 P.2d 1361, - (Ct.App. 1992). 
As set forth above, Defendant submits that any ageement between the parties 
hereto is rendered unenforceable by application of the Statute of Frauds. Iu the 
instant case, Plaintiff had no ownership interest in the Subdivision-it was owned by 
Old West. Thus, Plaintiff has no right to an "equity" position in the Subdivision. 
Plaintiff had very limited involvement overall in the project itself. Plaintiff made a 
phone call to put Tallman in touch with Old West, and subsequently flew to Spokane 
with T a b a n  and Rendrick, primarily to approve the financing of the purchase of the 
Subdivision. Plaintiff loaned the down payment required for purchase of the 
Subdivision, as well as smaller loans for infrastructure, and several construction 
loans. 
AU of these funds have been paid back to Plaintiff by Defendant, plus interest 
(at ten percent (10%)). Thus, Plaintiff has been completely made whole for any 
benefit it conferred on Defendant, plus compensation for said benefit in the form of 
the interest which accrued and was paid by Defendant. It would be an injustice to 
allow Plaintiff to recover not only the interest paid by Defendant, but more than 
$186,000 in "payments per lot" as claimed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff essentially is 
attempting to get double recovery for the funds loaned to Defendant. Further, 
Plaintiff is attempting to circumvent I.C. $9-508, which requires that any payment for 
procuring a purchaser of the real estate of another must be in writing to be 
enforceable. Plaintiff should not be allowed to nullify the effect of the statute in this 
instance. Therefore, based upon the foregoing application of law, Defendant is 
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entitled to summary judgment. 
E. Plaintiff cannot su~port  its claim of kaud awainst Defendant. 
1. Plaintiff has failed to set foab its allewation of fraud against Defendant 
with particularity. 
In its Amended Complaint, Third Cause of Action, Plaintiff has alleged that 
Defendant has perpetrated fraud upon Plaintiff. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9@) 
requires that Plaintiff state "the circumstances constituting fraud.. .with 
particularity". IRCP 9@). Plaintiff fails to particularly identify any 
misrepresentations made by any member of Defendant at the time the oral 
agreement to provide financing was entered into by Plaintiff and Defendant. 
Plaintiff merely alleges in its Amended Complaint that Defendant "made 
representations" without identifying what the same may be. Defendant is unable to 
identify what such representations may be, but if Plaintiff is relying upon the 
substance of the oral agreement, set forth above, its claim based in fraud must still 
fail. In Eastern Idaho Economic Development Council v .  Lockwood, 139 Idaho 492, 
80 P.3d 1093 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court held that promises made the lender 
(EIEDC) to secure execution of a continuing guaranty document "were, at best, 
promises of future performance" and the same "did not amount to a particular 
allegation of misrepresentation in the inducement". Eastern Idaho Economic 
Developrizent Council v .  Lockwood, 139 Idaho 492,497,80 P.3d 1093, - (2003). 
In the instant case, the intentions or agreement by Defendant to execute a 
Deed of Trust or Promissory Note in favor of Plaintiff were, at best, promises of 
future performance, the terms of which were not even specifically agreed upon, as 
discussed above. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 
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granted and therefore, PlaintifPs Third Cause of Action, Fraud, must be dismissed in 
its eniirety. 
2. Plaintiff isunable to vrove all required - elements to sustain an action of 
fraud against Defendant. 
As noted above, in its Amended Complaint, Third Cause of Action, Plaintiff 
has alleged that Defendant has petpetrated fraud upon Plaintiff. In order to prove 
this allegation, Plaintiff must prove the following elements: ''(1) a statement or 
representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of 
its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of 
the falsity; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; (9) resultant injury". 
Lettunich v. KeyBank National Association, 141 Idaho 362,368,109 P.3d 2104,1110 
As set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to set forth its claim based upon fraud 
with particulatity. Therefore, Defendant is unable to coherently discuss the first 
three (3) required elements of a claim of fraud. As for the fourth element, knowledge 
of falsity of the statement, Plaintiff is unable to prove that, at the time the oral 
agreement was discussed or entered into between the parties was made, Defendant 
did not intend to sign a Promissory Note and Deed of Trust in favor of Plaintiff. At 
deposition, Plaintiff, through its designee, DeYoung, admitted Plaintiff has no proof 
that Defendant did not intend to execute such a Note and Deed of Trust: 
Q. AU right. At the time the money was loaned, do you 
have any factual information that the-the intended 
members of Cornerstone did not intend, at that point, to 
sign a note and deed of tmst? 
A. No, I have none. 
Q. Okay. And in fact, you could have ptovided a note 
and deed of trust that comported with what you 
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believed to be the oral agreement, correct? 
A. It's possible, yes. 
Deposition of Curtis L. DeYoung, Transcript, p. 106, ln. 19 - pg. 107, ln. 3. Further, 
DeYoung admitted that several proposed trust deeds and promissory notes were 
presented to him for approval including a signed Deed of Tmst, but he never 
approved or recorded any of the proposed documents. At deposition, he testified as 
follows: 
Q. Would you agree with me that a trust deed was, in 
fact, supplied to you in August of 2005? 
A. You can provide as many trust deeds as you want, 
but without a recordation, they don't mean anything. 
Q. Could you have recorded it when it was provided to 
you? 
A. I presume so, if they were signed. The trust deed 
prior to-I'm sure which one you're talking about. 
But a lot the trust deeds that I-the copy of the two 
trust deeds were not signed. 
Q. okay. 
G I was sent copies unsigned. 
Q. Okay. Did you approve of any of those trust deeds? 
A. Recorded interests can be recorded by anybody. 
Q. That's not- 
A. By the owner of the property. 
Q. Mr. DeYoung, thafs not what I asked you. What I 
asked you is: did you approve of any of the trust 
deeds that were sent you by CornerStone? 
A. The trust deeds were fine. The notes were not fine. 
Q. Okay. So you could have recorded any of the trust 
deeds if they were fine; is that not correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. But you didn't record them yourseff for your 
company? 
A. They were to be recorded by CornerStone. 
Q. That wasn't my question. My question was: Did 
you record them yourself? 
A. No, I did not tecord them myself. 
Q. Okay. And you did not record them on behalf of 
your company? 
A. No. I did not. 
Q. Okay. And did you provide, at any point, a 
promissow note and deed of ttust that you were 
comfortable with to 
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A. No. 
Q. Could you have? 
A. I could have. 
Q. Okay. But you chose not to, correct? 
A. A practice in waste of time fot somebody who 
wouldn't sign something, that wasn't what I was 
going to do. 
Q. Okay. 'Who woulc¶n9t sign something? 
k Neither Scott nor Brad. 
Q. How do you know that? 
k The first note had no interest on it. 
Q. Okay. That's-but I'm talking about if you had 
provided documents for them to sign, you never did 
that? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Okay. So you tea& don't know if you had provided 
such documents they have signed it, correct? 
A. No, I don't know that. 
Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, Transcript, pg. 101, la. 15 - pg. 103, En. 23. 
Thus, by Plaintiffs own admission, it received several drafts of Notes and Deeds of 
Trust, none of which it approved for recordation, and it failed or refused to provide 
its own drafts of such documents for signature by Defendant, throughout the 
relevant times to this proceeding. No evidence exists that Defendant fraudulently 
induced Plaintiffs agreement to provide funding of the Subdivision project. No 
evidence exists that Defendant did not intend to provide a Deed of Trust or 
Promissory Note. 'What is apparent, however, is that there was no meeting of the 
minds as to the rights and responsibilities of the parties, and there was no agreement 
as to how any agreement was to be carried out between the parties. As such, 
Defendant must be granted summary judgment on the Third Cause of Action 
(Fraud) in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, because Plaintiff is unable to prove aU 
material elements required to sustain this cause of action. 
E. Plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action for breach of implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dea lh .  F o - - 
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In the instant case, Plaintiff hasalleged a breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing by Defendant in its Seventh (sic) Cause of Action in its Amended 
Complaint. Idaho law on this point is as follows: 
"The impLied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a 
covenant implied by law in the parties' contract." It 
"arises only regarding terms agreed to by the parties." 
"The covenant requires that the parties perform, in good 
faith, the obligations imposed by their agreement.. . ." 
Lettunich u. KeyBank Nationa2Association, 141 Idaho at 368,109 P.3d at 1110, 
citations omitted. Defendant, notwithstanding Plaintiffs failure to provide full 
funding for the subdivision project, made several payments to Plaiitiff throughout 
2004 and 2005 to reimburse the pnhcipal and interest owed to Plaiitiff for funds it 
actually lent to Defendant. Defendant has now paid the principal and interest owed 
to Plaintiff, in full. Defendant attempted numerous times to obtain a pay-off amount 
throughout 2004 and 2005, culminating in a payment in full in January, 2006. 
Defendant attempted numerous times to provide Plaintiff with a Note and Deed of 
Trust, requesting approval and acceptance by Plaintiff prior to recording any Deed of 
Trust. Approval, however, was never forthcoming ftom PIaintiff. Therefore, there is 
no material issue of fact that Defendant did in fact attempt to honor its agreement 
with Plaintiff to repay the principal and interest owed to Plaintiff. 
Further, as noted above, any agreement entered into by Plaintiff and 
Defendant were oral and therefore, the Statute of Frauds is applicable. As discussed 
above, the oral agreement of Plaintiff and Defendant is unenforceable under the 
plain language of I.C. s9-505(4) and (5) (as well as I.C. §9-508). Therefore, because 
the agreement between the parties is unenforceable by operation of I.C. 09-505(4) 
and (9, "there are no obligations imposed by the agreement that the parties are 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this > 2 day of April, 2007. 
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COMES NOW Defendant, CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC., by 
and through its attorney of record, Penny Noah Shaul, Esq., and hereby submits the 
following Response to PlaintifPs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
I. FACTS 
Please see the Facts set forth in Defendant's Memotandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, together with the affidavits and pleadings attached 
thereto. 
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11. ARGUMENT 
A. Anv ameement between Plaintiff and Defendant is unenforceable 
pursuant to the Statute of Frauds. 
1. The Statute of Frauds is ao~licable to this case. 
Plaintiff argues that the Statute of Frauds (I.C. s9-503) does not bar recovery 
because "the parties did not intend to transfer any property in any way that would 
bting the statute of frauds into play as to the payment of the $750.00 per lot 
agreement." Plaintiff claims that its sole contention, that Defendant has a 
contractual obligation to pay $750.00 pet lot at closing, and to secure said obligation 
by note and deed of trust, does not involve a transfer of real property. 
Idaho Code s9-503 states, in pertinent part 
No estate or interest in real property.. .can be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, otherwise 
than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other 
insttnment in writing, subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, 
or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
Idaho Code s9-503, emphasis added. The Idaho Supreme Court has held as follows: 
A deed of trust is a conveyance of real property. I.C. 
s45-1513. To be valid, a conveyance of property requires 
delivety of the instrument. McLaws v .  Casey, 88 Idhao 
348,353,400 P.2d 386,389 (1965); see also Walter e. 
Wilhite Revocable Living Trust v. Northwest Yearly 
Meeting Pension Fund, 128 Idaho 539,547,916 P.2d 1264, 
1272 (1996). Delivery is sufficient when the grantor parts 
with control of the deed and does not retain a right to 
keep it. Williams v .  Williams, 82 Idaho 451,455,354 
P.2d 747,749 (1960). Delivery has not been 
accomplished merely when the grantee knows of the 
existence of a deed. Glander v .  Glander, 72 Idaho 195, 
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Although for practical purposes a deed of trust is only a 
mortgage with power of sale, title to the teal estate does 
pass for the purpose of the trust. Long w.  Williams, 105 
Idaho 585,587-88,671 P.2d 1048,1050-51 (1983). Legal 
title to the property is conveyed by deed of trust to the 
trustee. I.C. s45-1502(4). Like any deed of trust, a deed 
of trust must be delivered to give it effect. Only after the 
obligation secured by the deed of trust is satisfied is the 
deed of trust re-conveyed to the grantor. I.C. s$ 45-1202, 
45-1203. 
Defendant A w. Idaho State Bar, I32 Idaho 662,664-65,978 P.2d 222,225-26 (1999). 
Thus it is clear, that a deed of trust does in fact convey an interest in real property. 
Plaintiff indicates it has sought and contiaues to seek a deed of trust and promissory 
note from Defendant to secure funds it claims are due &om Defendant. PlainfifY is 
clearly seeking creation of an interest in the real property owned by Defendant. As  
such, the Statute of Frauds is applicable to the facts of this case. 
2. No written documents exist that fullv satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
Plaintiff attempts to piece together a written memorandum of a third party to 
satisfy the Statute of Frauds, through several documents, alleging "various 
memorandums, notes and agendas evidencing the $750 per lot agreement" exist. 
Idaho Code $9-503 requires that an instrument intended to create an interest in teal 
property be subscribed by the paxty intending to create the interest. BlacKs Law 
Dictionary defines the word "subsctihe" as follows: "Literally to write underneath, 
as one's name. To sign at the end of the document". See also "subscriber" (one who 
writes his name under a written instrument; one affixes his signature to any 
document, whether for the purpose of authenticating or attesting it, of adopting its 
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terms as his own expressions, or of binding himself by an engagement which it 
contains". BLACKS' LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (6* ed. 1990). In the instant case, 
only one of the documents relied upon by Plaintiff, and purported to memorialize the 
alleged agreement is "subscribed" by anyone (Brad Kendtick, acting without 
authority): an April 7,2005 document titled "APS Financial Reconciliation, and 
attached as Exhibit G to an affidavit of Brad Kendtick, submitted by Plaintiff in 
support of its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Second 
Affidavit of Scott Tallman. 
The relevant portion of the "APS Financial Reconciliation'' document is as 
follows: 
Regarding the NOTE amount - Based on the above 
numbers, the note amount should be $300,054.42. I 
would like to get this Note and Deed of Trust recorded, 
in APS's name, if we all agree on this amount. 
Regarding the equity interest ia the project to APS -I 
have searched my notes, and literally every file I have, 
but have found nothing. However, I specifically recall 
that we all discussed and agreed to an equity 
participation of either $550 or $725 per home to APS. I 
am therefore proposing a payment of $625 per home 
which would equate to $175,000 to you as an equity 
participant on the Single Family Homes and roughly 
$20,000 on the Multi-Family Units, for a total of $195,000. 
However, the last thing I want to do is short change you. 
Therefore if you remember the number to be different, 
then let me know. 
Nothing in the above language details the number of lots contemplated, or number 
of twin homes. There is no duration or due date; no discussion of the necessity to 
provide a Deed of Trust or promissory note to secure any amount; and no discussion 
of the respective patties' right and obligations relating to any agreement. In fact, the 
DEPENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
4 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM tic- 6 3  
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
only reference to preparation of a note and deed of trust is in regards to funds 
actually loaned by Plaintiff to Defendant, not to any sums owed on a per lot basis. 
Further, KendricWs memorandum does not reflect a Exed payment per lot amount, 
either. As the Idaho Supreme Court held in Lexington Heights w. Crandlemire, 140 
Idaho 276,92 P.3d 526: 
With respect to the Statute of Frauds, the issue is not 
whether the parties had reached an agreement. The 
issue is whether that agreement is adequately reflected 
in their written memorandum. "[Ejxecutory contracts 
and agreements for the sale of real estate must be 
complete and speak in definite terms of all the 
conditions, terms, and descriptions necessary to 
constitute the contract." Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho W3, 
141,100 P. 1052,1055 (1909). 
Lexington Heights v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276,282,92 P.3d 526, ___ (2004). 
Further, the mere fact that Defendant acknowledged that the correct sum 
discussed was $750.00, per lot, at closing, does not prevent application of the statute 
of frauds herein. The Idaho Court of Appeals, quoting 'WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS, s27:10 at 89-90 (4* ed. 1999), stated: 
"[iln order for the admission to operate to remove the 
bar of the Statute, it must in fact be an acknowledgment 
of the contract alleged, whether the admission is 
contained in a complaint, responsive pleading, 
deposition, other testimony, or otherwise in a judicial 
proceeding." 
Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485,492,20 
P.3d 21,27 (CtApp. 2001). In Treasure Valley, the defendant refused to accept 
several & a h  of an employment contract, which included a non-compete clause, 
prior to actually beginning employment with plaintiff. Dnting discovery, the 
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defendant acknowledged receiving drafts of the employment contract which 
contained the non-compete clause. The Treasure Valley court affirmatively stated as 
follows: 
"Where the 'admission' consists of statements merely 
conhrming ... that the defendant had agreed to certain 
terms different from those alleged by the plaintiff, it will 
not operate to remove the alleged contract from the 
Statute ..." WILLISTON, s27:10, at 91-92. See also 
Frantz, 111 Idaho at 1009,729 P.2d at 1072, where we 
held that there was no acknowledgment of an 
employment contract with a noncompetition clause even 
though the defendant did admit to a contract with all the 
other terms as alleged. 
Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 335 Idaho at 491-492,20 
P.3d at 27-28. Defendant has never admitted to the aUeped ofal contract in the form 
in which Plaintiff has alle~ed. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot now claim that 
Defendant's statements and pleadings have removed the facts of this case ftom 
operation of the Statute of Frauds. 
While the agreement at issue is not for the sale of real property, it involves 
conveyance of an interest in real property, as discussed above. The memorandum 
upon which Plaintiff attempts to rely is vague and indefinite, and completely fails to 
set forth the necessary terms of the agreement, as discussed above. Therefore, this 
memorandum fails to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, and 
Defendant is entitled to snmmary judgment as a matter of law. 
3. The doctrine of part perform+ce does not prevent application of the 
Statute of Frauds to the facts of this case. 
"Under Idaho law part performance per se does not remove a contract ftom 
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the operation of the statute of frauds. Rather, '[tlhe doctrine of part performance is 
best understood as a specific form of the mote general principle of equitable 
estoppel."' Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho at 
491-492,20 P.3d at 27-28; see also Lettunich v. Key Bank National Association, 141 
Idaho 362,367,109 P.3d 1104,1109 (2005). The elements of equitable estoppel are as 
follows (as to the party to be estopped): 
(1) Conduct which amounts to a false represenation or 
concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is 
calculated to convey the impression that the facts are 
otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which 
the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) 
intention, or at least an expectation, that such 
conduct shall be acted upon by the other party; (3) 
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. 
As to the party asserting estoppel applies, the following elements apply: 
(1) Lack of knowledge and of the means of 
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question[;] 
(2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; 
and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to 
change his position prejudicially. 
Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, W5 Idaho at 490,20 
In the instant case, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence to this Court 
that Defendant false% represented or concealed material facts from Plaintiff at any 
time relevant hereto. In fact, Plaintiff, through Curtis DeYoung, conceded it had no 
evidence that Defendant did not intend to sign a Promissory Note and Deed of rrust 
at the time funds were loaned to it by Plaintiff. Deposition of Cuds DeYoung, p. 106, 
In. 19-24. In addition, there is no evidence before this Court that Defendant induced 
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Plaintiff to lend funds to it while intending to not repay the same. Fnrther, there is 
no evidence that Defendant did not originally intend to pay Plaintiff the sums it now 
claims, per lot, at closing. Rather. the evidence before this Court is that Plaintiff 
failed and refused to provide full fun* for the subdivision project. and bv virtue of 
this breach bv Plaintiff. Defendant was relieved of any oral oblkation it chose to 
Thus, Plaintiff is unable to prove the elements of equitable estoppel, and 
therefore, the doctrine of part performance does not bar operation of the Statute of 
Frauds to this case. 
In regards to the elements applicable to Plaintiff in an equitable estoppel 
claim, Plaintiff is unable to prove "that the reliance by the party c l a i i  estoppel 
[is] referable only to the contractual term that is in dispute." Treasure Valley 
Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho at 490,20 P.3d at 26. Plaintiff 
has alleged that it is entitled to $750.00, per lot, at closing, due to PlaitiEE bringing 
the subdivision project to Defendant's attention, and for loaning the down payment 
required to purchase the subdivision. However, Plaintiff brought the subdivision to 
the attention of Martin Pool nearly two years before Defendant was involved in the 
project-there is no evidence before this Court that an agreement was entered into at 
that time. Deposition of Martin Pool, p. 34, in. 13 - p. 35, in. 2. Plaintiff did in fact 
loan funds to Defendant, but the fact that funds were loaned does not provide 
evidence of the terms of the alleged oral agreement. It simply provides proof that 
there was some form of oral agreement between the parties. Further, Plaintiff and 
Defendant both agree that the funds actually loaned by Plaintiff were to be repaid at 
ten percent (10%) interest, and in fact, were paid in full. including accrued interest, 
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in January, 2006. Again, these facts do not provide proof of the actual terms of the 
alleged oral agreement. The standard ivhich must be applied is that "performance in 
reliance upon an oral promise must be explainable only by existence of the promise. 
The performance must evidence the promise." Treasure Valley Gastroenterology 
Specialists, P.A. a. Woods, I35 Idaho at 490,20 P.3d at 26, quoting Frantz a. Parke, 
111 Idaho 1005,1111,729 P.2d 1068,1074 (Ct.App. 1986). Plaintiffs conduct with 
Defendant (discussing the project, loaning funds) is certainly equally explainable by 
the fact that it was negotiating to receive, and did in fact receive a fired interest rate 
on funds loaned. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot prove its reliance upon the conduct of 
the parties is referable only to the alleged agreement to pay $750.00, per lot, at 
closing. Thus, the Statute of Frauds applies to the oral agreement herein, and 
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
B. Plaintiff cannot sumort any causes of action against Defendant arising 
out of a claim based upon breach of contract. 
The Idaho Coutt of Appeals set forth the applicable definition and elements 
of a contract in Atwood a. Western Construction, Inc., 129 Idaho 234,923 P.2d 479, 
A contract is "a promise or set of promises for the 
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as 
a duty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS, 1 (1981). A promise is "a manifestation 
of intention to act or reftain &om acting in a specified 
way, so made as to justify a promise in understanding 
that a commitment has been made. Id., s2. A 
distinction must be recognized between promises and 
mere statements of opinion or prediction. In making 
this distinction, the inquiry is whether a reasonable 
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person in the position of the listener would conclude 
that the speaker had made a promise or only expressed 
an opinion, prediction or expectation. See 
RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, 2, 
Comment f (1981); J. Perillo, COIlBIN ON 
CONTRACTS, s1.15 (1993). This is a factuai issue and 
therefore ordinarily is to be determined by a jury. 
However, if the evidence reIating to the alleged promise 
is not conflicting and admits but one inference, the 
court may decide the issue as a matter of law. Watson v .  
Zdaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals, Inc., 111 Idaho 44, 
47,720 P.2d 632,635 (1986); Johnson v .  Allied Stores 
Corp., 106 Idaho 363,368,679 P.2d 640,645 (1984). 
Atwood v .  Western Construction, Znc., 129 Idaho 234,238,923 P.2d 479, - (Ct.App. 
1996). "There are essentially three types of contractual arrangements: express 
contracts, contracts implied in fact, and contracts implied in law." Podolan v .  Zdaho 
Legal Aid Services, Znc., 123 Idaho 937,942,854 P.2d 280,285 (Ct.App. 1993). The 
Podolan court stated: 
Express contracts require that the parties expressly 
agree regarding a transaction. Contracts implied in fact 
are those where there is no express agreement but the 
conduct of the patties implies an agreement from which 
the contxactual obligation arises. To find such a 
contract, the facts must be such that the intent to make 
a contract may be fairly inferred. Contracts implied in 
law--also known as quasi contracts, unjust enrichment, 
or restitution---are not contracts at all but are obligations 
imposed by law to provide a remedy without teference to 
the intentions or expressions of the parties. 
Podolan v .  Idaho Legal Aid Services, Znc., 123 Idaho 937,942,854 P.2d 280,285 
(Ct.App. 1993), citations omitted. 
1. There is no exaress contract between the parties hereto. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines an "express contracf' as "an actual 
agreement between the parties, the terms of which are openly uttered or declared at 
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the time of making it, being stated in distinct and explicit language, either oralty or 
in writing." BLACRS LAW DICTIONARY 323 (6" ed. 1990). In the instant case, 
there is no dispute that any agreement alleged between the parties was oral-no 
written contract exists. Defendant has not denied that there was an oral agreement 
between the parties hereto, to the extent that in exchpnge for Plaintiff providing full 
funding to the subdivision project, Defendant would repay aU funds loaned at ten 
percent (10Yo) interest, plus $750.00, per lot, at closing. Further, Defendant has even 
admitted that the sum discussed was to be fixed at $750.00, per lot, at closing. 
However, Defendant has always alleged that the oral agreement to pay the contested 
sums was contingent upon Plaintiff providing full funding of the subdivision project. 
Plaintiff claims there is no factual support for Defendant's position that the 
$750.00, per lot, at closing, was contingent upon full funding of the subdivision. 
However, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint (which is verified), filed with the Court on 
October 4,2006, alleges as follows: 
12. Following the initial wire transfer to Cornerstone 
and/or it manager(s) and/or its member(s) or 
individual(s) affiliated thereto, Plaintiff conhued to 
provide capital to Cornerstone through February 
2004, with such capital to be utilized on the 
development of the land as described above and in 
the aforementioned Warranty Deeds. 
13. Prior to Plaintiffs agreement with Cornerstone 
and/or it manager(s) and/or member(s) or 
individual(s) affiliated thereto, to provide the 
foregoing stream of financing for the above 
mentioned construction and subdivision project, 
Cornerstone and Plaintiff verbally agreed to certain 
repayment terms, including but not limited to, an 
interest rate of ten percent (10%) per annum on the 
monies lent, a promissory note and deed of aust on 
the land in the construction and subdivision project, 
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as well as an agreement between Cornerstone and 
Plaintiff that Plaintiff was to receive $750.00 per lot 
sold in the project. 
Second A w a v i t  of Penny North Shaul, (emphasis added to quoted paragraphs), 
Plaintiff's own pleadings support the testimony of Scott Tallman, the sole remaining 
member of Defendant. Tallman testified at deposition that he aIways understood the 
agreement to be that Plaintiff would provide the down payment to purchase the 
subdivision, but also that Plaintiffwould fund the project through completion. 
Plaintiff now tries to explain that it sent subsequent wires (af&er the original wire on 
September 30,2003) "to help them get going" (meaning Defendant). Deposition of 
Cwtis DeYoung, p. 72, in. 22-p.73, in. 1. 
Plaintiff also now is claiming it had an option to loan additional funds to 
Defendant, but not a duty putsuant to any agreement. However, this contention is 
not supported by P la i i f f s  own pleadings, as set forth above---Plaintiff alleged that 
it entered into an agreement to provide a "stream of financing" to Defendant to be 
used in the subdivision project. No where, until recently, has Plaintiff alleged it had 
an optional agreement to provide funding. There is factually no reason for Plaintiff 
to have continued to provide funding to Defendant but for the fact that it had an 
obligation to Defendant to continue to provide a "stream of financing". 
Plaintiff attempts to show that Scott Tallman did not have &st hand 
knowledge of any alleged oral agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant. In fact, 
Scott Tallman did first hear of the project from Martin Pool. However, he was 
present during numerous conversations with Pool, Reyes, Kendrick and DeYoung, 
wherein these individuals were all discussing the project. Second Afidavit of Scott 
I L 
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Tallman; Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, p. 67, in. 10-16. Further, Scott TalJman 
spoke with C d s  DeYoung personally regarding Plaintiffs commitment to provide 
full funding of the project to Defendant. This conversation took place while he was 
still in Spokane with DeYoung and Kendrick, when these individuals were there 
negotiating the putcbase of the subdivision. Second Afjrdazrit of Scott Tallman. 
Clearly, Scott Tallman had first hand knowledge of any agreements and/or 
negotiations between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
In addition to the contested provision of the oral agreement, as noted above, 
Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence to this Court that the terms and conditions of 
the oral agreement were concise and detailed: there is no maturity date or due date; 
there is no legal description of the real property implicated; there is no defined 
number of lots implicated; there is no documentation which references a note and 
deed of trust specific to the oral agreement. Thus, Plaintiff cannot prove that there 
was an express oral contract between the parties hereto. 
As discussed above, the terms of the alleged oral agreement are not definite 
and concise, and fail to form a complete express contract. It follows, then, that 
Defendant cannot be held to have breached an express otal contract, given that one 
did not, in fact, exist. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
2. There is no implied in fact contract beisveen the parties hereto. 
As discussed above, an implied in fact contract is one in which there is no 
express agreement, but the conduct of the parties is such that it implies an 
agreement &om which obligations arise. As noted above, there is no express otal 
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agreement in this case. Neither, however, is there an implied in fact contract. The 
only implied in fact contract that can be inferred from the conduct of the parties is 
that Plaintiff agreed to loan funds to Defendant, which Defendant agreed to repay. 
PIaintiff had disclosed the subdivision project to Martin Pool nearly two years before 
Defendant even existed40 money was owed by any party to any party for that 
disclosure. Plaintiff loaned funds, through several transactions, from September 2003 
through February 2004--all these funds were repaid, at the agreed-upon interest, in 
several installments, and in any event, in full by January 2006. Even Brad Kendrick's 
memorandum dated April 7,2005, fails to provide support for an implied in fact 
contract-again, it faits to specify a sum certain, lots implicated, dnration of 
agreement, or any requirement of security documents. 
3. Defendant did not bteach any conttact. 
As noted above, there is factual support in Plaintiffs own pleadings in its 
Amended Complaint that Plaintiff was obligated to provide a "stream of financing" 
to Defendant to complete the subdivision. AEter the original wire transfer in 
September, 2003, Plaintiff wired several smaller loans to Defendant. Altogether, 
these sums totaled just under $500,000.00. Plaintiff never provided a promissory note 
or deed of trust for Defendant's execution to secure these sums. Second Afidavit of 
Scott Tallman. Plaintiff certainly had the opportnnity to provide such documents as 
the lender in this transaction. Deposition of C u d s  DeYoung, p. 103, In. 2-7. In 
February 2004, Scott Tallman received a call from Curtis DeYomg, on behalf of 
Plaintiff, indicating it had rnn out of funds, and was bowing out of the project. 
Second Afidavit of Scott Tallman. On behalf of Defendant, Scott Tallman was then 
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forced to seek financing from an alternate source in order to keep the subdivision 
project going. Second Afidavit of Scott Tallman. 
As noted above, Defendant does not concede that there was either an express 
or implied in fact contract in this case. Further, the Statute of Frauds precludes 
enforcement of any contract that may exist in the instant case. However, assuming 
for the sake of discussion only, that an oral contract existed that was enforceable, the 
party who initially breached such agreement is Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims there is no 
factual support for Scott Tallman's testimony regarding the call he received from 
Curtis DeYoung. However, at deposition, the following exchange occurred: 
Q. Okay. Are you specifically denying today that you 
informed Mr. Tallman you were not going to provide 
any funher funding for CornerStone Home Builders 
because you were out of money? 
A. No, I a m  not denying that. I'm just saying, I don't 
recall a conversation that went like that. 
Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, p. 48, In. 10-16. According to Scott Tallman, 
DeYoung indicated Plaintiff was "out of money". DeYoung did not deny this 
conversation at deposition, but did, in fact, deny that he .was out of money. 
Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, p. 49, In. 8. Further, in response to Defendant's 
written discovery request (Request for Admission No. 2), Plaintiffs verified response 
was, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Plaintiff did loan all the money which it agreed to loan 
and when such funds were exhausted, plaintiff provided 
funding sources which were willuq! and able to provide 
additional funding. Plain&% specihcally indicated that it 
was ready, willing and able to provide funding at the rate 
of 12% per annum and with 4 basis points on the loan, 
but defendant indicated that it could obtain a cheaper 
loan elsewhere and refused plaintifPs offer to provide 
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additional funding . . . . 
Ajqidavit of Penny North Shaul. Clearly, Plaintiff has admitted it exhausted the 
sources it was using to provide funds at the agreed-upon interest to Defendant. 
Clearly, Plaintiff was not capable of completing its obligation to provide funding at 
ten percent (10%) interest. Thus, Defendant herein submits that Plaintiff breached 
any oral agreement then in existence between the parties hereto by failing to provide 
funding at the agreed-upon rate of interest, throughout the subdivision project. 
According to Scott Tallman, as well as Brad Rendrick, Defendant made 
numerous attempts to determine the amount of funds owed to Plaintiff, and to 
submit proposed Deeds of Trust and Promissory Notes. According to Scott 
Tallman, a proposed Note was sent to Plaintiff, in June, 2004, to try to get Plaintiffs 
attention, due to its failure to communicate with Defendant. Second Ajqidavit of 
Scott Tallman. In September 2005, in response to a proposed Deed of T N S ~  and 
Promissory Note, which accurately reflected the remaining principal owed, Plaintiff 
indicated, through DeUoung, it would not loan any fuEther funds to Defendant. 
Second Afidavit of Scott Tallman. At deposition, Plaintiff admitted the Deed of 
Trust was accurate. Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, p. 102, in. 10-17. It could have 
been recorded, in fact. Further, Defendant was not trying to borrow more funds from 
Plaintiff-it was merely trying to fulfill its obligations regarding the funds loaned by 
providing security documents. Second Afidavit of Scott Tallman. In any event, at 
the point when Plaintiff again stated it would not provide funding to Defendant 
( a fhnhg  its intention to not honor any oral commitment it had to Defendant), only 
approximately forty-nine (49) houses were completed. Second Afidavit of Scott 
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Tallman. 
Defendant attempted repeatediy to obtain correct figutes to include in 
intended promissory notes and/or deeds of trust. Second Algidavit of Scott Tallman; 
Deposition of Brad Kendrick, p. 120, in. 14--p. 121, in. 1. Defendant was forced to 
obtain alternate financing in the midst of a huge hnancial undertaking, after relying 
on Plaintiffs promise to provide a "stream of financing" for the project. 
Unfortunately, Defendant relied upon Plaintiffs promise, to its detciment. Further, 
Defendant relied upon Plaintiff% assertion that it was bowing out of the project, 
thereby releasing Defendant from any obligation to Plaintiff, since Plaintiff was 
unable to provide full funding of the project. Plaintiff breached any oral agreement 
that may have existed first, and therefore, Defendant was released from any further 
obligations to Plaintiff. As such, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. 
C. Defendant's defense Dursuant to IRCP 12(b\(6) can be treated as a motion 
for summa? judgment by this Corn. 
Defendant concedes it did not He a separate motion pursuant to IRCP 
L2@)(6). However, this Court may tteat Defendant's a h a t i v e  defense as a motion 
for summary judgment, based upon the record herein, the pleadings on file, and the 
affidavits and deposition testimony submitted by the parties. Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b). In the instant case, all payments made by Defendant were required 
by Plaintiff to be sent to a Master Trust Account maintained by Plaintiff, presumably 
on behalf of its self-directed IRA/retitement clients. Defendant has directed 
discovery to Plaintiff to determine the m e  source of funds loaned, or held out by 
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Plaintiff to have originated from it. However, Plaintiff has refused to answer such 
discovery to date. Defendant can only surmise that the tcue source of the funds 
loaned to Defendant are in fact from the self-directed IRA/retirement clientele of 
Plaintiff, and therefore not from Plaintiff itself. Thus, Plaiitiff is not entitled to the 
relief it is requesting, in that it tnrly did not lend the funds, and all funds loaned by 
the actual sources have since been repaid, plus interest. Thus, Defendant is entitled 
to summary judgment as a matter of law because nothing is owed to the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff is entitled to nothing because the funds were supplied by thitd patties. 
Summary judgment must be granted in favor of the Plaintiff. 
D. Defendant is entitled to the protection of the Statute of Frauds. 
Defendant has set fo& its affirmative defense that Plaint8 is barred from 
recovery by application of the Statute of Frauds. Defendant has discussed this 
defense exhaustively in both its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed with the C o w  on April 24,2007, as well as above. Defendant wiU 
not herein revisit the same arguments, but incorporates and realleges them by 
reference herein. 
E. Defendant is entitled to summaq judgment based upon accord and 
satisfaction. 
Defendant does not dispute the elements of accord and satisfaction as set 
forth by Plaintiff. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on 
this issue. Fitst, there is no question there is a bona fide dispute as to whether any 
amount is owed to Plaintiff. Hence, the instant litigation exists. Second, Defendant 
did in fact tender $187,591.35, to satisfy the debt owed to Plaintiff by Defendant for 
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funds loaned to Defendant. This payment was addressed on the record on January 
24,2006. From Defendant's perspective, said sums were certainly tendered to totally 
satisfy the debt it owed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff accepted said payment in total 
satisfaction of the repayment of loans made to Defendant. While Defendant agreed 
that Plaintiff would be allowed to amend its complaint, it in no way conceded that 
there was a continued debt owed to Plaintiff. As argued above, there is no 
enforceable contract regarding the claims Plaintiff now raises. Therefore, because 
the actual loans to Defendant by Plaintiff have now been satisfied, Plaintiffs claims 
are barred by accord and satisfaction. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as 
a matter of law. 
F. Plaintiff is not entitled to recovery from Defendant pursuant to the 
affirmative defense of detrimental reliance. 
In order to sustain a defense of detrimental reliance, Defendant must 
establish the following: Defendant "must show that [it] reasonably and justifiably 
relied on a specific promise of the offending party and suffered substantial and 
foreseeable economic loss when relying on the promise." Podolan a. Legal Aid 
Services, Znc., 123 Idaho 937,943,854 P.2d 280,286 (Ct.App. 1993). In the instant 
case, Plaintiff, through DeYoung, specifically promised to Defendant, through Scott 
Tallman, immediately following the meeting with Old West, while still in Spokane, 
Washington, that Plaintiff would fund the subdivision project to completion. Second 
Ajqidavit of Scott Tallman. This is borne out by Plaintiffs allegations in its 
Amended Complaint, wherein in it alleges it was to provide a "stteam of financing" 
to Defendant to be used in the subdivision project. 
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Defendant began construction and improvements in the subdivision, based 
upon Plaintiff's promise to provide funding. Second Afji'davit of Scott Tallman. Of 
necessity, Defendant was requited to hite subcontractor crews to perform 
construction work within the subdivision. Second Afidavit of Scott Tallman. 
Defendant incurred the liability of paying the subcontractors for the work they 
performed relating to construction within the subdivision. Second Afji'davit of Scott 
Tallman. Thus, when DeYoung called Tallman at the end of February 2004, and 
notified him that Plaintiff was bowing out of the project, Defendant was forced to try 
to find another source of funding for the subdivision, suffering the foreseeable 
economic hardship of inability to pay its debts, including payment of subcontractors 
who had already performed work within the subdivision. Second Afidavit of Scott 
Tallman. Based upon PlaintifPs history of providing funding to Defendant relating 
to the subdivision project, Defendant's reliance upon the promise of a "stream of 
financing" was reasonable and justifiable. Defendant incurred the debt and liability 
owed to the subcontractors in reliance upon said specific promise, and was only able 
to satisfy its obligations to the subcontractors through its own efforts with another 
lender. Further, had Defendant not obtained another source of fundiug, once 
Plaintiff breached its specific promise to fund the project, Defendant could have 
foreseeably lost its ability to satisfy the outstanding balance owed to Old West on the 
property, and therefore, lost its ownership of the subdivision. 
Defendant was also given a second specific promise &om Plaintiff, in the 
form of its notice that it was out of funding, and was bowing out of the project. 
I 
I Defendant relied up DeYoung's statement on behalf of Plaintiff, and obtained 
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alternate Gnancing. Fuaher, relying on Plaintiffs notice that it was no longer going 
to be involved in the project, Defendant assumed Plaintiffwas no longer entitled to 
any payment other than to repay funds loaned by Plaintiff. Defendanfs reliance 
upon Plaintiffs withdrawal from the project was reasonable and justified under the 
circumstances-Plaintiff was no longer actively participating in the project in that it 
was no longer funding the project. 
Defendant is now subjected to this litigation and potential liability for relying 
upon Plaintiffs refusal to provide any fuaher funding of the project. Plaintiff has 
been reimbutsed fully for all funds loaned, plus interest. It now attempts to recover 
essentially half again of the funds it actually loaned to Defendant. Defendant relied 
to its detriment on Plaintiffs promise to remove itself from the project, and therefore, 
Plaintiff is estopped from asserting it is now owed any sums by Defendant, when 
Plaintiff failed to complete the terms of its agreement with Defendant. Therefore, 
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter on law on this point. 
G. Plaintiff has failed to confer a benefit on Defendant. 
Defendant is entitled to prevail on the defense that Plaintiff failed to confer a 
benefit on Defendant. Defendant herein realleges its argument above regarding 
Plaintiffs breach of confxact claim. Plaintiff brought the subdivision project to 
Martin Pool's attention nearly two yeats before Defendant became involved in the 
project. Deposition ofMartin Pool, p. 30, la. 4-8. At that time, Pool declined to 
engage in the project. Id. Importantly, Plaintiff itself did not embark on the project 
at that time, either. Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, p. 26, in. 23-25. Nearly two years 
later, when Scon Tallman entered the picture, the subdivision project became more 
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viable. However, until his involvement, no action was being taken in regards to the 
subdivision, by Pool, Kendrick, Reyes, DeYoung, or Plaintiff. Deposition of Martin 
Pool, p. 34, in. 3-12. Plaintiff had no ownership interest in the subdivision-at best, it 
had knowledge of a potential project, but it had shared that same knowledge nearly 
two years earlier, with no result, to Martin Pool. Plaintiff could not and did not 
develop the subdivision on its own. Plaintiff was not the only party with knowledge 
of the subdivision-any third party could have stepped in and developed the project. 
In fact, had Plaintiff not offered to fund the subdivision project, Tallman 
would have still pursued the project himself. Afidaivt of Scott Tallman. Had 
Tallman pursued the project himself, he would have found Enancing, and repaid said 
financing pursuant to a financing agreement--just as Defendant did with Plaintiff. 
It is true that Defendant was able to borrow the original down payment on the 
property, due to Plaintiffs agreement to loan funds. It is also true that Plaintiff 
provided several smaller loans through February 2004. The only benefit Plaiiff 
conferred on Defendant was loaning funds (and not even as fully agreed upon) to 
Defendant-for this benefit, Plaintiff has been reimbursed in full, plus accrued 
interest. The fact that Defendant is now realizing nearly three (3) million dollars 
through its own efforts at construction and development within the subdivision is not 
relevant-it does not prove that Plaintiff conferred a benefit on Defendant. 
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on this point. 
H. Plaintiff is not entitled to damages. 
Plaintiff alleges it is entitled to damages for breach of contract. Defendant 
herein realIeges its arguments set forth in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
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Summary Judgment. Further, as set forth above, there is no enforceable agreement 
between the parties hereto. It follows that any property purchased by Defendant 
within the subdivision, pursuant to a right of first refusal, is not subject to any 
unenforceable orat agreement between the parties, as well. Defendant is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law that Plaintiff is not entitled to any damages. 
I. Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs. 
Defendant agrees that the parties hereto were involved in a commercial 
transaction, and thus, I.C. sl2-l20(3) is applicable. However, based upon the case 
law and statutes set forth above, there is no enforceable contract between the parties 
hereto, and thus, Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief it seeks against Defendant. 
Given that no enforceable contract exists between Plaintiff and Defendant, 
Defendant is entitled to prevail in this case as a matter of law. As such, Defendant is 
entitled to an award of attomeys fees and costs against Plaintiff pursuant I.C. sl2- 
UO(3). 
111. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment 
against Plaintiff, on Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, in its entirety. Further, 
Defendant is entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs against Plaintiff, 
pursuant to I.C. sl2-120(3). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this of May, 2007. 
~ t t o t k e ~  for ~efendant 
- \ 
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X HEREBY CERTIFY that on the &day of May, 2007, a m e  and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by: 
- Hand Delivery 
Postage-piepaid mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Stephen J. Muhonen, Esq. 
RACINE, OLSEN, NYE, BUDGE 
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P.O. Box 1391 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC. ) Case No. CV-06-140 
1 
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COMES NOW Plaintiff, AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC., a Utah coyoration 
(hereafter "APS"), that is authorized to do and is doing business in the State of Idaho by and through 
its attorneys of record, and hereby subtnits its response to Defendant's ("Cornerstone's") Motion for 
Sum~na~y Judgnent. 
INTRODUCTION 
Cornerstone is seeking an entry of Judgment in its favor based upon its Me~nora~~duin in 
Support of its Motion for Surnmary Judgment. In its ~nen~orandurn, Cornerstone argues it is entitled 
to judgment in its favor as a matter of law based upon the following defenses: (1) APS's Verified 
Co~nplaint fails to state a ciairn for which relief may be granted; (2) Recovery sought by APS is 
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prevented by the Statute of Frauds; (3) Cornerstone has not been unjustly enriched; (4) APS cannot 
maintain its action for fraud; and (5) APS cannot maintain its action against Cornerstone for 
Cornerstone's alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings. 
For tile following reasons and those outlined in APS's Motion for Sununary Judgment, with 
its supporting ~nelnorandu~n a d affidavits, as well as the Second Affidavit of Stephen J. Muhonen 
submitted herewith, each and every defense raised by Cornerstone fails. APS is entitled to this 
Court's denial of Cornerstone's Motion for Suinrnary Judgment and entry of Judgment awarding 
APS the unpaid balance in the sum of $750.00 per lot within the developed subdivision identified 
and described in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, together with all accrued interest on said sums and 
together with its reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
111 its tneinorandurn in support of its Motion for Sumnary Judgment, APS has already 
briefed the applicable standard in Idaho which supports this Court's awarding summary judgment 
in favor of APS. As a convenience for the Court, APS incorporates in this response the standard for 
summary judgment set forth in its original rne~norandurn and respectfully refers the Court to said 
metnorandurn. 
IT. APS's AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES VALID CLAIMS. 
As asserted in APS's Me~norandutn in Support of its Motion for Sumnary Judgment, the first 
affirmative defense raised by Cornerstone, which is I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), is improperly plead and cannot 
act as a bar to recovery by APS. The prior version of I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) allowed a party to plead in 
its answer to a coinplaint that the complaining party had failed to state a claim upon which relief 
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could be granted. However I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) was amended on July 1,2004. I.R.C.P. 12@)(6) now 
reads as follows: "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto 
if one is required, except that the following defenses shall be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted . . ." See, I.R.C.P. I2(b)(6) (italics added). cornerstone 
failed to raise its I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) claim in a proper motion before it filed its answer to APS's 
complaint. For this reason, Cornerstone has failed to properly plead its I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) claim and 
has therefore waived this defense. Because this defense has been waived it cannot prevent APS from 
obtaining summary judgment as requested. 
Even if Colnerstotle were allowed to proceed with its 12(b)(6) defense, Colnerstone cannot 
sustain its own burden that APS's Amended Co~nplaint fails to state a claim for which relief may 
be granted. "In detennining whether a complaint states a cause of action, every reasonable 
itlterldment will bemade to sustain it." Ernst v. Iieme~lwavandMoser, Co. Inc., 120 Idaho 941,945, 
821 P.2d 996, 1000 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991), modified, 126 Idaho 980, 895 P.2d 581 (1995). "For 
a complailtt to be dismissed under Rule 12@)(6) on the grou~ld that the co~nplaint fails to state a 
claim, it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief." d at 946, 821 P.2d at 1001. 
Co~nerstone argues that the Amended Complaint fails to state a clai~n because APS is a third 
party administrator for pension platls, thus "[alny payments owed under an enforceable contract 
would be owed to the actual participants in such pension plans or IRAs, and not the Plaintiff herein." 
(Def's. Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 9). Cornerstone then asserts that APS does not have-standing 
in this case since if money is owed, it is owed to pensio~l plan participants and not APS. Id. This 
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argument is without merit and fails for several reasons. First, Cornerstone, u~lequivocally admits 
there is a contract between APS and Cornerstone. (Answer ij 13.) The only issue, from 
Cornerstone's perspective, is not whether there was a $750 per lot agreement (Cornerstone readily 
admits that it made the $750 agreement with APS), but whether payment of $750 per lot to APS by 
Cornerstone was contingent upon APS providing full funding for the entire development project. 
Id. -
Additionally, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provides, in pertinent part: 
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An 
executor, administrator, personal representative, guardian, conservator, bailee, trustee 
of an express trust, aparty with whom or in whose nanze a contract has been nzade 
for the beneJit ofanother, or a party authorized by slatute may szre in this capacity 
withoutjoining thepartyfor whose beneJt the action is brought; and when a statute 
of the state of Idaho so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be 
brought in the narne of the state of Idaho. 
IDAHO R. CIV. P. 17(a) (emphasis added). 
This rule speciJically allows and supports APS's ability to bring this action. Whatever relationship 
APS has with its pension plan participants literally has no bearing in this case with Cornerstone. 
However the funds collected by APS are distributed to pension plan participants, once again, has 
absolutely no bearing on the contract between APS and Cornerstone. Cornerstone is not a pension 
plan participant with APS and as such, APS has no fiduciary obligation, disclosure obligation or 
otherwise to Cornerstone regarding the collection and distribution of the $750 per lot owed to APS. 
For these reasons and those enumerated in APS's lnernora~ldunl submitted in support of its 
Motion for Sumlnaty Judgment, Cornerstone's affirmative defense of failure to state a claim fails 
and APS is entitled to judgment on this issue as a matter of law 
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111. CORNERSTONE'S STATUTE OF FRAUDS DEFENSE DOES NOT APPLY. 
In its Answer, Cornerstone pled the affinnative defense of the Statute of Frauds stating, 
"[Tlhis transaction involves real estate, and such transaction was never reduced to writing." (Answer 
p.) The Statute of Frauds as it relates to real estate is the only portion of the Statute of Frauds 
pled as an affinnative defense in Comerstone's Answer. Id. "In pleading to a preceding pleading, 
a party shall set forth affirmatively . . . statute of frauds . . . and any other matter constituting an 
avoidance or affirmative defense." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 8(c). "The statute of frauds defense is an 
affirmative defense which nzust be specifically raised by the pleadings." Paloukos v. Lntennountain 
Clievrolet Co., 99 Idaho 740, 744,588 P.2d 939,943 (1978)(emphasis added). 
The Statute of Frauds as it relates to real estate is found in Idaho Code 9-505(4). In 
Cornerstone's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sutntnary Judgment, Cornerstone argues the 
applicability of I.C. 9-505(4), but then also argues LC. 9-505(5), which relates to the promise to lend 
snoney, and I.C. 9-508, which deals with real estate comnmissions. By failing to affirmatively and 
specifically plead the other sections of the Statute of Frauds in its Answer, Cornerstone has waived 
its ability to present these additional defenses. 
Assuming arguendo that cornerstone has not waived its right to utilize these other sections 
of the Statute of Frauds, as explained in APS's Memorandurn in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment and herein below, the Statute of Frauds is not applicable in this case. Even if it were, the 
writings that exist and which are part of the record before the Court fully satisfy any Statute of 
Frauds requirements. 
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A. Idaho Code 9-505(4) is not applicable in this case. 
Idaho Code 9-505(4) pertains to "An agreement. . . for the sale, of real property, or of an 
iuterest therein. . . ." IDAHO CODE 5 9-505(4) (Michie 2004). Neither APS nor Cornerstone is 
selling any real property. No facts alleged and no evidence produced by either party evidences any 
"sale" ofreal property. This case relates to mo~lies lent by APS to Cornerstone so that Cornerstone 
could buy real prope~ty froin a third party. (Am. Coinpl. 7 13; Answer 7 13 .) The agreement in issue 
pertains to security for monies lent by APS to Cornerstone and payment of the $750 per lot to APS, 
which was a condition of payment by Cornerstone to APS due to APS bringing the project 
opportunity to Cornerstone. (Pool Aff.7 16; Kendrick Aff. 7 16; See gerzevally Dep. of Curtis 
DeYoung at 99, lines 6-20.) Idaho Code 9-505(4) silnply does not apply because neither of the 
parties were selling real property or selling an interest in real property to the other party. 
Most importantly, even if 1.C. 9-505(4) were somehow deemed by the Court to apply to this 
case, a sufficient writing exists which fully satisfies the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds 
requirement concerning a transfer in real property is satisfied when an instrument in writing exists 
that is subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or 
by his lawful agent thereto. See IDAHO CODE 5 9-503 (Michie 2004). In this case Cornerstone 
admitted that Brad Kendrick was the Member Manager of Cornerstone. (Pool Aff.7 10; Kendrick 
Aff 7 9; Dep. of Scott Tallman at 13, lines 3-20.) 
Coi-nerstone's agent, Mr. Kendrick drafted multiple memorandums, agendas and notes 
lnemoiializing the agreenlent of payment of $750 per lot by Coinerstone to APS. (Kendrick Aff. 77 
17, Ex. C, 18, Ex. D, 35, Ex. G, 38, Ex. H, 39, Ex. 1, 40, Ex. J.) The April 2005 me~norandum 
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identified as Exhibit G in Mr. Kendrick's affidavit, which is signed by Mr. Kendrick is particularly 
insightful since it was drafted by Cornerstone's Member Manager and reads in part, as follows: 
Regarding the equity interest in the project to APS - I have searched my notes, 
and literally every file I have, but have found nothing. However, I specifically recall 
that we all discussed and agreed to an equity particiiatioil of either $550 or $725 per 
home to APS. I am therefore proposing a payment of $625 per home which would 
equate to $175,000 lo you as i n  equity participant on the sillgle Family Hotnes and 
roughly $20,000 on the Multi-Family Units, for a total of $195,000. However, the 
last thing I want to do is short change you. Therefore if you remember the number 
to be different, then let me know. 
(Kendrick Aff. 7 35, Ex. G.) 
Any applicable Statute of Frauds requirements are krther satisfied by Cornerstone's own 
admissions. In Cornerstone's Answer to Plaintiffs Arnended Complaint, Cornerstone admits there 
was an agreement to pay APS $750.00 per lot, but alleges such obligation was contingetit upon APS 
providing full financing for the entire developlnetzt project. (Answer 1 13.) 
In addition, the doctrine of partial performance, which relieves the requirement of a writing, 
actually is embolded in this case since there exists both a writing and actually, conplete performance 
by APS. "The doctrine of part performance is a well-established exception to the strict application 
of the Statute of Frauds." Watson v. Watson, 2007 Ida. LEXIS 108, 8-9 (2007). 
Under the doctrine of part performance, when an agreement to convey real property 
fails to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds . . . the agreement may 
nevertheless he specifically enforced when the purchaser has partly perfotlned the 
agreement. Before an oral agreement to convey land will be specifically enforced, 
the underlyiilg contract must be proven by clear and conviilcitlg evidence. Further, 
the proof must show that the contract is complete, definite and certain in all its 
material tenns, or that it contains provisions which were capable in thenlselves of 
being reduced to certainty. The material terms which must be identified in a contract 
to convey land include the parties to the contract, the subject matter of the contract, 
the price or consideration, and a description of the property. 
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The foregoing case law demonstrates, once again, that the Statute o f  Frauds relates to the 
conveyalice o f  real property, which is not the issue in this case. However, as admitted by 
Cornerstone, APS performed its obligation and provided the agreed upon downpaynent, in the sum 
o f  $226,218.70, which was used to purchase the property. (Pool Aff.718; Kendrick A f f .  7 19; See 
generally Dep. o f  Scott Tallman at 122, lines 15-25, 123, lines 1-2.) The April 7 ,  2005 
~nemorandu~n from Cornerstone evidences the conlplete agreement between APS and Cornerstone. 
The me~norandu~n evidences ~nonies received from APS, monies paid by Cornerstone to APS, a 
balance, interest incurred and thepaynent due per lot. This writing is complete, definite and certain 
in all its nlatelial tel~ns. The only ambiguity was the anlount o f  the per lot payment, not whether 
there was a per lot payment to be made at all. Fu~thennore, this writing was created after APS 
stopped providing additional funding due to not receiving a Pro~nissory Note and Deed o f  Trust. No 
where in the document does it say anything about a contingency for APS to receive its per lot 
payment. As a matter o f  funda~nental contractual and agency law, the agreement between APS and 
Cornerstone is lawful and binding. 
The statute o f  frauds is simply not applicable in this case, despite the claims made by 
Cornerstone. For these reasons, APS is entitled to summalyjudgnent against Con~erstone as to any 
a i d  all o f  the Statute o f  Frauds affirn~ative defenses raised b y  Colnersto~le in this case. 
B. Idaho Code 9-505(5) does not apply in this case. 
In addition to the satisfaction o f  any Statute o f  Frauds requirements, the facts do not support 
the applicatioll o f  other sections o f  the Statute o f  Frauds raised by Cornerstone. In essence, 
cornerstone argues that because the principal amount loaned by APS to Cornerstone was greater 
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than $50,000, then for the loan fronl APS to Coinerstone to be valid, it had to be in writing. Idaho 
Code 9-505(5) is a rnechanisln of I-edress for lenders who are accused of  laki king oral cominitments 
to lend money, then fail to deliver the fiu~ds. "The apparent purpose of the statute is to protect banks 
and other businesses from claims that they made an oral conimitment to lend lnolley or to grant credit 
and breached such comrnitnlent by failing to deliver the funds. Once the loan funds have been 
delivered to the bolrower, so there is no longer an executorypronlise to make a loan, the statute, by 
its plain language, has no further application." Rule Sales & Serv. v. United States Bank Nat'l. 
Ass'n., 133 Idaho 669,673,991 P.2d 857,861 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999). 
Idaho Code 5 9-505(5) does not apply in this situation because Co~nerstone is not seeking 
to force APS to further lend funds. To the contrary, Cornerstone is attempting to get out of its 
repayment obligations by incorrectly relying on a statute that was designed to protect lenders from 
unenforceable oral commitments to make loans. It is absurd that Cornerstoile attempts to convince 
the Court that this statute applies when Cornerstone has failed to allege a single fact or introduce a 
single item of evidence in suppolt of the statute. Either Cornerstone grossly misunderstands this 
statute or it is attempting to deliberately mislead the Court. The only conceivable situation where 
Idaho Code § 9-505(5) would apply to this case would be if Cornerstone was attempting to force 
APS to loan hrther funds (i.e. more money to complete the development). In that case, APS could 
validly assert Idaho Code § 9-505(5) as a defense and prevent Cornerstone from obtaining an order 
requiring APS to make a loan of further funds. 
For these reasons, APS is entitled to su~nmaryjudgment against Cornerstone as to this issue 
of the Statute of Frauds. 
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B. Idaho Code 9-508 is not relevant in this case. 
Cornerstone also argues that APS is precluded from recovery in this matter due to Idaho 
Code 9-508. Idaho Code 9-508 deals with real estate co~nmissions to be paid by the sellers o f  
real property. Idaho Code 9-508 reads as follows: 
Real estate commission contracts to be in writing. - No contract for the 
payment o f  any sum o f  money or thing o f  value, as and for a co~nrnissio~l or 
reward for the finding or pxocuritlg by one person o f  a purchaser o f  real estate o f  
another shall be valid unless the sane shall be in writing, signed by the owner of 
such real estate, or his legal, appointed and duly qualified representative. 
IDAHO CODE 5 9-508 (Michie 2004). 
The primary purpose o f  I.C. 5 9-508 is to prevent fraudulent or unfounded clailns o f  
brokers. This particular poltion o f  our code relates entirely to statutes o f  frauds aud 
has as its objective avoidiug disputes as to whether or not an agreement in fact exists, 
the amount o f  a cornlnission and the exclusive or non-exclusive tenrts o f  a listing 
agreement. 
Rexburg Realtv. Inc. v. Com~ton,  101 Idaho 466,467,616 P.2d 245,246 (1980). 
Cornerstone admits and does not dispute that the real property purchased in this matter was 
purchased from a third party and not APS. APS was not the seller or the owner o f  the real estate 
purchased by  Cornerstone. (Pool Aff.77 12, 13; Kendrick A f f .  77 12, 13; Am. Compl. 77 3-4; 
Answer 77 3-4.) Because APS was never the seller or owner o f  the real estate involved in this case, 
I.C. 9-508 is simply not applicable. Orlce again, Cornerstone attempts to rely on a statute that. has 
no bearing in this case as a defense, either due to misunderstanding the statute or in a deliberate 
attempt to mislead the Court APS is entitled to sumnlary judgment against Cornerstone as to this 
issue pertaining to the Statute o f  Frauds 
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1V. APS WAIVES ITS UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM. 
APS's Amended Complaint, which states altenlative causes of action, does not bar recovery 
by APS. I.R.C.P. 8(e)(2) states in pertinent part: 
A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or 
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When 
two or more state~nents are made in the alternative and one of them if made 
independet~tly would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the 
insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statetnents. A party may also state as 
many separate clainls or defenses as the party has regardless of consistency and 
whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. 
See, I.R.C.P. 8(e)(2). 
In Cornerstone's Seventh Affirmative Defense, it alleges that APS cannot proceed under the 
theories of breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The foregoing rule explicitly allows APS to 
proceed under said alternative theories. Nonetheless, APS does hereby waive and withdraws its 
unjust enriciunent claim as plead it1 its Amended Coinplaitlt. 
V. APS WAIVES ITS THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION, FRAUD. 
APS hereby waives its third cause of action, fiaud, as firther identified in its Amended 
Complaint. 
VI. THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALINGS 
Cornerstone has breached the agreement between itself and APS and likewise, has breached 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealings which is implied in every contract. See, Luzar v. 
Western Surety, 107 Idaho 693,696,692 P.2d 337,340 (1984). A violation of the covenant occurs 
when "either party violates, ~~ullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract." Sorense~l 
v. Co~nm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 669, 799 P.2d 70, 75 (1990). "It is well settled that a contract 
includes not ollly that which is stated expressly, but also that which is . . . implied froin its language." 
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lndeuendence Lead Mines Co. v. I-Iecla Mining. Co., 2006 Ida. LEXIS 54, 9, 137 P.3d 409, 413 
(2006) citing Star Phoenix Min. Co. v. Iiecla Min. Co., 130 Idaho 223, 231, 939 P.2d 542, 550 
(1 997) (quoting Commercial Insurance Co. v. Hartwell Excavating Co., 89 Idaho 53 1,541,407 P.2d 
312, 317 (1965)). The covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be implied, however, it arises 
only regarding tenns agreed to by the parties, and requires that the palties perfonn, in good faith, the 
obligations imposed by their agreement. Inde~endence, 2006 Ida. LEXIS 54 at 9, 137 P.3d at 413 
citing Lettunich v. Kev Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368, 109 P.3d 1104, 11 10 (2005). "[Tlhe 
covenant is an objective detennination of whether the parties have acted in good faith in terms of 
enforcing the contractual provisions." hdepe~~de~lce,  2006 Ida. LEXIS 54 at 10, 137 P.3d at 414 
citing Jenkitls v. Boise CascadeCora., 141 Idaho 233,243,108 P.3d 380,390 (2005). "Anobjective 
determination can only be made by considering a party's reasonableness in carrying out the contract 
provisions." Independence, 2006 Ida. LEXIS 54 at 10, 137 P.3d at 414. 
In this case the evidence unequivocally demonstrates the existence and tern~s of the 
agreement between APS and Cornerstone. The tenns of the agreement were that APS would provide 
the down payment of approxin~ately twenty percent (20%), which would be repaid at 10% interest. 
In addition, APS would receive $750.00per lot sold in the developinent project. Furthermore, APS 
was to have the option of being able to lend on the individual homes to be built in the development 
project. The lending of money %om APS to Coinerstone was to be secured by APS through a 
Proinissory Note and Deed of Trust issued by Cornerstone. (Pool Aff.7 16; Kendrick Aff. 7 16; See 
generally Dep. of Curtis DeYoung at 99, lines 6-20.) 
In compliance with the agreement, on Septeinber 30,2003, APS perfomxed its obligatio~l and 
provided the agreed upon 20% down payment, in the suin of $226.218.70, which was used to 
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purcllase the property. APS was not provided a Promissory Note or Deed of Tn~st  at this time. (Pool 
Aff.7 18; Kendrick Aff. 7 19; Seegenerally Dep. of Scott Tallman at 122, lines 15-25, 123, lines 1- 
2.) After providing the down payment as required, APS exercised its option to lend further monies 
on the project and did so by lending a combined total of $487,951.52 through Feb~uary 2004. 
(Kendrick Aff. 1 24.) In March 2004, after more than five months of not receiving a Promissory 
Note and Deed of Trust securing the ahnost one half of a rnillio~l dollars lent by APS to Cornerstone, 
APS rehsed to lend further funds to Cornerstone. (Pool Aff. 7 22; Kendrick Aff. 7 27; Dep, of 
Curtis DeYoung at 45, lines 18-23.) 
It was not until June, 2004, eight (8) months after the original funds were lent, that 
Cornerstone finally attempted to provide APS with aPromissory Note, which was inaccurate, as was 
eachproposed draft submitted thereafter. (Kendrick Aff. fl30,33.); Dep. of Scott Tallman at 130.) 
The contract is further evidenced by Conierstoi~e's own admissions. In Cornerstone's 
Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, Cornerstone admits there was an agreement to pay APS 
$750.00 per lot, but alleges such obligation was contingent upon APS providing full financing for 
the entire development project. (Answer 7 I3 .) However, there is no external evidence that supports 
cornerstone's contingency claim. There is nothing in writing hat  supports Cornerstone's defense. 
Additionally, there is no testimony from any other source that suppo~ts Cornerstone's defense. All 
Col-nerstone can offer is it's own bald assertion that a contingency existed. (Tallman Aff. 17 9-10.) 
Cornerstone has admitted that it has no evidence, whatsoever in this whole world that will support 
its contingency position. (Dep. of Scott Tallman at 119, lines 14-25, 120, lines 1-15.) 
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Fundamental agency law is being ignored by Cornerstone in its analysis o f  this case. This 
is a case involving a contract between two entities, APS and Cornerstone. Idaho Code 53-616 
describes the authority o f  LLC agents to bind their companies. 
53-616. AGENCY POWER OF MEMBERS AND MANAGERS. ( 1 )  Except as 
provided in subsection (2) of' this section or as provided in the articles o f  
organization, every member is an agent o f  the linlited liability company for the 
purpose o f  its business or affairs, and the act o f  any menlber, including, but not 
limited to, the execution in the name of the linzited liability cornpalzy of any 
instrumeizt,.for apparently cartying on in the usual way the business or affairs of the 
linzited liability company of which he is a nzenzber, binds the linzited liability 
company, unless the member so acting has, in fact, no authority to act for the limited 
liability company in the particular matter, and the person with whom the lnernber is 
dealing has knowledge o f  the fact that the member has no such authority. 
(2 )  I f  the articles o f  organization provide that ~na~lageruent o f  the linlited liability 
conlpany is vested in a manager or managers: (a) No member, solely by reason o f  
being amember, is an agent o f  the limited liability company; and (b) Everylnanager 
is an agent o f  the lilnited liability company for the purpose o f  its business or affairs, 
and the act o f  any manager, including, but not limited to, the execz~tiolz in the name 
ofthe linzited liability company of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the 
usual way the business or affairs ofthe linzited liability conzpany of wlziclz he is a 
manager binds the limited liability company, unless the manager so acting has, in 
fact, no authority to act for the limited liability company in the particular matter, and 
the person with whom the manager is dealing has knowledge o f  the fact that the 
manager has no such authority. 
IDAHO CODE S 53-616 (Michie 2004)(en1phasis added). 
Curtis DeYoung, the agent for APS, negotiated and finalized this agreement through 
Cornerstone's agents Martin Pool, a member o f  Cornerstolle and Brad Kendrick, the Member 
Manager o f  Cornerstone. (Pool Aff.7 16; Kend~ick A f f .  1/ 16; See generally Dep. o f  Curtis DeYoung 
at 99, lines 6-20; Dep. of  Scott Tallman at 13, lines 3-20 (admitting Mr. Kendrick was the Managing 
Member o f  Cornerstone).) APS was told that Mr. Kendrick was Cornerstone's manager, and for this 
reason directed the nlajority o f  its discussions sulroullding the agreement and the develop~nent 
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project with Mr. Pool and Mr. Kendrick. (Dep. of Curtis DeYoung at 46, lines 22-25,47, lines 1-2, 
50, lines 19-20.) As the Member-Manager, Mr. Kendrick had full, apparent authority to bind 
Cornerstone with the agreement it made with APS. Fulthennore, as discussed above, it was 
Cornerstone's Member Manager that drafted the April 7,2005 memorandum that memorialized the 
agreement between the pat-ties. 
Mr. Tallman, is the only member of Cornerstone to ever allege a colltillgency existed that 
required APS to provide complete funding in order to receive $750 per lot. In his depositiot~, Mr. 
Tallrnan stated it was his "understanding from the get go" that APS was going to fund the entire 
development project. (Dep. of Tallrnan at 94, lines 22-24,91,linel7.) Mr. Tallrnan also conceded, 
though, that he based his "understanding" ofthe agreement, oninfonnation he learned, second hand, 
from Mr. Pool, not from his personal dealings with APS. (Dep. of Tallman at 56, lines 9-21, 94, 
lines 22-24,91,linel7.) Furthennore, in his deposition testimony, Mr. Tallman also stated, "I didn't 
really talk to Curtis. It was mostly through Martin or Brad. . . ." (Dep. Of Tallinan at 50, lines 20- 
21 .) Mr. Pool, the alleged source of Mr. Tallman's "understanding" and Mr. Kendrick, the Member 
Manager of Cornerstone, both state that there never was any sort of contingency discussed or agreed 
to that required APS to provide full funding of the development project in order for APS to receive 
$750 per lot. (Pool Aff. 77 10, 17; Kendrick Aff. 71 1, 28;.) 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Tallman cannot even personally testify as to what the 
I 
agreement was between APS and Cornerstone nor can he produce any evidence demonstrating that 
Cornerstone cannot be bound by the agreement entered into with APS. All Mr. Tallnlan can present 
is his own self serving affidavit which contains nothing more than bald assertions that callnot unwind 
the agreement between the entities. By his own admission, Mr. Tallman was not present or involved 
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in the fonnation of the agreeinent between these two entities. The agreement was made by other 
members of Cornerstone. These ~neinbers all testify that the amounts are due and owing and were 
never contingent. In fact, the key piece of evidence before the Court is the valid April 7, 2005 
inemorandurn written and signed by Mr. Kendrick, acting as the Managing Member of Cornerstone. 
The fact that Mr. Tallman does not like the agreement is irrelevai~t as to whether it is valid and 
enforceable. 
Based upon the foregoing, the evidence is manifestly clear that there was an agreement 
between the entities and what the terms of the agreeinent were. The covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing applies in this case. The lenns were agreed upon between the parties and each entity was 
required to perfoim in good faith. APS held up its end of the bargain by providing &nds as required 
and it is Cornerstone who first, failed to provide APS with a Proinissory Note or Deed of Trust and 
never even attempted to provide said security documents for over eight (8) montl~s after the funds 
had been lent. Secondly, Cornerstone refuses to pay the $750 per lot that it agreed to pay. 
For these reasons and those enumerated in APS's ~neillorandum submitted in support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the covenant of good faith and fair dealings does exist in the 
agreement between the parties and APS is entitled to judgment on this issue as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Cornerstone cannot sustain even one of its affirmative defenses 
in this case. The Court is acting as the trier of fact in this case. All the evidence that will be 
presented to the Court at trial concerning the $750 per lot issue is already on the record before the 
Court in these summary judgment proceedings. Because of this the Court is entitled and required 
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"to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the evidence before it and grant summary 
judgment, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences." APS respectfully requests that the Court 
view the evidence on the record and that the Court grant sununary judgment to APS, denying all of 
Cornerstone's defenses and finding that Cornerstone owes to APS the sum of $750 per lot as was 
agreed upon between the parties. 
DATED t h i s  d day of May, 2007. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
BY: /I &dl- 
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, ) Case No. CV-06-140 
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COMES NOW, the Defendant, CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, 
LLC, by and through Penny North Shad, Esq., its attorney of record and hereby 
moves this Court for its ordet compellhg Plaintiff, AMERICAN PENSION 
SERVICES, INC., to respond to Defendant's Second Set of Discovery to Plaintiff 
which was served upon plaiatiff, via US Mail, on April 6,2007. This motion is 
brought pursuant to IRCP Rule 37(a). 
Defendant also seeks an awatd of attorney fees pursuant to IRCP Rule 37(a). 
This motion is based upon the iile herein, and the Affidavit in Penny Noah 
1 56. 101  
MOTION TO COMPEL 
RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY 
Shad in Support of Motion to Compel, filed herewith. 
Defendant desires to present oral argument at the time of hearing. 
DATED this &day of May, 2007. 
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COMES NOW, the Defendant, DEFENDANT HOME BUILDERS, LLC, 
by and through Penny North Shaul, Esq., its attorney of record and hereby submits 
the following Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Response to Discovery. 
I. FACTS 
The facts are set forth in detail in the previously filed memorandum in 
support of Defendant's motion for summary judgment and supporting affidavits. 
Defendant reincorporates those facts as if fuYI set forth herein. Notwithstandhg, 
the following facts are pertinent to the present motion: 
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1. Plaiitiff is governed by ERISA in regards to how it administers retirement 
plans. Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, p. 7, in. 18-22. 
2. Plaintiff performs decision making functions regarding loans. See 
Deposition of Curtis DeYoung, p. 111, in 11-p. 112, In. 23; Deposition ofMartin Pool, 
p. 22, in. 8-p. 23, In. 15. 
3. The loaned money was paid back to Plaintiffs master trust account. 
Depositon ofMartin Pool, p. 21, in. 4-9. 
4. Defendant made payments ditectly to Plaintiffs master trust account. 
Afjidavit of Scott Tallman, qq 2 and 3. 
11. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1. On April 6,2007 Defendant served its second set of discovery on the 
Plaintiff. Shad Aff. 3. 
2. On April 30,2007 Plaintiff served its objections and responses on 
Defendant. Shaul Aff. 7 5. 
3. On May 9,2007 counsel for Defendant notified Plaintiff that it would Eke to 
confer regarding Plaintiffs discovery responses pursuant to Idaho Rule 37(a)(2). 
Shaul Aff. 7 10. 
4. On May 11,2007, counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant conferred via 
telephone, wherein Plaintiff refused to supplement its previous responses and 
provide the information requested in Defendant's Second Discovery to Plaintiff. 
4. On May 11,2007 the present motion was filed. 
111. LEGAL STANDARD 
It has long been established that Rule 26 allows for the broadest possible 
discovery of unprivileged relevant information. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 
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(1947); Shoen v .  Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289,1292 (9th Cir. 1993). Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(l) provides: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it 
relates to the claim or defense of the paay seGking discovery or to the claim or 
defebse of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, 
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible 
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any 
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information 
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
IDAHO R. CN. P. 26@)(1) (emphasis added). One of the most significant aspects of 
discovery under the rules is that the information sought need not be admissible at 
trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence. 6-26 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE - CML 7 26.42 (3d ed. 2007). "This aspect of discovery is integral to 
maintaining discovery as largely party directed, and without immediate judicial 
participation. Information is discoverable if it is relevant to the claims or defenses of 
any party; inadmissibility at trial does not bar a discovery request" Id. 
Rule 26@)(1) permits broad discovery of any matter that is not privileged, 
even if it is inadmissible, so long as it is "reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence." Kirk v.  Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697,703-04, 
116 P.3d 27,33-34 (2005) (quoting IDAHO R. CN. P. 26(b)(l)). "The discovery rules 
require a defendant's answer to be responsive, full, complete and unevasive." Lester 
a. Salvino, 141 Idaho 937,941,120 P.3d 755,759 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Iv. ARGUMENT 
Defendant's second set of discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. The objections and responses submitted by 
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Plaintiff are incomplete and evasive. 
A. Idaho recopkes an ille_~aliv defense. 
The elicited responses for discovery will determine if Defendant has an 
illegality defense. An illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration 
consisting of any act or forbearance which is contrary to law or public policy. Trees 
w.  Kersey, W8 Idaho 3,6,56 P.3d 765,768 (2002) (citations omitted). The genetal rule 
is that a contract prohibited by law is illegal and unenforceable. Id. A contract 
which is made for the purpose of furthering any matter prohibited by statute is void. 
Id. This Rile applies on the ground of public policy to every contract which is 
founded on a transaction prohibited by statute. Id. Where a statute intends to 
prohibit an act, it must be held that its violation is illegal, without regard to the 
reason of the inhibition or to the ignorance of the parties as to the prohibiting 
statute. Id. 
Whether the illegality defense is viable here depends on whether Plaintiff 
violated provisions of ERISA. Defendant's second set of discovery is specifically 
designed to determine the answer. Thus, an order compelling Plaintiff's response is 
appropriate. 
B. VioIations of ERISA establish an illegality defense. 
Defendant's second set of discovery to Plaintiff is necessary to define 
PlaintifPs legal role in administration of pension plans and to determine whether 
Plaintiff is seeking to recover an illegal benefit. If retirement funds were uiiLized by 
Plaitiff to loan money to Defendant, then ERISA is implicated. Interrogatory Nos. 
11-U, 17-21 and Requests for Production Nos. 9-W, 16,19-20 seek facts and 
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documents p e e  to this issue. 
Numerous provisions of ERISA may have been violated by Plaintiff in 
furtherance of its purported contract with ~efendant! If ERISA was violated by 
Plaintiff, then Defendant has a viable illegality defense. 
First, it must be determined whether Plaintiff is a fiduciary under the plans. A 
fiduciary, with respect to a plan, is anyone who has discretionary control or gives 
investment advice for a fee. See 29 USC § 1002(21). If Plaintiff exercised any 
discretion in recommending loans, disbutsing money on its own without 
authorization from a person acting independently or if it received or is to receive 
compensation for recommending the loans, it would be a fiduciary. See Id. 
Fiduciary duties are set forth in 29 USC 1104. The entire second set of discovery 
seeks to obtain facts and documents pertinent to determiniug whether (1) Plaintiff is 
a fiduciary; and (2) Plaintiff breached a fiduciary duty.2 
Second, it must be determined whether Plaintiff is a party in interest. Anyone 
who provides services to the plans is a party in interest. See 29 USC s 1002(14)0)). 
Plaintiff provided services to the plans and is a party in interest. 
Tbird, it must be determined whether Plaintiff engaged in prohibited 
transactions under ERISA. As a party in interest and a fiduciary, Plaintiff must not 
be involved in prohibited transactions. See 29 USC s 1106. Section 1106(a) prohibits: 
the sale of any property between the plan and the party in interest; lending of money 
between the plan and a party in interest; furnishing goods or setvices between the 
plan and a party in interest; transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a party in 
1 Thete is no way Defendant can be certain until Plaintifffuy. complies with the discovery tequests. 
2 See specifically Intertogatoties Nos. 14-16 and Requests for Ptoduction Nos. 14-15,14-18. 
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interest, of any assets of the plan; the acquisition, on behalf of the plan, of any 
employer security or employer real property in violation of 29 USC § 1106(a), or; any 
fiduciary who has authority or discretion to control or manage the assets of a plan 
shall permit the plan to hold any employer security or employer real property if he 
knows or should know that holding such security or real property violates 29 USC § 
1106(a). 
Section 1106(b) prohibits a fiduciary from: dealing with the assets of the plan 
in his own interest or for his own account; in his individual, or in any other capacity, 
act in any transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party whose interests are 
adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or beneficiaries, 
or; receiving any consideration for his own personal account Erom any party dealing 
with such plan in connection with a transaction involving the assets of the plan. The 
second discovery requests specifically request facts and documents in order to 
determine if Plaintiff engaged in any prohibited transactions pursuant to 29 USC 5 
1106. 
The second discovery responses will determine whether Plaintiff or plan 
participants are supposed to receive funds from the purported $750 lot arrangement 
Plaintiff is seeking to recover. If the plan participants are to receive the equity 
interest, then Plaintiff has failed to name a necessary party. If Plaintif£ is to receive 
the equity interest, then Plaintiff is seeking to recover an illegal benefit by receiving 
consideration for its own personal account in violation of section 1106@). Either way 
PlaintifPs claim fails. Plaintiff did not file suit on behalf of anyone else, but rather 
sought amounts owing on its own behalf. See generally Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint, 77 1-49. 
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In its response to summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that putsuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) it is entitled to sue on behalf a contract beneficiary. 
However, by stonewalling Defendant in its response to the second set of discovery, 
Plaintiff has refused to disclose the names of those people on whose behalf it is it 
purportedly is now suing. The Amended Complaint in this case is cleac Plaintiff 
sued Defendant on its own behalf. Plaintiff for the fitst time in its response to 
summary judgment suggested that it is suing on behalf of the plan participants. If 
this is t d y  the case, then Plaintiff is not a real party in interest. 
Real parties in interest are the persons or entities possessing the tight or 
interest to be enforced thtough the litigation. The real party's right or interest 
must be legally protected. Aparty not possessing a substantive legal right is 
not the real party in interest with respect to that right. 
4-17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE - CML 7 17.10 (3d ed. 
2007). In other words, if the plan participants are the ones with substantive legal 
rights, then they are the real parties in interest and should have been named as 
parties. 
This is not a real party in interest issue. This is an improper Plaintiff issue. 
The real party in interest rule is designed to allow the holder of the interest, whether 
thtougb assignment, equitable conversion, or otherwise, to sue. It does not 
authorize someone who does not hold any interest in a claim to assert the claim for 
the benefit of someone else. In this case, it is wen worse because the Plaintiff wants 
the right to refuse to say who really has the claim, and wants to prevent all discovery 
aimed towards identifying the owner of the claim. It is like a collection agency with 
no assignment of a claim, asserting a collection claim in its own name and refusing 
to say who the original creditor was and refusing to allow any discovery against the 
original creditor. It would be almost impossible to defend against such a claim and 
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that is why it is not allowed. 
Notwithstanding the above, Plaintiff argues that its relationship with pension 
plan participants has no bearing on this case. Such an assertion is contradictory to 
its suggestion that the plan participants are third pa* beneficiaries and ignores the 
provisions of ERISA which may have been violated. 
There are two scenarios under which Plaintiff could distribute the claimed 
equity intere~t.~ Both scenarios would result in the same end result: dismissal of the 
lawsuit. Under the first scenario, Plaintiff would recover the claimed equity for itself. 
Such an action is a prohibited transaction under ERISA and would constitute an 
iUegal benefit to Plaintiff. Any purported contract would be void based on illegality. 
Under the second scenario, the amounts would go to the plan participants. 
Isowever, the plan participants are not named parties and have never been identified. 
No claim has ever been asserted on their behalf. Plaintiff has objected to and 
refused to answer all interrogatories and requests for production regarding the plan 
participant's existence and relationship with Plaintiff. It is that refusal which is the 
subject of the present motion to compel. Defendant cannot assert or prove its valid 
defenses until Plaintiffresponds to the second set of discovery. Defendant must have 
a meauingful opportunity to obtain discovery from the party who claims to have 
rights against Defendant. Defendant has learned only within the last few days that 
the Plaintiff may not be claiming any rights to recover against Defendant, but is only 
asserting rights held by someone else. Due process demands that Defendant know 
who claims to have rights against it and that it have the opportunity to confront that 
Importantly, the ouly scenario suggested by the Complaint is the first scenario. Not until its 
response to summary judgment did Plaintiff suggest otherwise. 
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party and defend itself against the claims of that party. Thus, an order requiring 
Plaintiff to do so is appropriate. 
Plaintiff will likely argue that the accounts in question are self-directed and 
that it is protected pursuant to 29 USC 1104(c). This argument is problematic for 
several reasons. The only way Defendant can independently verify that the accounts 
in question are self-directed is to obtain responses to its second discovery requests. 
Further, even if the accounts ate self-directed they are still subject to tbe 
independent control and fairness tests. See 29 CFR 2550.404~-1(c)(2),(3). If a 
participant has exercised independent control depends on the facts and 
circumstances of the particular case. Id. Similarly, if a transaction is not fair and 
reasonable there is no 1104(c) protection. Id. The second discovery requests seek 
information vital to this determination. Thus, an order compelling Plaintiff's 
response is appropriate. 
Plaintiff cannot claim a possible i n j q  to retirement beneficiaries as an 
argument to negate the illegality defense. The United States Supreme Court has 
ruled on this actual issue. The highest court found: "[Plension fund tmstees have 
no special status which exempts them from the general rule that courts do not 
enforce illegal contracts. Only Congress could create such an exemption and. . . it 
has not done so." Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72,83 (1982). Idaho law 
frowns upon a party which breaches its fiduciaiy duty for his own personal benefit. 
See Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276,240 P.2d 833 (1952). Here, Defendant has 
made the necessary inquiries to establish its illegality defense. These inquiries are 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discoveiy admissible evidence and the Court 
should compel their response. 




Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfuYT requests that its 
Motion to Compel Response to Defendant's Second Set of Discovety to Plaintiff be 
granted. 
DATED this @day of May, 2007. 
Penny ~ d &  Shad, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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COMES NOW Defendant, CORNERSTONE HOME BUILDERS, LLC., by 
and thiough its attorney of record, Penny North Shad, Esq., and hereby submits the 
following Reply to Plaintiffs Responseto Defendant's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. FACTS 
Please see the Facts set forth in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, together with the affidavits and pleadings attached 
thereto; and Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
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together with the affidavits and pleadings attached thereto. 
11. ARGUMENT 
k Plaintiff has no stan* to pursue it Amended Cornplaint. 
1. Plaintiff has failed to establish that it has authority to sue on behalf of 
pension plan participants. 
As reflected by the pleadings in this case, Plaintiff brought this action in its 
own name-American Pension Services, Inc. See generally Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint, qq 1-49. Plaiitiff operates as a tL&d party pension/IRA plan 
adminisirator, as alIeged previously. Deposition of Curtis DeYotmng, p. 7, in. 6-7. 
From all appearances, the funds loaned to Defendant came from plan participants 
who have lodged their funds with Plaintiff. Defendant previously submitted 
testimony by sworn affidavit to this Court averring that it had made all payments to 
Plaintiffs Master Trust Account. These payments are documented by seven (7) 
Outgoing Wire Transfer sheets. Third Afidavit of Scott Tallman, 7 2. 
Presumably, PlaintifPs Master Trust Account manages all pension plan 
participant and IRA funds. Defendant has been unable to specifically ascertain the 
natute of Plaintiffs authority in regards to negotiating and finalizing loans on behalf 
of the pension plan and IRA participants, due to Plaintiffs refusal to provide any 
such information requested (hrough written discovery. At this point, Defendant has 
been unable to determine if in fact Plaintiff is the intended recipient of the alleged 
$750.00 per lot. 
In its Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff 
alludes that it is suing on behalf of plan patticipants, emphasizing those portions of 
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IRCP 17(a) which specifically authorize suit on behalf of "a party with whom or in 
whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another ... without joining 
the party for whose benefit the action is brought". However, Plaintiff has refused to 
submit any proof of contractual ability to enter into a contract on behalf of the 
pension plan and IRA participants. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint names itself as 
the aggrieved party, not any other entity or person. See generally, Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint, YY 1-49. Plaintiff has failed to establish that it in fact has the 
right to sue on behalf of said plan participants, and therefore, cannot be considered 
the real party in interest as defined by IRCP 17(a). 
2. Plaintiff cannot enforce an illegal transaction against Defendant. 
Plaintiff also argues that its relationship with the pension plan participants 
has no bearing on this case. However, Plaintiff's relationship to the plan participants 
is of significant importance. There are two scenarios under which Plaintiff could 
distribute the monies it now claims. Both scenarios result in dismissaI of this 
lawsuit. Under the fist scenatio, Plaintiff would recover the alleged $750.00 per lot 
closing itself. However, under federal law, specifically ERISA, as a third party 
administrator of pension plans owing a fiduciary duty to the plan participants, such 
an action is a prohibited transaction, and therefore, its alleged agreement with 
Defendant is illegal and unenforceable. 
B. Defendant is entitled to the protections afforded by the Statute of Frauds 
against PIaintifPs claims. 
In Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant pled as 
follows, its Second Affirmative Defense: "The Amended Complaint is barred by the 
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Statute of Frauds, in that this transaction involves real estate, and such transaction 
was never reduced to writing." In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Defendant also argued that application of I.C. $9-505(5) and 
I.C. §5-508 also bar Plaintiffs attempts at recovery from Defendant. Plaintiff now 
attempts to rely upon IRCP 8(c) to prevent Defendant from raising any portion of the 
Statute of Frauds, other than I.C. $9-505(4), as a defense against Plaintiffs alleged 
claims, citing Paloukos v. Intermountain Chewrolet Co., 99 Idaho 740,588 P.2d 939 
(1978) as support for its contentions. Plaintiffs reliance is misplaced. In Paulokos, 
Intermountain did not raise the Statute of Frauds as a defense until appeal on oral 
argument. Paloukos v. Intermountain Chewrolet Co., 99 Idaho 740,744,588 P.2d 
The Idaho Supreme Court addresses a fact pattern very similar to the case at 
bar in Bluestone a. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453,649 P.2d 1209 (1982). In Bluestone, 
the plaintiff filed a complaint, and defendant filed an answer and cross-complaint. 
In answering the cross-complaint, plaintiff did not raise the aftimative defense of 
the statute of frauds. Plaintiff raised the defense of the statute of frauds for the fitst 
time in her motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court stated as follows: 
where the defense was raised before trial and the 
defendant was given time to present argument in 
opposition, the defense of statute of frauds can be raised 
for the first time in motion for summary judgment even 
though the reply to the counterclaim has been fled. 
Bluestone a. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453,455,649 P.2d 1209, - (1982). In the 
instant case, den, Defendant is clearly entitled to argue all sections of the Statute of 
Frauds as may be applicable, regardless of the form of its affumative defense 
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referenced above. 
1. Idaho Code s9-505(4) bars Plaintiff from recovering from Defendant. 
Defendant incorporates by reference herein the arguments and case law 
previously set forth in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, as weU as its Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
specificaUy as it relates to application of Idaho Code $9-505(4). This matter involves 
PiaintifPs attempt to create an interest in real property owned by Defendant. Both 
parties hereto agree there was no specific written contract memorializing any alleged 
agreement between the parties. 
Instead, Plaintiff attempts to cobble together an agreement which meets the 
requitements of the Statute Frauds. However, as previously discussed, the 
memorandum identified as Exhibit G to the AfEdavit of Brad Rendrick, submitted by 
Plaintiff in support of its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, fails to satisfy the strict application of the Statute of Frauds. The 
memorandum fails to provide a legal description or any parameters regarding the 
property alleged to be affected by any agreement to the parties. It fails to specify an 
amount owed, either in total, or on a per lot basis. It fails to provide a maturity date, 
or even reference if a note and deed of trust are contemplated by the parties. 
In order to overcome application of the Statute of Frauds in this case, where 
clearly any agreement was oral, and the transaction between the parties hereto 
involved creation of an interest in real property, the Plaintiff must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence to this Court, that the alleged contract is "complete, definite 
and certain in aU its material terms". Watson v. Watson, 2007 WL 1229120, p. 4, 
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April 27, (No. 32237). In the instant case, there is not even agreement as to the 
number of lots which may have been implicated in the any oral agreement, because 
the parties hereto never actually defined said term or condition. In fact, Plaintiff now 
claims that two hundred and forty eight lots exist in the subdivision. However, only 
two hundred and twelve lots exist. Third Afidavit of Scott Talhan, 77 3 and 4. 
Further, there is no writing that memorializes that the "commercial piece" now 
claimed by Plaintiff was evet discussed by the parties hereto. Third Afjidavit of 
Scott Tallman, 4. Plaintiff is unable to prove the terms of any oral agreement 
between the parties hereto, to the standard set forth above, and therefore, Defendant 
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
2. Idaho Code C9-505(5) . bars Plaintiff from recove- from Defendant. 
Idaho Code s9-505(5) does in fact require that "a promise or commitment to 
lend money or to grant or extend credit in an original principal amount of fifty 
thousand ($50,000) or more, made by a person or entity engaged in the business of 
lending money or extending credit?' must be in writing in order to be enforceable. 
Defendant does not disagree that Plaintiff has correctly quoted Rule Sales & Serv. v .  
U.S. Bank Nat% Ass'n., 133 Idaho 669,673,991 P.2d 857,861 (Ct.App. 1999), for the 
proposition that the "apparent purpose of the statute is to protect banks and other 
businesses from claims that they made an oral commitment to lend money or to 
grant credit and breached such commitment by failing to deliver the funds." 
That is exactly the point in this case: there was no written agreement 
regarding the lending of funds and/or terms of such financing between the parties 
hereto-as such it is unenforceable pursuant to the Statute of Frauds. Plaintiff made 
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an oral commitment, to Scott Tallman, that it would provide full funding for the 
subdivision project. Afidavit of Scott Tallman, 79; Second Afidavit of Scott 
Tallman, 74. Plaintiff made several lump sum advances to Defendant. Plaintiffs 
conduct in advancing several lump sums establishes that Plaintiff's obligation was 
not conhned to one wire ttansfer. Plaintiff then failed to uphold its oral obligation, 
by refusing to provide full funding for the subdivision project. Afidavit of Scott 
Tallman, 717. Defendant, acting in detrimental reliance upon Plaintiffs breach of its 
commitment, was then released from any further obligations to Plaintiff. At the time 
that Plaintiff breached its obligation, Defendant was reqniced to obtain alternate 
funding in the amount of $481,300.00 to pay off existing invoices and bills submitted 
by subcontractors, as well as to hnish constcuction on ten (10) homes within the 
subdivision. Third Afidavit of Scott Tallman, 7 5. 
In any event, any alleged agreement, regardless of the alleged terms thereto, 
was oral. Whiie Defendant is not attempting to force Plaintiff to provide further 
funds to it, it does assert that Plaintiff breached its obligations to it. There is nothing 
that prevents a borrower (Defendant) from asserting that a lender has failed to 
protect itsell by providing a &en agreement that sets forth its lending 
commitments, thereby implicating the Statute of Frauds as a sword instead of a 
shield against broken commitments to lend funds. 
3. Idaho Code S9-508 bars recovery by Plaintiff in this case. 
In the instant case, the "equity participation" now claimed by Plaintiff is 
nothing less than a finder's fee or commission for bringing a purchaser and seller 
together, for "bringing the project to Cornerstone's attention". Pool AH. 716; 
/ 
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Kendrick Aff. q16. There is no question that Old West, the original seller of the 
property subsequently purchased by Defendant, did not sign an agreement 
authorizing payment to Plaintiff in conjunction with the purchase of the subdivision. 
Plaintiff asserts that this portion of the statute does not prohibit it from recovering a 
commission from Defendant because it is not a broker, relying upon Rexburg Realty, 
Inc., 101 Idaho 466,467,616 P.2d 245,246 (1980), quoting, in relevant part, that "[tlhe 
primary purpose of I.C. 9-508 is to prevent fraudulent or unfounded claims of 
brokers." Plaintiffs argument overlooks that there can be other purposes for which a 
statute is intended-the fact that the Rexburg Redly court stated a primary purpose 
does not preclude other pwposes from existing. In the instant case, Kendrick and 
Pool both stated the alleged funds now claimed were intended to compensate 
Plaintiff "for bringing the project to [Defendant's] attention. Kendrick even 
conceded that this alleged agreement was essentially a payoff for bringing a real 
estate deal to the Defendant. Deposition of Brad Kendrick, p. 83, in. 14-17. The 
reasoning behind the Statute of Frauds is glaringly apparent in the instant case: the 
terms and conditions which give rise to alleged claim of commission or payoff for 
bringing a purchaser and seller together must be set forth in writing to adequately 
protect all parties to the deal. In the instant case, such an agreement was not in 
writing, and therefore is not enforceable. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment 
against Plaintiff, on Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, in its entirety. Further, 
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Defendant is entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs against Plaintiff, 
pursuant to I.C. 912-120(3). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this &ay of May, 2007. 
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LN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TNE 
STATE OF IDANO LN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVlLLE 
AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC. ) Case No. CV-06-140 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 PLAINTIFF'S =PLY MEMORANDUM 
vs. ) I N  SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 




COMES NOW Plaintiff, AMERICAN PENSION SERVICES, INC., A Utah corporation 
(hereafter "APS"), that is authorized to do and is doingbusiness in the State of Idaho by and through 
its attorneys of record, and hereby submits this Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
The sole issue before this Court is whether there existed a contingency that APS had to 
provide fill finding of the property development project in issue in order to be paid $750.00 per lot 
developed or to be developed. cornerstone admits there was an agreement between the parties. APS 
tent finds that it was required to lend and exercised its option to lend additional funds. Cornerstone 
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accepted the lent money and has since acknowledged its obligation and paid back the principle and 
interest owed to APS. The contract behveen the parties has basically been totally performed by both 
parties, except for the remaining issue of APS being paid $750.00 per lot. There are no other 
remaining obligations by either party to perform. 
InComerstone's Response Memorandum, it continues to argue, as it did in its Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, that the Statute of Frauds is applicable in this case. 
Cornerstone then argues, interestingly enough after admittingin their Answer and briefing that there 
was a contract behveentheparties, that there wasno contract behveen theparties. Next, Cornerstone 
argues that APS's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim due Cornerstone's allegation that funds 
lent by APS were someone else's, thus APS is not entitIed to recovery since APS allegedly lent third 
party funds. Remarkably, Cornerstone also continues to argue that accord and satisfaction is a 
complete bar to recovery in this case. Finally, Cornerstone argues that APS is precluded from an 
award of Summary Judgment pursuant to the defense of detrimental reliance. 
For the following reasons and those outlined in APS's Motion for Summary Judgment, with 
its supporting memorandum and affidavits, and APS's Response Memorandum to cornerstone's 
Memorandum in support ofits Motion for Summary Judgment with its supporting affidavit, and the 
Third Affidavit of Stephen J. Muhonen submitted herewith, each and every defense raised by 
Cornerstone fails. APS is entitled to this Cou~t's award granting Summary Judgment in favor of 
APS on the unpaid balance in the sum of $750.00 per lot within the developed and to be developed 
portions of the subdivision identified and described in APS's Amended Complaint, together with 
all accrued interest on said sums and together with its reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred. 
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5G- 126 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT APPLICABLE. 
A. I.C. 9-503 does not support Cornerstone's defense. 
As argued in APS's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and APS's 
Response to cornerstone's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Stalute of Frauds is not applicable 
in this case. This is a case about a contract to lend money, not the transfer of or ownership interest 
of real property. Tlris is matter of factly substantiated by Cornerstone's own admission and 
argument found in its responsememorandum. "Plaintiffhad no ownership interest inthesubdivision 
-at best, it had knowledge of a potential project. . . ." (Def.'s Resp. Summ. J, at 22) Even if the 
Statute of Frauds were somehow deemed to be applicable, there exists both performance and a 
sumcient writing, written by the Managing Member of Cornerstone, that both, independent of each 
other and collectively, satisfi any Statute of Frauds requirements. 
In Cornerstone's Response Memorandum i t  focuses on the applicability of LC. 9-503 in its 
apparent attempt to justify the lack of a valid agreement between the parties. Interestingly enough, 
when Cornerstone cited I.C. 9-503 it failed to cite the heading of the code, i.e. "TRANSFERS OF 
REAL PROPERTY TO BE IN INTING."  IDAHO CODE $9-503 (Michie 2004). "Under I.C. 5 
9-503 a conveyance of an interest in real property requires an instrument in writing, srrbscribed b:~ 
tlze parp disposing of the same, or by his agent thereunto authorized by writing." Villager 
Condominium Ass'n v. Idaho Power Co., 121 Idaho 986,991,829 P.2d 1335, 1340 (1992)(Bake, 
C.J. dissenting)(ernphasis added). The agreement in issue is what APS seeks to have enforced, i.e. 
that Cornerstone pay to APS $750.00 for each lot developed or to be developed in the subdivision. 
The Promissory Note and Deed of Trust that APS seeks is for seczmrip purposes to ensure payment 
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of the $750.00 on each lot closing. The request for security documents by APS from Cornerstone 
does not implicate the Statute of Frauds as to whether there was an agreement between the patties. 
B. The writings by Cornerstone satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
APS has argued the validity and applicability of the April, 2005 Memorandum written by 
Cornerstone's Managing Member in APS's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in APS's Response Memorandum to Cornerstone's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The memorandum absoluiety satisfies any Statute of Frauds requirement. The memorandum 
identifies the parties, the monies lent and paid back, the interest incurred, the amount outstanding 
on theprincipal, what the note amount should be, and the agreement by cornerstone to pay APS an 
uncertain amount per lot. (Kendrick Aff. 135, Ex. G.) This document was written by Cornerstone's 
Managing Member over a year afler APS stopped lending money to cornerstone due to not having 
any securityonits approximately one-half ofamillion dollars lent; no where does thememorandum 
say anything about the per lot amount being contingent upon full financing. a. The reality is that 
the document is an acknowledgment ofamounts owed to M S .  Ti~eotherdocumei~ts attached to Mr. 
Kendtick's Affidavit, too, support and evidence the existence of the per lot obligation to APS and 
none of those documents, either, say anyfhing about a contingency agreement. (Kendrick Aff. 
7117,Ex.C, 18,Ex.D,35,Ex.H,39,Ex.I,40,Ex.J.) 
Cornerstone argues that the memorandum is deficient because it fails to identify the number 
of lots for which payment is owed, the amount owed per lot, the identification of the real property, 
nor any discussion to provide security on any amount. Cornerstone is wrong. On the bottom of the 
first page of the memorandum i t  describes what the "Note" amount should be. Id. On page three 
of the memorandum, phases and names of various areas in the subdivision are named. a. Couple 
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this with Cornerstone's Answer to the Amended Complaint, Cornerstone admits that the real 
property in issue has been correctly identified. (Answer 1/11 3-4.) The memorandum identifies 
monies are owed by Cornerstone to APS on each lot in the subdivision. The amount per lot is the 
only ambiguity, not if any is owed. This ambiguity is clarified by Cornerstone's Answer that the 
amount was in fact $750.00 per lot. Id. at 1 13. Finally, thememorandum also identifies the nuniher 
of lots for which payment is owed. In the memorandum, Cornerstone suggested the amount owed 
per lot was $625.00 per lot and that $175,000.00 is owed to APS on the single family homes and 
$20,000.00 is owed on the multi-family units. (Kendrick A& 7 35, Ex. G.) By performing basic 
mathematics and dividing$625.00 into each of these amounts, the number of lots computes as 280 
single family home lots and 32 multi-family home lots. 
Cornerstone has also asserted that the Managing Member of Cornerstone was acting without 
authority when he drafied the memorandum. This assmion of lack of authority is contrary to the 
evidence iuld testimony before the Court in this matter. Mr. Kendrick was designated to be the 
Member-Manager. (Pool Aff.110; Kendrick Aff. 19.) Furthermore, in Mr. Tallman's deposition, 
he admitted that Mr. Kendrick was the Managing Member of Cornerstone. (Dep. of Scott Tallman 
at 13, lines 3-20.). As submitted in APS'sResponseMemorandum, fundamental agency law allows 
the Managing Member to bind the LLC as a matter of law. Cornerstone has not, nor can it produce 
any evidence that Mr. Kendrick could not bind cornerstone. Even if there was an internal dispute 
amongst the cornerstone members as to whom couldbind, all APS knew was that Mr. Kendrick was 
the Managing Member, thus that is why APS dealt with Mr. Kendrick. (Dep. of Curtis DeYoung 
at 46, lines 22-25, 47, lines 1-2, 50, lines 19-20.) Cornerstone has not and camot produce any 
evidence that APS was informed otherwise. 
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C. Partial performance satisfies the Statute of Frauds. 
Once again, this is not an action regarding the conveyance of real property and the Statute 
of Frauds does not apply. Even if the Statute of Frauds were deemed to apply, APS has satisfied its 
obligations through partial performance. APS has previously argued its satisfaction of the Statute 
of Frauds through partial performance in both its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in APS's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. In sum, the oral agreement 
behveen Ule parties was later reduced to writing by Cornerstone, as outlined in the memorandum 
described in prior briefing and herein above. The evidence before this Court shows that the contract 
is complete, definite and certain in all its material terms. The material terms are present in the 
memorandum and Answer, both of which identify the agreement, the parties to the agreement, the 
subject matter of the agreement, the consideration to be performed and the description of the 
property. 
For these reasons and those outlined in APS's Memorandum in Support of Motion Tor 
Summary Judgment and APS's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, the Statute of Frauds 
just does not apply in this case. APS is entitied to summary judgment against Cornerstone as to the 
issue of the Statute of Frauds. 
11. THERE IS A LAWFUL, BINDING CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
As argued in APS's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, there is a 
lawful binding contract behveen APS and Cornerstone, requiring Cornerstone to pay APS $750.00 
per lot sold or to be sold in the subdivision in issue. In Cornerstone's Response Memorandum, it 
lays out the various types of contracts that exist, i.e. express contracts, contracts implied in fact and 
contracts implied in law. (Def.'~ Resp. Mot. Summ. J. at 10.) What is puzzling is that Cornerstone 
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first states, "Plaintiff cannot support any causes of action against Defendant arising out of a claim 
based upon breach of contract." a. at 9. Then states, "There is no express contract between the 
parties hereto." @. at 10. This statement is followed by an explanation ofwhat an express contract 
is and that it can be created either orally or in writing. id. at 9-10. Cornerstone then admits there 
was an oral agreement between the parties, contingent upon full financing of the development 
project. Id. at 1 I. Cornerstone then sums up its express contract argument by stating lhat since the 
terms of the oral contract were not degnite and concise, tliere was no contract to be breached at all. 
14 at 13. 
The only person claiming the agreement between the two entities required full financing is 
Mr. Tallman. The members of Cornerstone who made the agreement with APS, including the 
Managing Member, directly contradict Mr. Tallman's position. (Pool Aff. 117; Kendrick Aff. 728; 
Dep. of Curtis DeYoung at 59, lines 22-25,60, lines 1-5.) Cornerstone has admitted that it has no 
evidence, whatsoever in this whole world that will support its contingency position. (Dep, of Scoff 
Tallman at 119, lines 14-25, 120, lines 1-15.) 
The agreement made is clear. Due to APS bringing the project to Cornerstone's attention, 
the funding agreement that was entered into, orally, behveen Cornerstone and APS for the Idaho real 
property development project was as fo11ows: APS would provide the down payment of 
approximately twenty percent (20%), which would be repaid at 10% interest. In addition, APS 
would receive $750.00 per lot sold in the development project. Furthermore, APS was to have the 
option of being able to lend on the individual homes to be built in the development project, The 
lending ofmoney from APS to Cornerstone was to be secured by APS through a Promissory Note 
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and Deed of Trust issued by cornerstone. (Pool Aff.7 16; Kendrick Aff. 7 16; See generally Dep. 
of Curtis DeYoung at 99, lines 6-20.) 
In compliancewith the agreement, on Septeml~er30,2003,APS performeditsobligationand 
provided the agreed upon 20% down payment, in the sum of $226,218.70, which was used to 
purchase theproperty. APS was not provided a Promissory Note or Deed of Trust at this time. (Pool 
Aff.? 18; Kendrick Aff. 7 19; See generally Dep. of Scott Tallman at 122, lines 15-25,123, lines 1- 
2.) This failure of cornerstone to provide security documents to APS for the sums lent is actually 
the first breach of the agreement. This breach was by Cornerstone. 
After providing the down payment as required, APS exercised its option to lend further 
monieson the project and did so by lending acombined totalof$487,951.52 throughFebmary2004. 
(Kendrick Aff 9 24.) In March 2004, aRer more than five months of not receiving a Promissory 
Note and Deed of Trust securing the almost a half of a million dollars lent by APS' to cornerstone, 
APS refused lo lend further funds to Cornerstone, (Pool Aff. r[ 22; Kendrick A f t  7 27; Dep. of 
Curtis DeYoung at 45, lines 18-23.) 
cornerstone attempts to make much to do about APS calling Mr. Tallman and telling him 
that APS was out of money and would not be lending further funds. In APS's deposition, Mr. 
DeYoung explains this comment by stating, "I, do recall being out of money for any project that 
won't provide a note and trust deed." (Dep. of Curtis DeYoung at 49, lines 10-1 1.) 
It was not until June, 2004, eight months after the original knds were lent, that Cornerstone 
finally got around lo attempting to provide APS with a Promissory Note, which, by the way was 
inaccurate, as was each proposed draft submitted thereafter. (Kendrick Aff. 30,33.); Dep. of 
Scott Tallman at 130.) 
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As previously briefed, this agreement was made between APS and Cornerstone, for which 
Mr. Tallman had very little involvement in and learned about second hand from other members of 
Cornerstone. (P1.s Resp. Summ. J. at 25.) Mr. Tallman attempts to invalidate his deposition 
testimony by statingthat thecontingency arrangement was created in Spokane, Washington aRer the 
agreement was reached between Cornerstone and the sellers of the real property. (Tallman Aff. at 
2-3, m] 9-1 0.) This assertion is cor~trary to the evidence that the agreement was already made 
between the parties prior to going to Spokane. See (Kendrick Aff. 'l[ 17 Ex. C.) The notes found in 
Exhibit C attached to the Kendrick Affidavit were twitten by Mr. Tallman. (Dep. of Scott Tallman 
at 96, lines 16-23.) When this exhibit was presented to Mr. Tallman at deposition, he initially did 
not know when the notes were written, but initially speculated they may have been written by him 
in Spokane, then, as the deposition continued, Mr. Tallman stated, "you know, maybe prior to that 
writing down ideas." (Dep. of Scott Tallman at 97, lines 1-3.) While still looking at the document 
and analyzing its content, Mr. Tallman then stated, "I might have done this before we even went up 
to Spokane." (Dep. of Scott Tallman at 104, lines 11-13.) Mr. Tallman then stated, "1 don't 
specifically recall doing this up in Spokane. It might have been before we even went up there." @. 
at lines 22-24. 
The foregoing is important because on Exhibit C, in the upper right hand comer is a note 
written by Mr. Tallman that says '750.00 Curtis." (Dep. of Scott Tallman at 106, lines 11 -1 7.) Mr. 
Tallman then explains that "750 Curtis" means, "I'm assuming that was when we originally made 
the deal that the $750 equity position for Curtis." &. at 106, lines 15-17. This explanation is then 
followed by Mr. Tallman stating "You h ~ o w ,  again, Steve, I really think I did this before we went 
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to Spokane and trying to figure out down payments and what we could get out of it. . . ." (Dep. of 
Scott Tallman at 11 1, lines 4-7.) 
The Court is acting as the trier of fact in this case. All the evidence that will be presented 
to the Court at trial concerning the $750 per lot issue is on the record before the Court in these 
summary judgment proceedings. The foregoing solidifies the existence of the contract behveen the 
parties and what its terms were. Because of this, the Court is entitled and required70 arrive at the 
most probable inferences based upon the evidence before it and grant summary judgment, despite 
the possibility of conflicting inferences." APS requests that the Court view the evidence on the 
record and that the Court grant summaryjudgment to APS finding that Cornerstone owes to APS 
the sum of $750 per lot as was agreed upon between the parties. 
111. APS'S AMENDED COMPLALNT STATES A CLAIM. 
APS's Amended Complaint states a claim for which relief can be granted. APS has visited 
this issue in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in its Response to 
Cornerstone's Motion for Summary Judgment . cornerstone admits it did not file a proper motion 
in accordance with Rule 12@) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure but then asserts that their 
Motion for Summary Judgment is sufficient. {DeE's Resp. Summ. J. at 17-18.) This is blatantly 
contrary to the rule. The rule states that once the motion is made, it is then treated as one for 
summary judgment. See, I.R.C.P. 12@). 
Regardless ofcomerstone's procedural errors, the basis of cornerstone's 12@)(6) argument 
is that APS lacks standing. Cornerstone alleges that "The Plaintiff is entitled to nothing because the 
funds were supplied by third parties." (Def.'s Resp. Summ. J, at 18.) Cornerstone has absolutely 
no evidence where the funds lent by APS cane from, whether they came from APS's own funds or 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 10 
56- 954 
clientele of APS. As outlined by Rule 17(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, APS could bring 
suit under either scenario. 
The source of the funds lent has absolutely no bearing in this case. How the source of the 
funds lent has any relevancy as to whether there was a contingency agreement to provide full funding 
of thedevelopment project is simplynot comprehendible. The agreementbehveentheparties, which 
Cornerstone admits exists, has been basically performed and satisfied byboth of theparties. All that 
remains is the $750.00 per lot, for which the source of the monies lent has no relevance. 
APS's Amended Complaint states a claim for which relief can be granted, thus APS is 
entitled to this Court's award of Summary Judgment as to this issue. 
IV. AN ACCORD Ah'D SATISFACTION HAS NOT OCCURRED. 
Comerstone's affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction is not applicable and does not 
bar recovery by APS. APS finds it remarkable that Cornerstone continues to assert this defense and 
brief it, even after acknowledging to this Court, on the record, that payment of the underlying 
principie and interest owed was not to be construed as a h l l  and final settlement between theparties. 
Either Cornerstonedoes not understand what accord and satisfaction is or Comerstoneis deliberately 
attempting to mislead this Court. 
On January 24,2006 this Court held a hearing regarding the principle and interest payment 
to be made by Cornerstone to APS in order to get the then TRO and Lis Pendens in place, lifted. 
Due to Cornerstone's actions of continuing to maintain this defense, APS has incurred the expense 
to present the transcript of the hearing for this Court's review. On the record, counsel for the parties 
stated as follows: 
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Mr. Mulionen: (Counsel for APS) Thank you, Your Honor. 
In consideration of American Pension Services, lna, not pursuing preliminary 
injunction or writ of attachment, American Pension Services, Inc., has agreed to 
release the TRO that is currently in place as well as the lis pendens that is also in 
place in consideration of receiving today a wire transfer from Cornerstone in  the 
amount of $187,591.35. 
By no means is lhis to be construed as full and final resolution of this 
matter, and this sum relates only to the lifting of the TRO and the release of the lis 
pendens as well. 
The Court: All right. Mr. Decker (counsel for cornerstone's 
Managing Member, Brad Kendrick), do you stipulate to that? 
Mr. Decker: Yes, Your honor, with the clarification that the 
$187,591.35 has been arrived at by theparties as anamountthat is- that isowed that 
is not in dispute. So it's not merely consideration for the release of the TRO, but it 
is not our understanding that it is a full and final settlement of all the claims. 
The Court: It may be partial payment ofsome remaining claims? 
Mr. Decker: Yes, Your Honor. 
The Court: Is that all? 
Mr. Muhonen: That's correct, Your Honor. 
The Court: All right. Ms. Shaul. 
Ms. Shaul: (Counsel for Mr. Tallman) Tllank you, your Honor. 
I concur with what Counsel has represented, both Counsel have represented, and I 
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believe that Mr. Decker has clarified appropriately that this is an amount that is not 
contested by any of the parties at this point as due and owing; and therefore, that's 
why it's being tendered today. 
The Court: Ail right. So with thatproviso you're stipulating to it? 
Ms. Shaul: We are, Your Honor. 
Hr'rron Mot. to Extend Prelim. Ini.. Writ of Attach. andT.R.O., Jan. 24,2006 (Third Aff. Muhonen 
1 4, EX. c.) 
cornerstone's accord and satisfaction defensedoes not apply and APS is entitled to an award 
of Summary Judgment on this issue. 
V. CORNERSTONE CANNOT SUSTAIN A DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE 
DEFENSE. 
Cornerstone's affirmative defense of detrimental reliance cannot bar recovery by APS. 
APS has visited this issue in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and 
briefly replies to points made in Cornerstone's Response Memorandum. "To establislt 
detrimental reliance, a party must show that she reasonably and justifiably relied on a specific 
promise of the offending party and suffered ssbs~antial andfbreseeable economic loss when 
relying on thepromise." Podolan v. Legal Aid Services, Inc., 1223 Idaho 937,943,854 P.2d 
280,286 (Ct. App. 1993)(emphasis added). 
cornerstone has not produced one single piece of evidence demonstrating it "suffered 
substantial and foreseeable economic loss when relying on the promise." First, as demonstrated by 
the evidence, there was no promise by APS to provide complete funding of the entire development 
project. (Pool A E  lo, 17; Kendrick Aff. q1Tr/ 1, 28.) Second, Cornerstone admits that when it 
initially calculated its projected profit in the development project, it estimated it would realize an 
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amount over two (2) million dollars. (Pool Aff.? 15; Kendrick Aff. ¶15; Dep. of Scott Tallman at 
55, lines 19-25.) Cornersto~le now estimates to realize a profit of over 3 million dollars. (Dep. of 
Scott Tallman at 174, lines 23-25, 175 lines 1-6.) 
The loss contemplated to sustain a detrimental reliance defense is not present in this case. 
Cornerstone has not presented one piece of evidence to sustain its burden and substantiating that it 
suffered substantial and foreseeable economic toss. For these reasons and those argued previously, 
APS is entitled to this Court's award of Summary Judgment on this issue. 
VX. DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY FEES 
U S  has argued these issues in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment and respectfully refers the Court to said briefing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments as presented above and in APS's Memorandum in Suppoit of 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in APS's Response to Cornerstone's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, APS has established &at a lawful, binding agreement was entered into between APS and 
Cornerstone. None of Cornerstone's defenses are applicable. APS is entitled to judgment requiring 
Cornerstone to pay APS $186,000.00 or $750.00 per lot sold and to be sold in the development 
project, plus $750 per lot on the commercial piece of reat property if and when it is subdivided. 
DATED this $day of May, 2007, 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
By: 
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the& day of ~ a y ,  2007, I served a tiue and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Penelope North-Shaul 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
4. 3. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
P. 0. Box 277 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 [ ] Overnight Mail 
W m i p i l e  - 743-8160 
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN 
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